
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No. 1747

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CHIEF OF MAIN POLITICAL DIRECTORATE DISCUSSES SOLDIERS' COLLECTIVES' SOLIDARITY

Moscow AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA in Russian No 19, Oct 82 (signed to press 29 Sep 82) pp 1-5

[Article by Col Gen M. Sobolev, Deputy Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "The Basis of Solidarity of the Troop Collectives"]

[Text It is well known that the solidarity of the troop collective, the moral climate in it, and the direction and effectiveness of its public opinion depend in tremendous measure on the combat vitality, activity, and efficiency of the party organization.

The collective, stressed the member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, at the 6th Army-Wide Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations, consists of people with different characters, tastes, habits, inclinations, demands, and needs. To work so that they are not simply a certain arithmetic sum of servicemen, but actually a single, harmonious, serried family which is living with ardent aspirations to accomplish their duty to the motherland in a worthy manner--this is the task of tasks for all Armed Forces party organizations.

The party organizations are achieving the accomplishment of this task first of all by intensifying the ideological influence on all aspects of the life of the troop collectives. For the main and determining thing in rallying the troop collective, raising its combat readiness, and strengthening discipline in it is molding ideological conviction in all personnel and raising their spiritual maturity. It is the foundation of the collective's solidarity. To strengthen this foundation means placing prime emphasis, in the work of party organizations, on ideological-political and military indoctrination in the course of which a community of views, goals, and tasks and a keen sense of responsibility for the cause of their collective and for the security of the country and the defense of socialism are molded in the servicemen.

The 6th Army-Wide Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations showed convincingly that political organs and party organizations conducted considerable work on the accomplishment of the decisions of the 26th Party Congress on ideological questions and the decree of the CPSU Central Committee, "On further improvement of ideological and political-indoctrinational work." In accordance with the Congress' decisions, measures are being persistently implemented in the Armed Forces

on the reorganization of a number of sectors of ideological work, which contributes to a further improvement of propaganda and agitation, the strengthening of their frank and intelligible character, and raising the socio-political activity of the communists and all propagandists and agitators. Important and comprehensive work on propagandizing and explanation of the Food Program of the USSR and other documents of the May (1982) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee has been initiated widely among the personnel in the units and on the ships.

At the same time, the task posed by the party's Central Committee to transform each party organization into a center for ideological-indoctrination activity is still far from accomplished. Therefore, the conference stressed the necessity for party organizations to build up their efforts in the quality accomplishment of ideological-indoctrination tasks and to close the ranks of the men on this basis.

The influence of the party organization in the unit, on the ship, and in the subunit will be stronger the more completely the unity of ideological-political, indoctrinational, and organizational activity of the communists is actually ensured. This by itself already imposes high requirements on the formulation of ideological work in the troop collective which should be ideologically saturated, specific, and closely linked with the life and tasks being accomplished by the subunits. Its goal is to mold in the communists and in all men lofty political consciousness which is manifested daily in their conscientious performance of their patriotic duty to the motherland and in a high state of discipline.

In the matter of uniting the troop collectives, a large role is played by the organization of the troops' service, combat training, and the entire tenor of the personnel's daily life and living conditions. Communists and all activists of oral propaganda should not forget that to a decisive degree the molding of collectivism and the striving to serve with the greatest return in the personnel depends to a decisive degree on clearly organized prescribed order, the men's good living conditions, and the undeviating observance of the requirements for discipline by each of them. And conversely, the slightest digression from prescribed order, disorganization and inefficiency of individual servicemen, and the disruption of the unity of word and deed inevitably lead to serious service and moral costs.

At the same time, it should be noted that individual primary party organizations of the Armed Forces as well as activists of oral agitation of subunits still do not make sufficient use of the political and organizational possibilities to strengthen prescribed order and raise the effectiveness of party influence on the quality accomplishment of tasks for combat readiness and combat training, and some of them disregard shortcomings in the performance of service and in the mastery of equipment and armament. Facts concerning the low quality of training lessons do not receive a principled party evaluation everywhere and a compromising attitude toward indulgences and omissions in training and an unobjective evaluation of results attained is often manifested. This, of course, does not contribute to the rallying of the military collective and the strengthening of military discipline in it.

Great potential reserves are contained in socialist competition which is now taking place under the sign of a struggle for a worthy greeting for the 60th anniversary of the USSR's formation. The forthcoming jubilee is a special date for the troop collectives since they themselves are the brilliant reflection of the international

union of our country's peoples. To put into operation all the unused reserves of competition and see that each serviceman marks the motherland's anniversary with new successes also means making a ponderable and specific contribution to the matter of the further rallying and strengthening of the troop collectives for party organizations and all agitation and propaganda activists.

Individual work plays an exceptionally large role in the indoctrination of the men and in rallying the collectives. Many on the whole correct considerations are associated with its importance. Actually, individual communists and some oral agitation activists do not have either sufficient ability, or patience, or tact. But you see, without the knowledge of people and without the ability to direct their strengths and energy effectively for the attainment of the assigned goal there can be no serious talk of the solidarity of the troop collective. Where else, if not in the course of a heart-to-heart talk with a man, can one better learn his character, inclinations, and enthusiasms. Frequently, it is namely with a regular talk and with daily contact with the men that the spiritual contact and mutual understanding are established which help to unite the troop collective into a single whole and to maintain high discipline and organization in it.

We often stress that our men have a high educational level. Yes, now a soldier and seaman with a school-leaving certificate or diploma from a technical school is a normal phenomenon. We correctly refer to the fact that their spiritual requirements have also grown. But do we always consider these and other changes which are occurring in the personnel? Far from always and everywhere. But this should be done. We should see ahead of us not a mass of subordinates and fellow-servicemen as a whole, but specific personalities, the characters of people, and groups according to interests; we should laud to the skies and glory those who are serving selflessly and with merit and honor, should be wise teachers in the reeducation of soldiers and seamen who are inclined to violate military discipline, and we should meet with them more often in a non-service environment and constantly influence them.

It would be unjustified to demand of all communists without exception that they be lecturers and speakers. However, not one CPSU member and candidate member can ignore the indoctrinational process in the troop collective. It is a matter of honor and duty for each communist to be an agitator and propagandist, to have heart-to-heart talks with the men, and to explain to them the party's policy and decisions, events in the international and domestic life of the country, the requirements of the military oath and regulations, and the tasks assigned by the commander, that is, to conduct objective individual work in any situation.

The essence of individual work also consists exactly of the comprehensive study of the special features of each man and, on this basis, organizing indoctrinational activity correctly, developing and consolidating everything favorable in people, and helping them to get rid of shortcomings. But in practice some officer-communists and warrant officers [praporshchik and michman] rarely visit the barracks and the crews' quarters during off-duty hours and they do not study the requirements and attitudes of the personnel. At times they have poor knowledge of how the troop collective is living and what the mutual relations of the people are. Therefore, neither can they exert influence on them in time and prevent the preconditions to violations of military order and digressions from prescribed living standards and

living conditions of the personnel. Such an attitude does not further the solidarity of the troop collective.

A one-sided notion of individual work exists among some communists and activists of oral agitation, especially young comrades. They consider the talk almost the only form for indoctrinating people, with which there can be no agreeing. For individual work is not only talking one on one. It is also constant attention to a comrade, and direct assistance in mastering combat skill, and friendly advice on how to overcome difficulties which are encountered, and how better to proceed in one case or another and, if necessary, severe condemnation of an erroneous opinion or an unworthy deed.

The complex inner world of each man is disclosed in interconnections with fellow servicemen. Everything is in sight in the collective: success and failure, joy and grief. The communist and activist of oral agitation can always notice how the moral position of the serviceman is manifested in interrelations with comrades and in various everyday situations. For a person's convictions, social orientation, spiritual requirements, and habits stand behind his deed. As a rule, the collective reacts to each delinquency of a serviceman. And it is important that its reaction be based on principle, objective, and correct from the viewpoint of communist morals.

One should always remember a person and his specific interests and should be able to approach him, gain his favor, know his needs and requirements, and strive to do everything for their satisfaction... This thought, which is clearly expressed in the materials of the 6th Army-Wide Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations, comprises the most important requirement for party work and the activity of all activists of oral agitation. In stressing the urgency and importance of individual work, the conference calls attention to seeing that it is conducted systematically and purposefully and is supplemented by various mass forms of indoctrination. It directs party organizations to seeing that the communists persistently attain efficiency and effectiveness in individual indoctrination. By itself, this already presumes the constant critical analysis of the communists' individual work. It is important to make such an analysis systematically at party meetings and at sessions of bureaus and committees. And the main thing—to select and instill in life thoroughly and bit by bit everything better and advanced which is provided by the daily practice of individual work of the communists and all activists of the subunits.

Indoctrinational work is a great art. It does not come to everyone easily, and skills and the ability to influence a person do not appear at once. The party organizations are called upon to help the communists and activists of oral agitation to master the experience of indoctrinational work, to mold in them the requirement to be among the men more often and to speak on the most diverse subjects, and to stimulate them to individual work, thanks to which they develop pedagogical thinking and the arsenal of skills and abilities of the teacher is expanded.

At the disposal of the party organization and its assistants from among the activists of the subunit are many diverse forms and means whose use serves the accomplishment of the difficult task of rallying the troop collective and maintaining in it a good moral-psychological climate. But among them, one of the most important places is rightly occupied by the personal example of the communists, Komsomol activists, and agitators. The best words will not attain their goal if they are said by a person

who has flaws in his behavior and "kinks" of a moral order. The military collective is that medium with which a person is linked by a great number of threads. And if that medium, the nucleus of which consists of the communists, is the most authoritative men who are irreproachable and morally healthy, it molds the personality of the man in its image and likeness. Relationships of friendship and military comradeship and mutual assistance develop between members of such a collective.

The party organization exerts constant indoctrinational influence on non-party men under the condition where it itself is an example of high ideological conviction, devotion to principle, organization and efficiency, and implacability toward short-comings in training, service, and violators of discipline. It is namely through intensification of intra-party work, the level of which is constantly rising, that the party organizations of the Armed Forces ensure a growth in the ideological tempering of the communists, their personal example, and active party influence on the troop collective which properly unifies the men and helps each one of them to take his worthy place in the formation of the motherland's defenders.

Various people are coming to the troop collective. At times their mutual relations are not formed simply, military affairs do not come to each one immediately, and a lofty sense of responsibility does not come to each one here. But in a collective where communists and activists of oral propaganda who know people well and are able to convince them by word and deed are working creatively and efficiently, specifically and purposefully, the soldierly development of the young servicemen is proceeding rapidly and with quality. Such a collective gains strength from day to day and multiplies successes in combat and political training and in the accomplishment of their assigned tasks.

Election meetings are now taking place in the party organizations of the Armed Forces. It is very important that a genuinely businesslike, principled discussion of the communists' contribution to the rallying of the troop collectives take place on them and that specific measures be defined for the further intensification of their influence on the strengthening of military discipline and the maintenance of firm military order in the subunits.

It is the duty of party organizations and of all the agitation and propagandist activists of the units and ships to rally the troop collectives persistently. To accomplish this important task means taking new positions in the accomplishment of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and achieving the further strengthening of military discipline, the raising of the Armed Forces' combat readiness, and intensification of the Soviet Armed Forces' indoctrinating role.

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ARMED FORCES

LECTURE ON DISCIPLINE AS SERVICEMAN'S FIRST COMMANDMENT

Moscow AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA in Russian No 19, Oct 82 (signed to press 29 Sep 82) pp 19-22

[Article by Lt Col S. Vasilenko: "The Serviceman's First Commandment"; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] It is recommended that this article be used in preparing for political lessons on the subject, "Discipline and industriousness—the most important moral—combat qualities of the Soviet servicemen."

It is not by chance that a high state of discipline and industriousness are called the first commandment of the Soviet serviceman. Along with other moral-political and combat qualities, they are the most important components of the personnel's combat readiness in daily life and service.

"THERE IS NO COMBAT READINESS WITHOUT FIRM DISCIPLINE," stressed the Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, at the 6th Army-Wide Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations. "IT IS AN AXIOM. IT HAS BEEN KNOWN SINCE THE ARMY AROSE. ITS TRUTH HAS BEEN PROVEN BY HISTORY. V. I. LENIN POINTED OUT THE TREMENDOUS SIGNIFICANCE OF DISCIPLINE IN THE ARMED FORCES MANY TIMES."

The theoretical principles of Soviet military discipline have been elaborated comprehensively in the works of V. I. Lenin and documents of the Communist Party. Vladimir Il'ich repeatedly stressed the tremendous significance of military discipline to ensure the high combat readiness and combat capability of the Armed Forces. V. I. Lenin wrote: "THERE CAN BE NO TALK OF ANY SERIOUS SERIOUS MILITARY TRAINING WITHOUT...ACTUALLY IRON DISCIPLINE.... INTENSIFIED MILITARY TRAINING FOR A SERIOUS WAR REQUIRES NOT IMPULSE, NOT A WAR CRY, AND NOT A COMBAT SLOGAN, BUT PROLONGED, STRAINED, MOST STUBBORN, AND DISCIPLINED WORK ON A MASS SCALE."

Military discipline is based on the high political consciousness of the servicemen, on their deep understanding of their military and patriotic duty and the international missions of the Soviet people, on their boundless devotion to the cause of the Communist Party, and on their personal responsibility for the defense of the socialist fatherland. Conscious military discipline is the foundation on which the combat skill of the personnel is improved and the men's readiness and ability to accomplish their sacred duty for the defense of socialism's historic achievements in a worthy manner is raised.

Discipline has an entirely different purpose in the armies of the imperialist states, where discipline is based on the principle of domination and subordination and thoughtless obedience. And it is attained by means of ideological hammering-away and stupefying drill as well as by the implantation of fear of punishment. For example, among the majority of the American servicemen the word "discipline" is firmly linked with the word "punishment." Using various procedures (sadism, brutality, and so forth) the officers and noncommissioned officers of the bourgeois armies succeed in embittering and stupefying many people. This is shown by instances of atrocities by the American soldiers in Vietnam and other countries.

In the Soviet Armed Forces, discipline has primarily a conscious, revolutionary character. This is its main essence and its radical difference from the discipline of the bourgeois armies. A class trend and the essence of socialism which unites within itself the flourishing of democracy and freedom of the personality with unconditional conscious subordination of its interests to the interests of the entire people are clearly expressed in our discipline. At the same time, Soviet military discipline, being an integral and specific part of state socialist discipline, is the totality of relations into which the servicemen enter in the process of accomplishing their service duties. Its requirements and content are set forth in the Disciplinary Regulation of the Soviet Armed Forces. In it, it states that military discipline is the "strict and precise observance, by all servicemen, of the order and rules established by Soviet laws and military regulations."

In the Regulation, it is stressed that military discipline is based on each service—man's consciousness of his military duty and personal responsibility for the defense of his motherland—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It obliges each serviceman to observe strictly the Soviet constitution and Soviet laws, to accomplish precisely the requirements of the military oath, military regulations, and orders and injunctions of commanders and chiefs; to endure steadfastly all burdens and privations of military service and not to spare his blood and life itself when accomplishing his military duty; to keep military and state secrets strictly; to be honest, truthful, study military affairs conscientiously, and to protect weapons, combat and other equipment, and military and the people's property which has been entrusted to him in every possible way; to render respect to commanders (chiefs) and seniors and observe the rules of military courtesy and saluting; and to conduct oneself with dignity and honor outside the unit area, not to commit violations of public order and to keep others from such violations, and to assist in the protection of the honor and dignity of citizens in every possible way.

"DISCIPLINE," points out the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, Army General A. A. Yepishev, "...IS NOT ONLY A MEANS FOR ACCOMPLISHING OUR LARGE AND SMALL MISSIONS. A STATE OF DISCIPLINE IS A SPECIFIC FEELING OF THE SERVICEMAN AS A CITIZEN OF THE SOVIET STATE AND A BUILDER AND PROTECTOR OF A NEW SOCIETY."

Discipline and industriousness are not inborn qualities. They are formed in the Soviet youth back in school and labor collectives. During service in the Armed Forces, which are a genuine school of life and school of valor and discipline for our youths, these important moral-combat qualities develop and become consolidated. Evidence of this is provided by examples of exemplary execution of their military duty by the men of the Armed Forces on the "Zapad [West]-81" exercises which were an

examination of the combat training of the troops and naval forces and became a report of our Armed Forces to the Communist Party and the Soviet government concerning their readiness to accomplish any assignment of the motherland in the defense of socialist achievements. Tankman Guards Sergeant M. Shevtsov, aviator Sergeant A. Boyko, motorized rifleman Guards Private S. Nazarov, artilleryman Private P. Lavrenov, Seaman S. Shumskiy, and many, many other men demonstrated genuine models of industriousness and high professional ability on them. These qualities and loyalty to their international duty were also brilliantly displayed in the soldierly deeds of junior commanders Sergeants V. Yakushkin, E. Naruzov, and I. Abulvagapov who were awarded medals "For Valor" for courage in rendering international assistance to the Afghan people.

The continuity of the traditions of the Soviet men, one of which is a high level of discipline and industriousness, is reflected in these and many other examples.

Under contemporary conditions the role of discipline and organization, constant self-collection, and irreproachable industriousness has grown even more. This can be explained by the following circumstances.

If the imperialists unleash a new war, it will be distinguished by the employment of unprecedented means of armed conflict. Combat operations will be fluid and accompanied by unprecedented physical and moral loads. This will require exceptionally coordinated and precise actions of the personnel. At the same time, the increase in the role of discipline is caused by the swift development of the combat equipping of the Armed Forces.

Finally, the increase in discipline is now dictated by the necessity to strengthen the moral-political and psychological training of the personnel and the molding of such moral and volitional qualities of the Soviet servicemen as honesty and truthfulness, courage and selflessness, and consciousness of their civil and military duty.

"IF THE ROLE OF DISCIPLINE," notes the Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, "WAS ALWAYS GREAT IN THE PAST, NOW IT HAS GROWN IM-MEASURABLY. IN THE AGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE TREMENDOUS SCOPE, DYNAMISM, AND COMPLEXITY OF COMBAT OPERATIONS AND OF THE UNPRECEDENTED SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MORALE FACTOR, THE SLIGHTEST NON-OBSERVANCE OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF MILITARY DISCIPLINE MAY LEAD TO THE MOST SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES. THIS IS WHY NOW EVEN INDIVIDUAL MANIFES-TATIONS OF CARELESSNESS AND INDISCIPLINE ARE ABSOLUTELY IMPERMISSIBLE."

In the process of all combat training, on exercises, on naval cruises, during drills, and when working out the combat standards it is the duty of each soldier and seaman to wage a persistent struggle to gain each second and to achieve skillful and co-ordinated actions as part of crews and sections. Here, it is very important always to remember that under contemporary conditions the very concept of military discipline was filled with a more capacious and multifaceted content. Such concepts as time discipline, the personal and collective responsibility of the servicemen, discipline of combat alert duty, competent operation of weapons and combat equipment, and discipline of cooperation have now appeared. The soldier and seaman must understand the following for themselves—the clear servicing of combat equipment and the minutes and seconds by which the combat readiness of units and ships is evaluated are simultaneously requirements of a political, moral, and technical order today.

Industriousness is an important component part of discipline and one of the main moral - combat qualities of the serviceman.

Industriousness is first of all the unconditional, rapid, and exact accomplishment of the commander's order and of all his instructions and a lofty sense of responsibility for the assigned matter. Industriousness presumes the resolve of the soldier and seaman, not considering danger or the risk to life, to accomplish the order which has been given to him in any situation. V. I. Lenin considered industriousness as one of the most important signs of revolutionary discipline and organization and he placed it alongside heroism as regards its significance.

The order of the commander (chief), it says in the Disciplinary Regulation of the Soviet Armed Forces, is a law for subordinates and it must be accomplished implicitly, precisely, and on time. The commander's order is the command of the motherland.

In the course of combat training and the accomplishment of the variety of service tasks, in days of peace, too, it often is necessary for the men of the Armed Forces to act independently: sentinal and watch service, operator's duty, and so forth. In such a situation the self-discipline of the serviceman which, in essence, is the highest form of discipline, is displayed along with the level of training.

SELF-DISCIPLINE IS THE SERVICEMAN'S ABILITY TO IMPOSE RIGID REQUIREMENTS ON HIMSELF, TO EVALUATE HIS ACTIONS SELF-CRITICALLY, AND TO REALIZE HIS PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE COLLECTIVE CAUSE. And it is manifested in the man's striving to observe organization and order in any situation, and to accomplish the requirements of the regulations precisely on his own initiative. The active life's position of the Soviet serviceman is expressed most vividly in self-discipline.

Becoming accustomed to self-discipline makes a person organized, full of initiative, brave, and industrious to the highest degree. It suppresses fear and maintains his resoluteness which ensures the accomplishment of his military duty at any price. As a rule, Soviet servicemen are accomplishing genuine exploits in days of peace, too, in critical situations and in the accomplishment of special tasks of the party and the government, obeying their patriotic and international duty and a sense of high internal discipline.

The men of the Armed Forces, loyal to the heroic, revolutionary, and labor traditions of our party and the Soviet people, are greeting the anniversary of our multinational motherland—the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Union's formation—with new soldierly achievements. On the concluding lessons they are demonstrating increased combat skill, accomplishing tasks in combat and political training in a quality manner, accomplishing their socialist obligations successfully, and demonstrating high organization and discipline and a readiness to accomplish their duty in the defense of their fatherland to the end.

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ARMED FORCES

RESULTS, TASKS OF MILITARY INNOVATORS DISCUSSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 21, Nov 82 (signed to press 19 Oct 82) pp 35-41

[Article by Army Gen V. Shabanov, USSR Deputy Minister of Defense for Armament: "For Mass and Effective Technical Creativity of the Servicemen"]

[Text] The Basic Directions for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the Period Up to 1990 as approved by the 26th CPSU Congress have posed the task of ensuring further economic progress in society and carrying out profound qualitative shifts in the material and technical base by accelerating scientific and technical progress, intensifying social production and increasing its efficiency.

Already in the 18 months of the 11th Five-Year Plan, a major step has been taken in carrying out this task. In the first half of 1982 alone, we developed and began producing more than 1,200 new types of products, the share of superior quality products in the total production volume has surpassed 15 percent, more than 2,000 sections, shops and production lines have been converted to full mechanization and automation and 4,000 mechanized flow and automatic lines have been installed.

These and many other scientific-technical and production achievements have been the fruits of intensive creative labor by the Soviet people, their creative activities with the result being the use of around 2 million inventions and rationalization proposals in the national economy in the first half of 1982.

The creativity of innovators in our nation has become truly mass. Being one of the most important levers for the nation's economic development, for accelerating scientific-technical progress and improving the efficiency of social production and work quality, for saving materials and labor resources, this has involved millions of workers, kolkhoz members, engineers, technicians, scientists and personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy. Inventions have assumed particular importance. Each year there are more and more of them. For example, during the Tenth Five-Year Plan, over 312,000 inventions were entered in the State Register, that is, more than 36 percent of all the inventions registered during the years of Soviet power. In 1981, over 80,000 technical ideas were covered by certificates of invention. In terms of the number of inventions, our nation has emerged in first place in the world.

Such a take-off of innovative thought in the USSR is not accidental. It has been the result of constant concern by the party and government for developing scientific-technical creativity in the nation and for involving broad masses of workers in it. The questions of invention and rationalization have been reflected in the USSR Constitution and in the USSR and Union republic principles of civil legislation. The Basic Directions for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR have also brought up the necessity of assisting in every way possible in further developing the mass creativity of inventors and rationalizers. In activating invention and rationalization work a significant role has been played by the Decree "On the Further Development of Invention Work in the Nation, the Improved Use of Discoveries, Inventions and Rationalization Proposals in the National Economy and Their Increased Role in Accelerating Scientific and Technical Progress" adopted in 1973 by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers as well as the Regulation Governing Discoveries, Inventions and Rationalization Proposals approved in the same year by the USSR Council of Ministers.

Great attention has been given to this question also in the Soviet Armed Forces. According to the Internal Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces, leadership over invention and rationalization work has been entrusted to the commanders (chiefs). Their specific duties have been outlined by the Regulation Governing Invention and Rationalization Work in the USSR Ministry of Defense. According to this document, in the Army and Navy, the aim of technical creativity is to increase the combat readiness and capability of the troops and naval forces.

The innovator servicemen must carry out the most diverse types of problems, the main ones being: improving the existing types of weapons, military equipment and supplies and the development of new ones, increasing the effectiveness of their employment and shortening the time required to reach combat readiness, increasing the effectiveness of automating weapon and troop control and developing the training facilities in the units and subunits. In order that these tasks be carried out on a high level and in the shortest time, the Army and Navy have carried out a range of measures aimed at involving as large a number of personnel in technical creativity and in achieving even greater results from the developed inventions and rationalization proposals.

Invention and rationalization are presently a component part of the socialist competition being developed in the districts, troop groups and fleets under the motto "Secure Defense for the Peaceful Labor of the Soviet People!" The fulfillment of the assumed socialist obligations by the innovators has a substantial impact upon increasing the indicators in the personnel's creativity, on raising the scientific and technical level and effectiveness of the developments and on their prompt use in the troops. Each year, thousands of inventions and hundreds of thousands of rationalization proposals arise in the Army and Navy and more than 80 percent of these are in practical use.

A characteristic feature of military technical creativity in recent years has been the increased number of inventions in the total number of technical ideas found. What is particularly noteworthy and important is that more of them have begun to arise in the troops. The use of many inventions has made it possible to increase the tactical and technical characteristics of the weapons and

military equipment and the mobility of the units and subunits, to accelerate the deployment of materiel for combat employment, to mechanize the labor intensive operations, to significantly surpass the planned norms and save financial and material resources. More than 30 inventions by the RSFSR Honored Inventor Engr-Col F. Barsov have been directed at improving and increasing the operating efficiency of the combat equipment and at reducing the time and labor expenditures for checking out the electrical equipment of the combat vehicles. Many projects of the RSFSR Honored Inventor Engr-Col V. Pozhidayev have been employed in the controls of electric motors and in electric drives. innovations by the RSFSR Honored Inventor Engr-Col A. Stomakhin have been employed in developing special instruments, control, navigation and automation systems for aircraft. On the basis of inventions developed under the leadership of the RSFSR Honored Inventor, Engr-Lt Col G. Shelikhov, a range of devices has been worked out making it possible with great precision to determine the condition of crucial assemblies and parts in aircraft. Each year there are more and more such projects. Their authors, as a rule, are communists and dedicate a great deal of strength and creative energy to make the weapons and military equipment even more modern.

Of particular significance under present-day conditions is the great efficiency and reliability of troop control. This is determined by the complex nature of combat operations, by their high speed and intensity. It is very important to ensure the broad introduction of the scientific organization of labor and advanced planning methods as well as the efficient employment of modern computers and various related highly-productive technical devices. Here the Army and Navy inventors and rationalizers have done good work. They have made many valuable proposals the introduction of which has made it possible to increase the efficiency of control, to mechanize many staff jobs and shorten the time for the transmitting, receiving and processing of information and bringing the commander's decisions to the troops.

The Army and Navy innovators have done a great deal to improve the maintenance, safekeeping and repair on military equipment. In the repair units and subunits, at the military enterprises, bases, dumps and arsenals, many new, more advanced devices, tools, monitoring and metering instruments and mechanization for laborintensive jobs have been created. Their application has made it possible to significantly increase work efficiency and quality. The greatest creative successes have been achieved by those collectives where scientific and technical achievements are widely employed and where the experience of the Great Patriotic War is widely studied. The USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, has termed this experience our invaluable wealth and the ability to utilize this in the interests of successfully carrying out the tasks confronting the Army and Navy is one of the essential indicators for the maturity of officer There still are things to be borrowed both in organizational and personnel. technical terms in the rationalization activities of the war years. In 1942-1944 alone, according to far-from-complete data, more than 76,000 inventions and rationalization proposals were worked out and introduced on the fronts. The use of them contributed to the successful carrying out of the combat tasks. and, in particular, to the rapid repairing of damaged equipment and weapons and to the maintaining of these in constant combat readiness.

It is generally known that a high quality of field, air and sea skills can be achieved with good training facilities. In the troops and fleets, as was pointed out by Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, there still are many opportunities for the independent manufacturing and extensive distribution of many types of trainers, simulators and other equipment helping to intensify the training and indoctrination process. The military innovators are successfully utilizing these possibilities. For example, in 1981, 25 percent of the total number of proposals introduced in the Army and Navy related to the creation of new training facilities and the improving of the existing ones.

At present, we have developed equipment meeting modern requirements for the tactical fields, ranges, firing ranges, weapon, chemical and engineer training centers, tank and motor vehicle driving ranges, seamanship centers and other training facilities. The innovators have developed new training installations, trainers and simulators, working stands and other technical training equipment for the personnel considering the tasks of combat training and the mastery of the weapons and military equipment in a short period of time and with the maximum savings of material resources.

For example, the developments carried out under the leadership of the RSFSR Honored Rationalizer, Col V. Blazhchuk, have been widely employed in the training of the Ground Forces. Among these are integrated trainers for tank firing and weapons training for the crews of combat vehicles, control board equipment for the target set-up and other training equipment.

Communist V. Blazhchuk is not only a talented innovator, but also a good organizer of the technical creativity of the men. He heads a creative brigade of rationalizers and ably leads it seeing to it that each job carried out is practically employed as rapidly as possible.

During his service in the Red Banner Pacific Fleet, the RSFSR Honored Rationalizer, Capt 3d Rank V. Cherepkov, has made more than 300 rationalization proposals. He has created around 40 trainers, simulators and monitoring devices. According to his proposals in the training process, trainer processes are employed developing the skills of the personnel in ship damage control. Many of the officer's proposals are employed in all the fleets. Communist V. Cherepkov not only excellently performs his service duties and is actively engaged in rationalization activities, but also carries out party and social work. He has repeatedly been elected the secretary and deputy secretary of the primary party organization, he presently leads a political exercise group and often gives lectures and talks to the personnel on scientific and technical questions, having attracted a number of men to participating in invention and rationalization.

The questions of thriftiness hold a prominent place in innovator creativity. Many inventions and rationalization proposals are aimed at saving fuel, electric power, metal, preassembled articles and parts and much else. The technical creativity of innovators has picked up particularly after the promulgation in July 1981 of the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers "On Strengthening Work in the Area of Saving and Rationally Utilizing Raw Product, Fuel, Energy and Other Resources." Just at the self-financing enterprises and organizations of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the economic effect from the

introduction of inventions and rationalization proposals last year was over 40 million rubles. Many developments, particularly inventions, are being introduced in the various national economic sectors. The Army and Navy innovators are also searching intensely in the area of personal and medical services for the personnel, in military organizational development and in other spheres of troop and fleet life and activity.

Technical creativity, thus, has permeated all elements of the complex and diverse military organism. Significant advances in this area have been achieved in the Strategic Rocket Troops, the Air Defense Troops and the Navy. In the Ground Forces this work has been better organized in the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District, the Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District, the Red Banner Odessa, Kiev and Carpathian Military Districts and in th Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

Practice confirms that the involvement of the personnel in technical creativity also is of great indoctrinational significance. In those troop collectives, invention and rationalization have become an inseparable part of military and political training for the personnel, there are greater successes in training and discipline and military order are firmer. And this is quite natural. The accustoming of the men to technical creativity helps them more profoundly understand the complex processes occurring in the development of modern equipment, to better master their specialty and broaden their viewpoint; it also increases their sense of responsibility for the assigned job.

It is important that the creativity of innovators in the Armed Forces assume an evermore mass nature and that it involve as many possible of the soldiers and sailors, sergeants and petty officers, students and officer candidates of the military schools, warrant officers ["praporshchik" and "michman"], young officers, workers and employees of the Army and Navy. The political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations must provide great help here for the commanders. Precisely due to their influence, the propagandizing of technical knowledge has become more specific, the socialist competition between the creative collectives has grown wider, control over the introduction of inventions and rationalization proposals become more effective and the invention commissions have improved their activities. As a rule, communists and Komsomol members are in the vanguard of the innovator movement.

The questions of invention and rationalization work are discussed at sessions of the military councils, the party committees and bureaus and at party meetings. For example, at the Red Banner Odessa Military District at a session of the military council they reviewed the question of further developing mass scientific-technical creativity among the men and strengthening its role in solving this problem confronting the troops. Specific tasks were also set for the political bodies. The state of invention and rationalization work as well as the measures to improve it in light of the demands of the 26th CPSU Congress were also reviewed by the military council of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet. A full decision was approved and this was announced as a directive of the commander and military council member and chief of the fleet political directorate.

The carrying out of extensive work in the party and Komsomol organizations contributes to the high creative activities of the personnel. Thus, in one of the

formations of the Order of Lenin Moscow Air Defense District, in accord with the plans for party political work, various mass measures are conducted aimed at propagandizing technical creativity. Meetings are organized for the personnel with prominent persons, production pacesetters and innovator servicemen; trips are organized to the USSR VDNKh [Exhibit of National Economic Achievements] in the aim of seeing the exhibits which are of value for the units and subunits. All of this ensures a continuous adding to of the ranks of the innovators in the formation and helps to increase the level of the developments made by them. This has largely been due to the political workers Lt Cols V. Yagoda, A. Yanchuk and V. Kucherov, the secretaries of the Komsomol committees Capt A. Chavachin, Sr Lt I. Stom and Lt V. Rybalko and others.

The political bodies and party organizations are also concerned that the innovators conduct a purposeful search and that the effectiveness of their proposals is increased. An example of this would be one of the formations in the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet. Here, out of the 120 assignments for rationalizers included in the annual subject plan, more than 100 were carried out on a high technical level. This was primarily the result of the able allocating of innovator forces and the well-thought-out staffing of the creative groups the leadership of which was assumed by the communists. In the formation, much has been done to increase the military-technical knowledge of the men and to exchange advanced experience. There are various circles at work, technical conferences are held periodically and consultations are organized for those who are becoming involved in rationalization work. The achievements of the innovators are quickly shown in the materials of visual agitation. Much attention is paid to organizing the socialist competition between the army innovators as well as supervising the fulfillment of the socialist obligations assumed by them.

Extensive party-political work aimed at instilling an interest in technical creativity in the youth, particularly students and officer candidates, is carried out in the military schools such as, for example, the Military Engineer Institute imeni A. F. Mozhayskiy, the Military Academy imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy, the Perm Higher Military Engineer Command School, the Kiev Higher Military Communications Engineer School imeni M. I. Kalinin and many others.

The effective work of involving the Army and Navy innovators in technical creativity can be seen from their active involvement in the central exhibits of youth scientific and technical creativity. Thus, at the 1982 exhibit devoted to the 19th Komsomol Congress, over 1,200 projects by young innovators from the Soviet Armed Forces were on display. They were represented in all 14 categories, but a predominant majority of them was concentrated in the areas of radio-electronics, electrical engineering, machine building and transport. These projects received high praise: over 400 authors received medals of the USSR VDNKh, over 850 participants in the exhibit were awarded the emblem and diploma of a winner of the All-Union Review of Youth Scientific-Technical Creativity, while 20 Komsomol organizations were awarded the Honorary Certificate of the Komsomol Central Committee.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of invention and rationalization work carried out in the Army and Navy. Hence, all reserves must be mobilized

to further develop and increase its effectiveness. Effective measures must be taken to eliminate the shortcomings in this important area.

And here there are a number of problems. In particular, proper attention is not given everywhere to the special planning of technical creativity among the servicemen. There are collectives where the subject plans are not drawn up at all and if they are, then this is done without considering the needs and possibilities for their fulfillment and they suffer from a lack of concreteness. Many assignments included in the plans at times remain on paper. military districts, these are only 30-35 percent carried out. The development of specific assignments which have been profoundly thought out and meet modern needs is a task of primary importance. As experience confirms, the effectiveness and technical level of the innovator developments depend largely upon this. For example, in mobilizing the creative thoughts of the personnel to develop new training equipment and, in particular, integrated trainers, it is essential to focus on the fact that this represents an analogue of a combat model and training on it should be as close as possible to real conditions. It is also essential to consider the circumstance that such assignments are complex and labor intensive. They cannot always be carried out by one person. Hence, it is essential to more widely develop and encourage collective creativity and pay more attention to organizing creative groups and brigades and volunteer design bureaus.

Regardless of the fact that the technical level of the innovator developments has risen (this can be seen from the increased number of inventions), among them there are still many which are minor and ineffective. In a number of instances the patent research is carried out superficially and little study is made (including in certain scientific research institutions) of the patent holdings and scientific-technical literature. As a result, a portion of the developments is not considered inventions as they are not marked by newness or originality. The eliminating of these shortcomings will make it possible to increase the effectiveness of the developed inventions and minimize the percentage of refusals to grant a certificate of invention.

It is very important to improve the quality of the expert evaluation of the applications reviewed by the directorates of the Armed Services, the branches of troops, as well as by the main and central directorates of the USSR Ministry of Defense. On the one hand, it is essential to exclude unjustified refusals to recognize valuable progressive applications for an invention and, on the other, not to recognize as inventions those technical ideas which do not contribute anything substantial to the already known. It is also important to ensure the review of the applications within the legally established times.

In invention and rationalization work, as in any other, the end result and its effectiveness are important and these are determined primarily by the practical use of the inventions. In the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev termed the introduction of discoveries and inventions as the crucial, most acute area now.

At the same time, the percentage of employing the useful developments of the Army and Navy innovators is not everywhere high. The introduction of the major inventions at times is drawn out for long years. This is explained by the fact

that the procedure for utilizing the developments is not always provided for in the appropriate plans. As yet, close ties have not been established everywhere between the invention commissions and the involved departments, the production associations and industrial enterprises. Supervision over the carrying out of the ideas of the innovators is still weak. Many inventions and rationalization proposals often do not go any farther than that military collective in which they arose.

The leaders and organizers of technical creativity should take every measure to quickly and widely introduce the innovator developments, they should put this matter under their own control and see to it that the subordinate repair units and subunits organize the centralized manufacturing of models following the proposals. In this area definite work has been done, for example, in the Strategic Rocket Troops, in the Air Force, in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, in the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District, the Red Banner Odessa Military District as well as in a number of other military districts and fleets.

Technical information must serve to disseminate advanced experience and to rapidly introduce all that is new, useful and valuable into practice. At the same time, in a number of military districts and troop groups, this is done irregularly and its quality leaves something to be desired. The capabilities of the Army and Navy press are not sufficiently fully utilized for these purposes. More attention must be paid to the publishing of information materials and more concern must also be shown that the inventors and rationalizers regularly be informed about scientific and technical achievements of interest to them as described in the technical and patent literature, the military and scientific-technical journals and as can be seen at various technical exhibits, in particular the USSR VDNKh. It is important to study these achievements in the aim of their possible employment in troop practice.

During the 11th Five-Year Plan, the Army and Navy innovators are confronted with difficult and diverse tasks. With the development of military affairs, with the appearance of new types of weapons and equipment and with the constantly increasing demands on raising the combat readiness of the units and ships and on the military skills of the personnel, creative thought should work even more intensely and solve new, more difficult problems on the basis of the most modern scientific and technical achievements.

Technical creativity will produce a maximum effect only in the instance that it is carried out in a planned and purposeful manner and if the commanders and chiefs, the political bodies, the party, trade union and Komsomol organizations in the future will pay unflagging attention to invention and rationalization work.

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ARMED FORCES

ARMY GEN SOSHNEV ON STANDARDS OF PARTY DISCIPLINE

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[Article by Maj Gen V. Soshnev, Chief of the Organizational Section of the Directorate for Party Organizational Work Under the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "Unified for All Communists"]

[Text] The ideological and organizational unity of the party ranks is an unbreakable law in the life and activities of the CPSU. This unity presupposes the unswerving observance of party discipline which is uniformly obligatory for all communists. In characterizing the importance and the concept of discipline in the party, V. I. Lenin wrote: "A unity of actions, freedom of discussion and criticism—this is our definition. Only such discipline is worthy of the leading classes' democratic party." Party discipline strengthens the ranks of the communists and makes the party an organized detachment the strength of which, in the view of Lenin, was a hundred-fold greater than its numerical size. Lenin emphasized that "the basis of unity lies in class discipline, in recognizing the will of the majority and in close work in the ranks of and in step with this majority."

In following the legacy of V. I. Lenin, the CPSU has strengthened discipline in the party and has worked for the unconditional fulfillment of the demands of the party Program and By-Laws by each communist. At the 26th CPSU Congress, great importance was given to developing a style of work which would actually bring together efficiency and discipline with bold initiative and entrepreneurship.

Discipline in our party is based upon the high ideological conviction and awareness of the communists and is voluntarily perceived by each of them as one of the basic conditions for membership in the CPSU. This characterizes the democratic nature of party discipline. Lenin repeatedly emphasized that firm discipline in the party is based on a unity of views, convictions and goals which fully conform to the interests of all the communists who have joined into a single organization for carrying out the historic task of building communism.

The democracy of party discipline consists in the fact that it is equally obligatory for all party members. "The party," the CPSU By-Laws state, "has one discipline, one law for all the communists, regardless of their accomplishments and the posts held by them." This means that each member of the Leninist party

always, everywhere in any post which the party, state and military bodies have entrusted to him must carry out his duty conscientiously, unfailingly and with full commitment, he must lead the nonparty persons and struggle actively against violations of the legal and moral standards and against all that causes harm to the state interests of our nation or to the cause of strengthening its defense capability.

Democracy and discipline are inseparable in our party. Democracy is the will and authority of the majority. The decisions approved by the majority are to be carried out without fail. A communist does not have the right to refuse to carry out what is recorded in the party documents for this would mean his non-recognition of this and an ignoring of the will of the majority as the higher law in the life and activity of the party. For this reason, the development of internal party democracy presupposes simultaneously the greatest possible strengthening of discipline within the party. Both aspects are inseparably linked.

Those comrades are far from right when they at times restrict their role and place in the carrying out of party decisions to participation in their discussion, to agreeing with them or voting for the approval of various decrees. Of course, this is important. But it is the duty of each member to firmly and steadily carry out the decisions of the CPSU, to explain its policy to the masses, to aid in strengthening and broadening the party's ties with the people, to show sensitivity and attention for people and promptly respond to the requests and needs of the workers. The CPSU By-Laws oblige each communist to take an active part in the nation's political life, to aid in developing and strengthening communist social relationships, to be an active proponent of the ideas of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism in the masses of workers, to struggle against the vestiges of nationalism and chauvanism and by word and deed to aid in strengthening the friendship of the Soviet peoples.

Party discipline is inseparable from state, labor and military discipline. The CPSU By-Laws and the party decisions oblige the communists to be the zeal-ous supporters of socialist legality and morality, to set an example of a communist attitude toward labor and to safeguard and add to socialist property. Under Army and Navy conditions, party discipline includes the unswerving observance of the requirements of the military oath and regulations, the orders and instructions of commanders and chiefs as well as exemplariness in carrying out service duties.

Discipline in the party is characterized by a maximum of initiative, independence and simultaneously a maximum of organization whereby the creative efforts of the individual party members are not broken up but rather directed into a single channel and the party acts as a monolithic, closely tied collective in carrying out a regular task. Party discipline is that touchstone on which is tested whether a communist is capable of acting in strict accord with the party decisions and directives, to observe the general state and party interests and dedicate all his forces and abilities to serving party and social duty.

The measure of party discipline for a military communist is primarily what his personal contribution to the common cause is and how he carries out his duties in the main type of his activities, that is, in struggling for high combat

readiness, strong proper order in everything, the improving of the combat skills of the personnel and the indoctrinating of aware military who are dedicated to our motherland. If, for example, a CPSU member sees shortcomings in the training and indoctrination of the men, but disregards these, if he is not concerned by the shortcomings of a comrade or the ideological failings of a fellow serviceman, if he does not find in himself the boldness to give battle to a deceiver, then this means that such a person is carrying out his duty formally and party discipline has not become part of his flesh and blood. Often among such comrades an inclination for idle talk and boasting develops, a desire to embellish the state of affairs, to play over the shortcomings and reduce one's blame.

The developing in the comrades of high party qualities and primarily an irreconcilability for any deviations from the standards of discipline, communist morals and morality, has a many-faceted nature. Of vital importance in this regard are the measures to improve ideological and political indoctrination, party studies, to strengthen party control, to develop criticism and self-criticism and increase the reciprocal exactingness of the communists. "Implacability for those who flaunt our morality and our Soviet laws," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in his speech at the ceremony in Baku devoted to the presentation of the Order of Lenin to Azerbaijan, "should permeate all social life."

The forms and methods for indoctrinating high party discipline in the CPSU members and candidate members are constantly being enriched. They are aimed at developing ideological conviction and high political awareness in the people, at ensuring the constant fulfillment of the By-Laws and involving each party member and candidate member in active party political work.

The indoctrinating of the communists in a spirit of conscious discipline has assumed even greater purposefulness in the Army and Navy due to the profound study of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, the adopting by the party Central Committee of a number of decrees on ideological questions and by the preparation and holding of the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries. In the course of training exercises, theoretical conferences, lectures, reports, talks and seminars, the party members and candidate members explain the responsible tasks posed by the congress for the nation and its Armed Forces. These tasks can be carried out under the condition of a further strengthening of the party ranks and increasing the activeness and discipline of all the CPSU members and candidate members and their responsibility for the assigned job, for the deeds and successes of the entire collective.

Over the time which has passed since the 26th CPSU Congress, the political bodies and party organizations have done a great deal for propagandizing its decisions and materials. This work must be actively continued in the future. Its basic content is explaining the further growth of the leading role for the Communist Party under present-day conditions, the essence of the ideological and organizational unity of the CPSU, the necessity of strictly observing the principle of democratic centralism, the development of internal party democracy and the strengthening of party discipline, concern for increasing the activeness, initiative and principledness of the party organizations in carrying out party policy in the Armed Forces and the carrying out of the tasks of combat readiness and service.

Many party organizations have acquired good experience in indoctrinating high aware discipline in the communists. For example, take the party collective which is headed by a participant of the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, Maj V. Borisov. Here at meetings they discussed such vital questions which largely determine the discipline of the CPSU members and candidate members such as "A Communist -- The Active Ideological Fighter of the Party," "Recommendations of the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries in Life," "On the Responsibility of Communists for Strengthening Military Discipline" and others. The party organization constantly and strictly assesses the contribution of each party member and candidate member to the struggle for high combat readiness, the strengthening of proper order, his participation in social life and the carrying out of party assignments by him. It effectively criticizes those communists who violate the CPSU By-Laws. All of this has most directly influenced the fact that a predominant majority of the organization's members strictly observe the demands of party discipline and manifest activity, initiative and principledness in everything.

Life shows that increasing the demands placed on the men for the assigned job is the best method for indoctrinating high party responsibility and discipline in them. Various means are employed for achieving such exactingness. For example, individual talks with the communists, the hearing of their reports and statements in the party organizations and the developing of criticism and self-criticism.

In our party the principle has been firmly established that the communists have one privilege, to always be ahead. They are where it is more difficult and are on the forward edge of our people's struggle to carry out the economic tasks and the tasks of military organizational development. Those party organizations act correctly when they place great demands on those comrades who violate party and military discipline, who are cool to service and studies and do not carry out their socialist obligations. Conversely, one must not tolerate a situation where a party member or candidate member allows a weakening of combat training or behaves unworthily and the party organization is not strict about this.

Precisely this happened in the party collectives where B. Mel'nik and K. Burkovskiy are CPSU members. Due to the fault of the communists, here there was an oversimplification in combat training. In desiring to look better, some did not bring up the errors and mistakes in organizing combat training and tolerated weaknesses in the training and indoctrinational process. The party organization did not give a principled assessment for this abnormal situation. In particular, it did little to make each officer profoundly aware of the measure of his personal responsibility for maintaining high combat readiness under the conditions of an excerbated international situation or so that he himself studied hard and taught his subordinates to gain the maximum possible from the military equipment and weapons. Here they did not remember the recommendation of the All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries that it is essential to analyze more deeply and fundamentally assess the fulfillment of party and service duties by each communist and his personal contribution to the combat readiness of the subunit or unit. It is particularly important to bear this in mind now when the results of the training year are being summed up.

The observance of party discipline by the communists is achieved by the ability of the elected bodies and the party aktiv to create a situation of intense work in the collective and an exacting attitude toward its results, and by a principled discussion of the questions related to the examples set by the party members and candidate members in service and training. Here it is hard to overestimate the role of criticism and self-criticism which are a powerful weapon in the fight against deviations from the demands of the By-Laws, against complacency, official abuses, eyewash, indifference and carelessness and passivity in social life.

The 26th CPSU Congress, as is known, emphasized the need to further develop criticism and self-criticism and to establish in all party organizations a spirit of self-criticism and intolerance of shortcomings. "Any attempts at persecution for criticism must be decisively rebuffed," pointed out Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. This must be remembered because individual leaders at times endeavor to shift the criticism from themselves, in referring to the known limitations on this under Army and Navy conditions. Although it is clear that it is only the orders of the commanders and chiefs which are not to be criticized.

The party meetings are a good school for indoctrinating the communists in a spirit of high discipline. Their preparation, the atmosphere of discussing the questions, democracy and professionalism—all of this helps to instill in the party members and candidate members principledness, discipline, a respect for the opinions of comrades and a readiness to carry out the adopted decisions.

There are no minor points in the preparation and holding of meetings. Here everything is important. For example, it is essential to promptly inform all the party members and candidate members about the time and place for holding the meeting, its agenda, to strictly check attendance at the meeting and discover the reasons for the absence of individual communists, to conduct the party discussion in an organized manner, to observe the established procedures and allow a possibility for everyone so desiring to frankly state their proposals and ideas. We must not tolerate such instances when certain communists feel it their right, without having obtained permission from the meeting, to significantly exceed the time allocated for comments or to make improper comments to comrades who have the floor. There must be support for the communists who wish frankly, although not always smoothly, to voice their ideas, to raise questions of concern to everyone or to share their experience. The main thing is that the speech be objective, principled and concrete.

One of the main conditions for the observing of party discipline is the steady carrying out of the adopted decisions and the supervising of their fulfillment. Nothing prevents a communist from using his inalienable right of freedom of discussion. At the same time, when a decision has been taken, nothing can free the communist from his responsibility for carrying out the planned. The decision of a meeting, a conference or a superior party body is the law for every CPSU member and candidate member. A law is a law. It must be unswervingly carried out. Otherwise the fate of the decisions would depend upon the whim of individuals and upon "their own" opinion about this. Our party is strong in the unity of will and actions of its members. The person who violates discipline in it or disregards the opinion of the majority should be

opposed by the unswervingness of the collective to defend the standards of the By-Laws. The 26th Congress emphasized that "having adopted a decision, it is essential to work for its unswerving implementation within the established time." The strengthening of party control in all levels of the party should contribute to this.

In the strengthening of party discipline, the party organizations operate primarily by the method of persuasion, developing in the communists such a valuable trait as self-criticism and self-control. This is largely aided by the hearing of reports by the communists on the carrying out of the duties envisaged by the CPSU By-Laws. Here we should particularly note the experience of those party organizations which carefully prepare for the discussion of each report and carry this out in a situation of sincere and at the same time exacting demands. As a rule, the decisions on the results of the reports should indicate what characterizes a communist as a disciplined member of the organization as well as point up the shortcomings in his work. The results of hearing the statement at a party committee or bureau are made available to the entire organization. Here publicity also disciplines the other communists.

The observance of party discipline presupposes a decisive struggle against violations of the CPSU By-Laws, various abuses, relapses into private property psychology, money-grubbing, protectionism, eyewash, drunkenness and other amoral actions. We must not tolerate instances when individual party members utilize their official position for selfish goals. Each such instance should be analyzed in the party organization. It cannot be considered correct when the case of a misdeed by a communist is examined not in one's party collective, but rather turned over to the party commission under the political body. In doing this they thereby shift the guilty party from responsibility to those comrades who better than anyone else know where and why their fellow serviceman "sinned," why he violated party discipline and where, possibly, others around are to be blamed not preventing the man's unworthy step. The very process of discussing the misdeeds is a most important means for indoctrination and checking the party loyalty of each communist as well as an indicator of the relationships in the collective.

Certainly, no two misdeeds are alike. The party By-Laws envisage various measures of party influence and reprimands from comradely criticism to expulsion from the CPSU. In showing a maximum of attention in reviewing a personal case, the communists should thoroughly analyze the activities and conduct of the erring comrade and at the same time in a self-critical manner assess those omissions in their own indoctrinational work which to some degree possibly contributed to the violating of party discipline.

In the observance of party discipline, the tone is set primarily by the communists who hold the leading positions and who were elected to the party committees, bureaus and commissions. In being shown great trust, they must set an example for everyone in carrying out the party decisions, orders and instructions and in observing the standards of communist morality. The party committees and bureaus see their task in actively influencing the recruitment and indoctrination of the cadres, in increasing the demands placed upon them in being promoted and in more fully utilizing for these purposes the right of issuing a party recommendation which provides a thorough, objective assessment of the worker's qualities and his attitude toward official and party duties.

How a communist lives, how he serves and behaves in the collective and in the family--all of this is of interest to the party organizations. And the more responsible the position held by the CPSU member, the greater the demands placed on him. "...The party must itself monitor the fulfillment of its By-Laws by the officials...," taught V. I. Lenin. "A person is unworthy of the title of party member if he is unable to demand and secure from his subordinates the fulfillment of their party duties...."

The political bodies and party organizations value the authority of the communist leader. He himself should be concerned for his good name, he should behave humbly, judge his own work self-critically and have the courage to recognize and rectify the mistakes made.

The conscientious fulfillment by the communists of one of their primary duties, the paying of party dues, also helps to increase organization and discipline in the primary party organizations. The importance of prompt payment of party membership dues, as was pointed out at the 26th CPSU Congress, is not only of practical, but also political importance.

The army communists basically carry out their most important official obligation scrupulously. The party organization secretaries play a major role in this. Many of them in receiving the membership dues, talk with the communists and explain their proper duties to them. The political bodies pay proper attention also to the receiving and correct turning over of the dues. They periodically instruct the secretaries, check their work on the spot and promptly point out mistakes.

Nevertheless, far from all the party organizations have imposed strict order in this important party matter. Thus, in the party organization where Capt V. Lisovoy was formerly the secretary, the membership dues list was kept negligently, the procedure for filling this out was not observed, individual communists paid their dues irregularly and no one was responsible for this. Here we might recall the well-known words of M. I. Kalinin: "If you do not pay party dues promptly, this means that you do not think about the party and that your attitude toward party duties is half-hearted."

Each instance of violating the proper order for paying membership dues, as is required by the CPSU By-Laws, should become a question of party investigation. The strict observance of the procedure for receiving, keeping and paying out membership dues and the indoctrinating of high responsibility for their payment in each communist are a major task for the party organizations.

In being concerned with strengthening the party influence on all aspects of the life and activities of the troops, the party commissions under the political bodies make a weighty contribution to improving the ideological and organizational work of the party organizations and to the strengthening of party and state discipline. By their activities in the area of improving the qualitative composition of the persons admitted to the CPSU and by checking the fulfillment of their party duties, the party commissions evermore steadily inculcate in the communists a sense of responsibility for observing the demands of the CPSU By-Laws. They correctly assess the misdeeds of the communists and carry out work

to prevent them. Attention should be paid to the activities of those party commissions which systematically inform the party organizations about the results of reviewing the personal files and the conclusions stemming from this. Here also they suggest in what manner instances of disciplinary infractions by the members and candidate members can be excluded, what indoctrinational work should be carried out in line with this and in what manner comrades who have party reprimands can be aided in rectifying their mistakes and not commit even the slightest deviations from the demands of the party By-Laws.

To strictly observe party discipline, to fully utilize the rights of a CPSU member, to guard the Leninist standards of party life and to constantly strengthen the unity of views and actions among all communists mean to further raise militancy in the work of the party organizations as well as their activeness, initiative and principledness.

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ARMED FORCES

OUTLINE FOR INDOCTRINATION ON "ACTIVIST POSITION IN LIFE"

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 21, Nov 82 (signed to press 19 Oct 82) pp 72-78

[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences, Docent, Col N. Mal'tsev: "An Activist Position in the Life of a Soviet Soldier*"]

[Text] The purpose in studying the given subject is to help the soldiers and sailors more profoundly assimilate the ideas of V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party on the essence and importance of an activist position in life for the Soviet people and the Army and Navy personnel. In the course of giving the material, it is important to make the students aware that service in the USSR Armed Forces is true schooling in the ideological, military and moral indoctrination of the personnel and to aim them at developing in themselves the qualities needed for the construction of communism and for the defense of socialist victories.

Some 6 hours are assigned for studying the subject. It is advisable to hold the exercise using the method of a narration and a lively, full discussion. The planned time should be allocated as follows: 2 hours for the narration, 2 for independent study of the literature and 2 hours for a discussion of the subject.

In the course of giving the material, it is advisable to examine the following questions: 1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the essence and importance of an activist position in the life of a Soviet man. 2. Service in the USSR Armed Forces--schooling in life and schooling in indoctrination. 3. Developing the qualities of an active builder of communism and a defender of the socialist fatherland.

In the brief introduction, it is essential to emphasize that the task posed by the 25th and 26th CPSU Congresses of indoctrinating an activist position in life among the Soviet people, including the personnel of the Armed Forces, is not only one of the most important but also one of the most complex in the area

^{*}Material for political exercises on the subject "An Activist Position in Life, Responsibility for the State of Affairs in the Troop Collective--A Moral Duty of the Serviceman."

of forming the new man, the builder and defender of a communist society. Success in realizing this depends largely upon to what degree one is able to achieve "in deed a unity of ideological-theoretical, political-indoctrination, organizational and economic work of the party ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], p 77).

An activist position in life is a characteristic trait of the Soviet citizens. The higher the political awareness, responsibility and social activeness of our people, the better they perform their civil and military duty to the motherland and, consequently, the stronger the economic and defense might of the Soviet fatherland.

1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the Essence and Importance of an Activist Position in the Life of the Soviet Person

Over the centuries, the best minds of mankind sought an answer to the question of the meaning of life and of the true dignity and honor of man. But the problems related to the moral improvement of the individual and society as a whole were worked out on a truly scientific basis only in the works of K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin. Precisely Marxism-Leninism disclosed the class essence of morality and its dependence upon the material conditions of society's life. "Our morality," stated V. I. Lenin, "is derived from the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat" (PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 41, p 309).

In the understanding of morality and its requirements, the founders of scientific communism proceeded not from general and abstract ideas, but rather from specific historical conditions. Morality taken outside of human society, pointed out V. I. Lenin, does not exist: this is deception. Thus, morality is not an abstract, but rather an historical, class category.

The propagandist should make clear that there is a bourgeois and a communist morality. Communist morality was initially established in our society with the victory of Great October. From the viewpoint of this morality, only what leads to the destruction of the old world of exploitation and poverty and helps to strengthen the socialist system is moral. The struggle for the strengthening and completion of communism lies at the basis of communist morality, emphasized V. I. Lenin.

In creatively basing itself on Marxist-Leninist teachings and in generalizing the rich experience of building a new society, our party has constantly developed the science of communist morality and the forms and methods for the moral indoctrination of the workers. The CPSU Program, the documents of the party congresses and plenums of the CPSU Central Committee as well as the works and speeches of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev define the specific areas for developing in the Soviet people, including the personnel of the Army and Navy, such important qualities as moral purity, social activeness and responsibility, implacability for shortcomings and bourgeois ideology which is alien to us.

At present, the questions related to forming an activist position in life among the workers of our society have been moved to the forefront in the theory and practice of moral indoctrination. The social essence of the given problem was expressed by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev: "Nothing so elevates the individual as

an activist position in life, an aware attitude toward social duty, when a unity of word and deed become a daily standard of conduct. To develop such a position is the task of moral indoctrination" ("Leninskim kursom" [By the Leninist Course], Vol 5, p 537).

What is an activist position in life for the Soviet person? In its essence this is a range of ideological-moral sets and attitudes, knowledge and abilities impelling the individuals to take an active part in social life in the aim of establishing our communist ideals. An activist position in life presupposes a person's understanding of a broad range of duties. Both those which society imposes on him and those which he himself voluntarily assumes. Thus, an activist position in life is nothing more than civil duty which becomes an inner impetus for people, their moral principle, a realized readiness and capacity to act for the good of our society.

Such a position is manifested in the actions and activities of a person in relation to the family, collective, class, nation and society as a whole. A heightened feeling of responsibility for everything occurring around is the main thing in the position of a person's life under socialism. In turning to the given aspect of the problem, V. I. Lenin wrote: "A person is judged not from what he says or thinks about himself, but rather from his deeds" (PSS, Vol 18, p 228). In developing this Leninist idea under present-day conditions, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev has pointed out that specific deeds are the measure of success in the political indoctrination of the masses (see "Leninskim kursom," Vol 5, p 535).

It is essential to explain to the students that in its social focus, an individual's position in life can be both progressive and reactionary. The main factors which determine the direction of human social activity lies in the sphere of human social relations. Capitalist social relations make a person the slave of selfishness and instant well-being and alienate him from the true interests of society and from the interests of other people. Capitalism quite often gives rise to moral degeneracy, it maims and destroys human souls, it leads to moral degredation and the spiritual devastation of the individual. How else could it be in a society based upon the ruinous power of money, on the passion for gain and money-grubbing and the suppression of man by man?!

Socialist social relations are something quite different. Our system is the most humane, justest system in the world. Imprinted on the banner of socialism are the proud words: "All for the sake of man, all for the good of man." Having provided the workers the broadest opportunities for the all-round harmonious development of the personality, the Soviet system has posed anew the question of the individual's ties with society and of the place and role of each man in the life of this society. As you are the co-owner of the property of the people, you are also responsible along with everyone for how it is preserved and added to. As you are an equal member of society to whom great social rights and freedoms have been granted, you must be able to correctly use these and conscientiously carry out the duties entrusted to you.

One must then go on to explain to the students that the positions of various people in life differ from one another in many ways. In their focus they can be positive and negative. For an absolute majority of the Soviet people,

including the men of the Army and Navy, a positive focus of their position in life is characteristic. The combat motto of this bent is to organically combine communist ideas with the practice of building a new society, the moral standards and principles of socialism with daily conduct and an attitude toward labor.

A negative focus to an individual's position in life is an atypical phenomenon for developed socialism. At the same time, such a bent is still observed among individual citizens in relation to the socialist standards of morality. "The moral underpinnings of a socialist society," pointed out Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in a speech at a ceremony in Baku devoted to the presentation of the Order of Lenin to Azerbaijan, "are based on respect and trust in man. However, it is no secret that persons are still encountered who utilize this trust to the detriment of society, who permit a lack of personal humility and even set out to deceive the state through eyewash, bribery and the embezzlement of socialist property.

"An intolerance of those who flaunt our morality and our Soviet laws should permeate all social life. The observance of the standards of social morality and law should be a natural need and a permanent inner law for each Soviet person."

It is essential to remind the students that a person's position in life is most starkly manifested in his production, sociopolitical and spiritual activities. In the labor sphere, the activeness of an individual is manifested in high labor productivity and work quality, in the economic expenditure of raw products and materials and in the achieving of the maximum possible results in the socialist competition. In the sociopolitical sphere, this activeness is expressed in what part a person takes in the activities of the party, Soviet and social organizations. The sphere of learning is also a sphere for the manifesting of a person's activeness, as the constant mastery of knowledge and the theory of Marxism-Leninism broadens a person's creative abilities, and makes him spiritually richer, morally purer and more noble.

Among the men of the Army and Navy, an activist position in life is characterized by the following traits: by a communist moral bent; by the predominance of social, collectivist principles in conduct; by a unity of word and deed in the struggle for excellent military skills, strong military discipline, high vigilance and constant combat readiness; by personal responsibility for ensuring the dependable security of the motherland; by implacability for bourgeois ideology and morality, social indifference, injustice, Philistinism, drunkenness, hooliganism and the other antipodes of the socialist way of life; by a conscientious attitude toward the carrying out of military duty, by a constant improvement in the moral-political and military qualities, by a struggle for the greatest possible strengthening of the nation's defense might and increased combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces.

In concluding the first question, it is essential to emphasize that at the basis of the activist position of life of the Soviet people who are the active builders, the steadfast and courageous defenders of communism, lie Marxist-Leninist ideology and high moral qualities. "To instill in a person a desire for high social goals, ideological conviction and a truly creative attitude

toward labor," commented Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "is one of the prime tasks. Here runs a very important front in the struggle for communism and both the course of economic construction and the sociopolitical development of the nation will depend more and more upon our victories on this front" ("Leninskim kursom," Vol 6, p 586).

2. Service in the USSR Armed Forces--A School of Life, a School of Indoctrination

The USSR Armed Forces have an enormous role to play in indoctrinating the Soviet people in an activist position in life. "The young men," pointed out Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "arrive in the military family without having any schooling in life. But they return from the army as persons who have undergone the school of endurance and discipline and who have gained technical professional knowledge and political training" ("Leninskim kursom," Vol 5, p 535).

There is a many-sided beneficial influence of military service on the development and improvement of a young Soviet person's personality. Above all, in the Soviet Army and Navy the soldier or sailor gains the firm skills of military service which now requires extensive knowledge in the area of mathematics, physics, cybernetics, electronics and other precise sciences. At present, all military to one degree or another are involved with combat and other equipment and powerful weapons. It is no surprise that after discharge into the reserves, they, as a rule, go to work where their able hands, knowledge, efficiency and dedication to the job are particularly needed.

The years of military service are always recalled by a Soviet person as one of the most vivid pages of his biography. Many skills and habits acquired in the Army and Navy are carried by people through all their subsequent lives. "With gratitude I recall my army service," said the famous construction worker, Hero of Socialist Labor N. Zlobin, in sharing his ideas with the youth. "For me, as for everyone who has stood in formation, it was good schooling. It was schooling in endurance and discipline, ideological steadfastness and moral tempering."

What are the factors which determine the high effectiveness of indoctrinational work in the Army and Navy and have an effective impact upon developing an activist position in life for the soldiers? In answering this question, it is essential to emphasize that the enormous indoctrinational possibilities of army (naval) service are determined primarily by the sociopolitical nature and purpose of our Army and Navy. Created under the leadership of Lenin's party, the Soviet Armed Forces for the first time in history were destined to carry out a noble and elevated goal of defending the revolutionary victories of the people. They were indoctrinated in a spirit of the most profound dedication to their socialist motherland and to the ideas of peace and internationalism. Like Soviet society as a whole, the USSR Armed Forces are now characterized by an increased inner unity of its ranks and by a moral-political solidarity among all serviceman categories. This is one of the fundamental distinctions of our Army and Navy from the armies of the imperialist states, where class antagonism between command and rank-and-file predominates, where racial and national discrimination exists and immorality and cruelty flourish.

...At one time the Guards Taman Division was visited by a delegation of social leaders from one of the capitalist nations. Upon the admission of the representatives from this delegation, here they discovered much that was unexpected. The guests asked many questions. Did the army actually assume the job of spiritually enriching man? Where were the sources for the high morale of our soldiers? Was it true that in the Soviet Armed Forces great attention was given to the cultural development of the servicemen? They were answered that all of this was in fact true. It was not difficult to understand the amazement of this delegation's members. Certainly in the armies of the capitalist states, there could be no question of anything of the sort. In endeavoring to turn the soldiers into robots which totally obey the will of the monopolistic capitalists, there by means of ideological and psychological pressure everything human is removed from them, their awareness is intentionally blunted and their souls hardened. As a result, professional murderers are produced who are ready to commit any bestialities and crimes.

The Soviet armed forces are confronted with a completely different indoctrinational goal. Their task is to train and indoctrinate a true defender of the motherland, a soldier, patriot, internationalist, a person of high ideological and moral convictions. In accord with this task, our party has put forward a clear, concrete and very responsible program of strengthening in every possible way the indoctrinational importance of army and navy service.

The specific features of military service and the precise regulation of the life and routine of the subunits, units and ships have a great impact upon the development of the soldier and upon the shaping of his high moral-political and combat qualities as well as social activeness. All the activities of our servicemen are strictly organized and subordinate to the interests of the security of the motherland, its friends and allies. These activities are regulated by the USSR Constitution, by the military oath and regulations, by the orders of commanders and superiors and by other legal enactments which express the policy of the CPSU in the area of Soviet military organizational development. These legal enactments oblige the armed defenders of the motherland to zealously carry out their patriotic and international duty of defending the socialist fatherland and to spare neither their forces nor life itself for achieving victory over the enemies.

Each young man who has donned a military uniform very quickly is convinced that military service is not only honorable, but also difficult and responsible. In order to be victorious over a technically well equipped, perfidious and strong enemy, much is needed including strong military training, good ideological-moral tempering, physical training and the ability to act skill-fully under the difficult conditions of modern combat. The army teaches a soldier all of this. In the daily army and navy life, gradually the iron character of a patriot soldier is forged and for him the highest purpose to all his life is the security and well-being of the motherland.

It is essential to draw the students' attention to the fact that military service even in peacetime involves a definite risk. It is widely known, for example, that personnel from the combat engineer subunits have deactivated a large number of mines, shells and bombs left by the Nazi invaders on our territory during the years of the Great Patriotic War. This required not only the most delicate skill, but also courage.

There is also a definite inherent risk to the service of pilots, submariners, paratroopers, missile troops and men of other specialties. The encountering of danger during flights, sea cruises, parachute jumps, in preparing and launching missiles and in tactical field exercises teaches the men to act confidently, decisively and boldly in the most difficult situations. And this contributes to the forming of strong character and will, tenacity and self-possession and other qualities essential for the soldier or sailor to successfully carry out the duties entrusted to him.

One of the most important factors contributing to an effective impact on the awareness of the men and on the process of developing their activist position in life is the ordered system of party political work which has come into being in the Soviet Armed Forces. "Probably scarcely anywhere else are there such favorable opportunities for organizing party political work as in the Army and Navy," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. "Here are concentrated well trained communists from the command, engineer and technical personnel who have undergone schooling in party indoctrination and combat conditioning, and an ordered system of a party-political apparatus has been set up. Here all conditions are found for a thorough study of the men and a daily political influence on each serviceman" ("Leninskim kursom," Vol 2, p 51).

The process of the ideological indoctrination of a soldier starts from the first days of his stay in the subunit, unit or ship. For this purpose, political information sessions are organized regularly for the soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers. These deal with urgent problems of CPSU policy at the present stage of communist construction in our nation, the domestic and international situation of the Soviet state as well as the questions of further improving the Armed Forces of a developed socialist society. During the established hours the men listen to the radio or tape recordings of recent news and view diverse TV broadcasts such as "The Times," "Today and the World," "International Panorama," "Studio 9," "I Serve the Soviet Union" and others. And there are magazines, newspapers, pamphlets and books! Virtually all the military are active subscribers to the periodic press and library readers. In each subunit (ship) there is a Lenin room (cabin) where good conditions have been created for fruitful independent work by the soldiers and sergeants (sailors, petty officers) on a political book.

Here one cannot help but point out the important significance of such a basic form for acquiring and adding to political knowledge as political exercises for the political, ideological and spiritual growth of the men. Over the entire period of service, each soldier, sailor, sergeant and petty officer regularly attends these unique "political lessons." To them are added the Lenin readings and lectures, reports and talks, special subject evenings and meetings with war and labor veterans, prominent production workers, discussions of books and films.... Probably one could not even list all the forms of the ideological-political and moral indoctrination of our military.

An important factor in further increasing the indoctrinational role of Army and Navy service is the greatest possible strengthening of the unity between our army and the people. Just as a mighty tree sinks its roots deep into the ground feeding it, said the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, so the Soviet Armed Forces draws its might from the people. The vital ties

linking the army and the people, as our society moves towards communism, become ever-richer and more advanced. We have long been accustomed to such forms of ties between the army and the people as the sponsorship of cultural leaders over the Soviet Armed Forces, the holding of joint mass political measures, the solemn farewells for inductees going off to service, the exchange of lecturers, propagandists, creative collectives and so forth.

Of important indoctrinational significance is the correspondence of the command, the political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations of the units and the ships with the labor collectives where the servicemen were employed prior to induction into the army as well as with the parents of the men. Such correspondence is an unique reciprocal report on the performing of assumed obligations and on the successes achieved. Here, for example, is what the soldier Sergey Svyatchenko wrote to the collective of his home shop at the Altay Tractor Plant imeni M. I. Kalinin [ATZ]: "I am now a private in the USSR Armed Forces. I am living through yet another stage in my life, in learning to defend what we all created. But the time will come and I will be back in your collective. Although I am far away from you, we are doing the same job, only I have been shifted to another section." The ATZ receives many such letters and in them one can see the desire of the soldiers, the former tractor builders, to excellently carry out their military duty and to return to the ranks of their enterprise.

As citizens with full rights in their great country, the Soviet military take an active part in the life of the people and in all their political, social and economic deeds. They help the rural workers during the harvesting and threshin period. The Soviet military is profoundly aware of the entire measure of responsibility for the fate of the crop, they demonstrate examples of unstinting labor at any work area and, as a rule, overfulfill the taut production quotas. The professional collaboration between the agricultural workers and the men of the Soviet Army is not only an important condition for rapidly carrying out the harvesting work, but also significantly encourages the desire of many soldiers and sailors to go to work in agriculture after completing their service.

In concluding the giving of the second question, it is essential to reemphasize that in the Army and Navy the young Soviet people undergo great schooling in life. This is precisely that schooling where the social activeness of the individual is honed, and his civil qualities, readiness and ability to build and defend communism are tested out.

3. To Form in Oneself the Quality of an Active Builder of Communism and Defender of the Socialist Fatherland

In beginning to take up the third question, it is important to point out that the problem of increasing the social activeness of the Soviet people in carrying out the tasks of communist construction was taken up with new force at the 26th CPSU Congress. Under present-day conditions, as was emphasized at the congress by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, it is essential in every possible way to aid in forming a generation of people who are politically active, who know their job, love labor and know how to work and who are always ready to defend their motherland (see "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," p 67).

The congress instructions are of particular importance for the Armed Forces. The demands of the moral code of a builder of communism as outlined in the CPSU Program should underlie the indoctrination of high moral qualities among the Army and Navy personnel. The moral code of a builder of communism is a compendium of scientifically based principles of communist morality. It has a concrete historical nature and reflects the level of economic development, the high moral culture of a socialist society and the trends in the moral indoctrination of the individual under the conditions of the transition to communism.

The leading principle in the moral code of a builder of communism is dedication to the cause of communism and love for the socialist motherland and for the socialist nations. This principle expresses the new attitude of the Soviet people to Soviet society and a readiness to dedicate all their forces for establishing and defending communist ideals not only within their nation, but within the entire socialist commonwealth.

The moral code of a builder of communism presupposes the conscientious labor by each citizen for the good of society, his concern for preserving and adding to public property, humane relations between people (collectivism and comradely mutual aid, honesty and justice, simplicity and humility in public and private life), mutual respect in the family and concern for the upbringing of children.

The code gives great attention to indoctrinating in the Soviet people an implacability for the enemies of communism, the cause of peace and the freedom of peoples, intolerance of injustice, loafing, careerism and money-grubbing. The international nature of the moral code of communism is also disclosed in its establishing of friendship and fraternity among the Soviet peoples and solidarity with the workers of all nations.

In opposition to the cruel and cynical preachings of bourgeois society as "every man for himself," "if you don't deceive you will be deceived," "every man is out to get you" and so forth, the moral code of a builder of communism proclaims highly moral socialist principles of collectivism and humanism expressed in the words: "one for all and all for one," and "each man is a friend, comrade and brother." Collectivism, mutual aid and support, a desire to hand on one's knowledge and practical experience to comrades and a keen observance of their growth and successes have become the standard of conduct for the Soviet people and the men of the Armed Forces.

In the exercise it is also essential to take up the role of the military oath and regulations in shaping in the personnel an activist position in life and to bring out the unity of the demands of the oath, the military regulations and the moral principles of the builders and defenders of communism.

Then the exercise leader should go on to explain that a soldier's activist position in life is most visibly apparent in his military service. Precisely from the quality of the performing of service duties by a soldier or sailor, from the specific results in military and political training his professional skills, ideological and moral make-up are judged. Certainly, an activist position in life is nothing abstract. It is tested out by deeds, by the desire and ability to bring benefit to the collective and to society. Aware military

service which has been organically fused with the process of political and moral indoctrination makes it possible for a person not only to manifest his best qualities, but also encourages him to constantly improve himself.

The struggle to carry out the demands of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Minister of Defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy on further increasing the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces is the basic field where the servicemen's position in life is formed. Combat readiness represents a fusion of the technical equipping of the troops, their military skills, moral-political, psychological and physical conditioning, as well as the organization and readiness of each Soviet soldier to commit a feat for the sake of the socialist motherland.

The USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, has pointed out that combat readiness is the main indicator for the qualitative state of the troops and naval forces. Constant combat readiness is achieved by steady labor by each soldier and depends largely upon the level of field, air and sea skills of the troops and naval forces. This is formed from large and small military deeds and each day is shaped in the intense training exercises, on alert duty and in the daily drills in the classrooms and ranges, in sea cruises and training air battles. The higher the activeness of the men in combat training the more stable its quality and results and the more dependable the combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

The socialist competition is a tested means for further improving the combat readiness of the subunits, units and ships. Under present-day conditions, this has assumed unprecedented scope and depth and has become an inseparable part in the entire way of military service. It is precisely in the competition where arise the sources of the patriotic initiatives of the personnel urging the men to even more steadily master the weapons and military equipment.

An indispensable condition for ensuring high combat readiness of the troops is strong military discipline and strict proper order and organization in the Army and Navy collectives. The unswerving observance of the requirements of the regulations and flawless discipline, efficiency and obedience should be the law of life for the soldier or sailor.

In contrast to the imperialist armies, where military discipline is completely maintained by coercion, violence and fear of punishment, in the Soviet Armed Forces it is founded on an awareness on the part of each serviceman of military duty and personal responsibility to defend his motherland, the USSR. For this reason with full justification it can be said that discipline is an unique criterion for the political and moral maturity of a soldier.

In the age of nuclear weapons, of the enormous scope, dynamism and complexity of combat operations and of the unprecedented importance of the moral factor, the slightest nonobservance of the demands of military discipline can lead to the severest consequences. This is why even now even individual manifestations of negligence and lack of discipline are completely inacceptable. In other words, at present there is greater importance for both discipline and self-discipline on the part of the serviceman, that is, his inner readiness to always and in everything follow the requirements of the Soviet laws, the oath and

regulations and the principles of communist morality and to carry out his service duties and military duty in an exemplary manner.

In indoctrinating an activist position in the personnel, an enormous role is played by the military collective. It is desirable to point out that the military collective, as was emphasized at the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, is a tried form for organizing interaction and unstinting comradely aid in a combat situation.

The strength of a military collective lies in its public opinion and in that emotional and moral situation under which the soldiers and sailors live and work. In a healthy collective, public opinion approves and supports the correct conduct of the men and contributes to their further growth and advancement. At the same time, it condemns the unworthy conduct of the negligent and obliges them to observe the standards of communist morality and the demands of military discipline.

In completing the description of the material, it is important to reemphasize that service in the army is real schooling in life and in indoctrinating an activist position in life. The person who has gone through army training is not only a good soldier, but also, as a rule, an active builder of communism. As was pointed out by L. I. Brezhnev, the Soviet Army, in indoctrinating new generations of Soviet military, is preparing for the motherland people who are morally and physically conditioned, courageous, with firm communist convictions and with a high awareness of their social duty. These qualities are needed not only by the soldier, but also by the citizen of our land (see "Leninskim kursom," Vol 2, p 255).

During the hours of independent study, it is recommended that the students study the works of V. I. Lenin "On Professional Grounds" (PSS, Vol 35, pp 408-409); "The Tasks of the Youth Unions" (PSS, Vol 41, pp 298-318); the Constitution (Basic Law) of the USSR (articles 31, 32, 59, 62, 63); the sections of the report of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th CPSU Congress and the Next Tasks of the Party in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," pp 20-31, 66); the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR," (Politizdat, 1982); the speech of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 19th Komsomol Congress (PRAVDA, 19 May 1982); the report of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee of 24 May 1982 (PRAVDA, 25 May 1982).

In the talk, it is possible to discuss the following questions: 1. What is an individual's activist position in life under socialism? 2. Wherein lies the fundamental opposition between the focus of a person's position in life under socialism and under capitalism? 3. What is the basic focus of a Soviet soldier's position in life? 4. Why are the USSR Armed Forces termed a school of life and a school of indoctrination? 5. What are the basic factors increasing the indoctrinational role of the Army and Navy? 6. What does it mean in practice for a soldier that he inculcate in himself the qualities of an active builder of communism and a defender of the motherland?

Literature for Propagandists

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- 2. V. I. Lenin, "On Professional Grounds," PSS, Vol 35, pp 408-409.
- 3. V. I. Lenin, "The Tasks of the Youth Unions," PSS, Vol 41, pp 298-318.
- 4. "Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoy Zakon) SSSR" [Constitution (Basic Law) of the USSR], Articles 31, 32, 59, 62, 63.
- 5. L. I. Brezhnev, "Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th CPSU Congress and the Next Tasks of the Party in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy," "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," pp 20-31, 66, 68.
- 6. L. I. Brezhnev, "Speech at the 19th Komsomol Congress," PRAVDA, 19 May 1982.
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- 8. L. I. Brezhnev, "Speech at a Ceremony in Baku Dedicated to the Presentation of the Order of Lenin to Azerbaijan," PRAVDA, 27 September 1982.
- 9. "O dal'neyshem uluchshenii ideologicheskoy, politiko-vospitatel'noy raboty" [On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination], Decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 26 April 1979.
- 10. "On the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR. Decree of the CPSU Central Committee," PRAVDA, 21 February 1982.
- 11. D. F. Ustinov, "Report at the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries," KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 11, 1982.
- 12. D. F. Ustinov, "Sluzhim Rodine, delu kommunizma" [We Serve the Motherland and the Cause of Communism], Voyenizdat, 1982, pp 83-94, 101-110.
- 13. A. A. Yepishev, "Report at the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries," KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 11, 1982.
- 14. "Sovetskaya Armiya--shkola ideyno-nravstvennogo vospitaniya molodezhi" [The Soviet Army--A School for the Ideological and Moral Indoctrination of the Youth]. Materials of an All-Union Scientific-Practical Conference in Baku on 25-27 April 1979, Voyenizdat, 1979, pp 9-26.

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ARMED FORCES

MONTHLY MAILBAGS REVIEWED

For August, 1982

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Sep 82 p 2

[Correspondence from readers reviewed: "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's Mailbag"]

[Text] The editors received 7,087 letters from readers during the month of August. Of these 360 were published. Articles published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA elicited 325 reponses.

The last month of summer is a special time for members of the armed forces. Characteristic of August, as convincingly shown by our mail, was intensive combat training both in our units and aboard ships. Commanders, political officers, party and Komsomol organizations, all personnel put forth persistent efforts to insure successful fulfillment of combat and political training plans and socialist obligations undertaken in honor of the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR.

"Over the course of the past series of exercises personnel of the artillery battery commanded by Guards Senior Lieutenant V. Kostenko honorably passed a serious test," writes Guards Captain O. Kalinchikov of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. "In a difficult tactical situation full of surprises, the crews led by Guards Sergeants V. Dan'shin and K. Tilavadiyev performed coolly, demonstrating initiative and high levels of fire training. By hitting all 'enemy' targets the battery insured the operational success of the motorized rifle subunits (podrazdeleniye) involved."

That armed forces personnel are full of resolve successfully to fulfill obligations in socialist competition to render a fitting salute to the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR and to achieve new levels of military skill we see in letters from tanker Lieutenant I. Vigdorov of the Transbaykal Military District, pilot Captain B. Ivanteyev from the Leningrad Military District, Navy Warrant Officer S. Kozin of the Pacific Fleet, rail troop Sergeant L. Biryukov, working on the construction of the Baykal-Amur Mainline, and many others.

While reporting successes in both service performance and training, readers are at the same time critically analyzing deficiencies in the organization of competition, the training and education program and living conditions and leisure time activities and suggesting ways to remedy them. Here is one of these letters. "We are serving in a helicopter squadron," writes Private R. Sabitov from the Ural Military District. "We

have been entrusted with important responsibilities. We do everything willingly and show the enthusiasm expected of Komsomol members. It's really irritating, though, to see none of the proper concern shown to provide for our leisure time activities. We get back to the barracks in the evening all tired out and in the mood for some good relaxation and recreation. But unfortunately, nobody finds anything but boredom here. The television doesn't work. We had a guitar, but the subunit warrant officer, Warrant Officer A. Golovin, smashed it. The troops just wander from corner to corner, and nobody seems to have any time for them. One time we complained about all this, and the answer we got was: 'These are all everyday trivial concerns. Flying's what's really important!' But what a painful effect these things, this 'trivia', have on your frame of mind."

This is an alarming letter, and the unfortunate thing is that it's not the only one we received in August's mail. Commanders, political personnel and party and Komsomol organizations need to concern themselves in a more concrete way with the matter of providing some structure for personnel leisure time and to move quickly and effectively to remedy existing deficiencies.

Armed forces personnel have recalled the last month of summer as more than a month of strenuous duty days. For many of them it was also a month of self-sacrificing labor as part of an effort to implement the national Food Program adopted by the May (1982) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

"Our troops are proud to have been entrusted with the task of helping with the harvest for the second year of the five-year plan," writes officer A. Sidorov. "While working in the fields of Saratovskaya Oblast, top-rated drivers Privates V. Tambovtsev, V. Stoykin, V. Petryakov and others transported more than a thousand tons of grain each."

"This is not the first year our battalion has been noted for its good unit farm,"
Junior Sergeant V. Sorochenko writes in his letter from the North Caucasus Military
District. "Fresh vegetables find their way onto the soldiers' table from the hothouses summer and winter. The pig farm is being continually expanded. Plans for this
year alone call for a yield of two and one-half tons of meat. The unit farming operation is branching out into new areas. We have reponded with great enthusiasm to the
Komsomol Central Committee appeal 'Komsomol concern for the Food Program.' Komsomol
brigades have been organized within the battalion. During their off-duty time they
not only work plantations on the unit's auxiliary farm, but they also help workers on
neighboring sovkhozes with their harvest."

Each month's mail brings new reports of successes our personnel are achieving in the performance of their military duties. Each of these letters is more dramatic evidence of the high level of their political consciousness and of their increased responsibility for high subunit, unit and ship combat readiness.

For September, 1982

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Oct 82 p 2

[Correspondence from readers reviewed: "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's Mailbag"]

[Text] The editors received 7,001 letters from readers during the month of September. Of these 482 were published. Articles published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA drew 208 responses.

We are approaching an important date in the life of our country—the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. As are all Soviet people, members of the armed forces are preparing a fitting salute to this historic event. Last month's letters to the editors included no few from writers reporting that on the eve of this national celebration the fire of socialist competition was blazing even brighter within their miltary units. In their training and drills as well as on their exercises, unit and shipboard personnel were involved in intensive efforts to incorporate in their practical routine new ideas and innovative experience accumulated in the course of the winter and summer training periods and engaged in continuous preparation for their final tests.

It is with great feeling, deep pride in his comrades-in-arms, that Major V. Zimin of the Central Asian Military District writes concerning successes achieved by radar personnel. "In the course of their tactical exercise, personnel of the subunit commanded by Captain A. Sedov demonstrated efficiency and high levels skill in accomplishing each practice mission," he reports. "After marching many kilometers, radar crews were able to locate the 'enemy' in the air in a timely manner. For distinguished performance in the course of the exercise the senior officer presented commendations to Warrant Officer N. Sokol, Privates M. Oytov, V. Bukreyev and others."

Proudly declaring in their letters that personnel are filled with resolve to finish the training year in a fitting manner and emerge winners in socialist competition are tanker Lieutenant V. Smirnov from the Far Eastern Military District, Naval Warrant Officer I. Fedorov of the Black Sea Fleet, military vehicle driver Sergeant B. Novikov, currently helping bring in the harvest, and many others.

While taking note of successes achieved in military duty performance, our readers are at the same time writing with some concern about deficiencies in training and the organization of socialist competition in their subunits and of the military education program, as well as about the need to both conserve and add to the wealth of our society and to exercise greater care in the use of construction materials and energy resources. Warrant Officer B. Komov from the Leningrad Military District rightly points out that the unit in which he serves is not devoting proper attention to the problem of conserving and economizing in the use of costly government materials. A letter from readers comrades Ledvanova and Grushchenko in Severomorsk complains about the bureaucratic attitude of housing administration personnel toward requests and applications from visitors. "This is an Arctic region," they write. "The freezing winter cold comes early here. The people in the housing administration are well aware of this. But all our requests and persistent demands that our quarters be readied for winter have run up against a wall of indifference. Nobody wants to have anything to do with our problems...."

Greater personal responsibility for the task with which he has been entrusted and for the quality of his own work as well as that performed by the collective as a whole—this, in the view of many readers, is what should constitute the real basis for the demands placed upon each official, regardless of his position.

September's mail included no small number of letters from writers telling about the selfless participation of members of the armed forces in bringing in the harvest. Despite poor weather conditions, our separate truck battalion is successfully accomplishing this government task," reports Senior Lieutenant S. Belyayev from the North Caucasus Military District. "Many hundreds of tons of agricultural produce have

already been delivered to the motherland's granaries. The best drivers in the unit, Sergeant A. Altasyuk and others are overfulfilling their shift targets by 150-200 per cent."

Our people are engaged in peaceful, constructive labors. The Soviet people are nevertheless attentively following the evolution of the international situation and the stratagems of American imperialism. Major N. Slyusarenko (Retired) from Cherkass, a veteran of the Great Patriotic War, writes: "I had a house full of people not long ago. My guests were old comrades-in-arms who had participated in the heroic defense of Leningrad. We all recalled that terrible time, the bitter fighting with the enemy and how we ultimately achieved our long-awaited Victory. It came to our people at a very high price. But now once again we're threatened by war from the other side of the ocean, nuclear war this time. This madness has to be stopped. We're going to be vigilant, work continuously to strengthen our country's defenses and keep our powder dry. We refuse to allow anyone to destroy peace on Earth." The Belovs, Anna Sergeyevna and Ivan Viktorovich, from Kuybyshev and many of our other readers whose sons are now on their tour of duty in the ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces express precisely the same thoughts.

For October, 1982

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Nov 82 p 2

[Correspondence from readers reviewed: "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's Mailbag"]

[Text] The editors received 10,947 letters from readers during October 1982. Of these 375 were published in the newspaper. Articles published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA drew 379 responses.

The Soviet people and members of the armed forces have greeted Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speech to military leaders at a meeting in the Kremlin with enormous enthusiasm. Their letters find the motherland's defenders unanimously expressing readiness to rally still more closely around the Leninist party, to strengthen the country's defense and to increase their vigilance and combat readiness.

The events and results of final exercises both in ground units and aboard ships are the subjects of many of the letters the editors received from service personnel during the month of October. From stories the newspaper has published our readers already know of the complete fulfillment of obligations by personnel of units which had come out as initiators of competition within the services of the Armed Forces. Letters have come in and continue to arrive reporting successes other military collectives have achieved in their final exercises.

Lieutenant V. Yartsev with the Central Group of Forces reported outstanding performance during a tactical exercise on the part of X motorized rifle regiment. For skillful execution of missions in the course of the exercise, Marshal of the Soviet Union K. S. Moskalenko, USSR deputy minister of defense, presented gifts of value to Lieutentant Colonels V. Arsen'yev and Ye. Talipov. Other exercise participants received commendations as well. The company under the command of Senior Lieutenant V. Fedorov qualified for the "excellent" title in this unit for the fourth year running.

Senior Lieutenant Yu. Klenov of the Belorussian Military District writes that "the companies commanded by Guards Captains Ye. Churanov and V. Chuzhikov, companies which have been competing with one another, finished the training year with high ratings in both combat and political training."

On the occasion of the 65th anniversary of the Great October and the approaching anniversary of the formation of the USSR, readers are sharing with us their thoughts and feelings concerning the motherland's achievements and her glorious history. Many of them speak of the role the Great October and the formation of the Soviet Union have played in their own personal life as well as in the life of the collectives they work in. D. Bykov from Kurganskaya Oblast, a participant in the First World War, the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War, recalls how he worked as an agricultural laborer from an early age, the first time he heard Bolshevik agitators bearing the truth of Lenin's teachings and then how he himself became an agitator and Red Army man.

"It is frightening to think," he writes, "what might have become of me, of the poor, of our entire people, had not the October Revolution occurred. Hunger, poverty and ruin were now forever a thing of the past. We have had to go through a lot. On the other hand, though, you now feel proud of what previous generations have accomplished, of the bright present their children and grandchildren now enjoy and the beautiful future that awaits them."

The same pride permeates letters from participants in the Great Patriotic War. Their recollections enlarge our picture of the great battle on the Volga and other combat operations and bring to light new incidents of unexampled heroism on the part of Soviet fighting men. Many front-line veterans have turned to us with a request for help in locating former comrades-in-arms and recounted reunions of war veterans. Major N. Slyusarenko (Retired), for example, writes of a meeting with old comrades-in-arms at his home in Cherkassy: "Russians, Ukrainians, Armenians, Belorussians and Latvians came to visit me from towns all over the country. I had participated with them in the heroic defense of Leningrad. I had never had nearer or dearer guests. What we had been through together!" Friendship, military comradeship, is one of the noteworthy military traditions to be found among Soviet fighting men.

Many letters among those arriving in October's mail are evidence of the devotion of soldiers of the present generation to the ideals of their fathers and grandfathers. V. Zubritskiy from Zhitomirskaya Oblast, a participant in the Great Patriotic War, wrote one of them. He wrote as follows: "I have eight sons. They well know from what their front line-veteran father has told them what a high price our people paid for the freedom of their socialist motherland and for the good fortune to be able to live and work under a peaceful sky. Seven of my sons have already served their time in the army, turning in "outstanding"-rated performances in the process. My youngest son, Yuriy, has now taken their torch."

Letters from parents whose sons are now serving in the armed forces express gratitude to commanders and political personnel for their responsive and attentive attitude toward their young soldiers and for their noble labors in the political and military education of young army personnel. Turning to us with the request that we convey their gratitude to officers for this have been M. Sedyuk of Krymskaya Oblast, Ye. Bulavina from Voronezh, V. Mineyev of Sverdlovsk and many others. These letters are dramatic evidence of the blood ties uniting our army and our people.

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ARMED FORCES

MILITARY JOURNAL CALLS FOR GREATER REPRESENTATION OF NON-RUSSIAN OFFICERS

[Editorial Report] Moscow AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA in Russian No 23, Dec 82 pp 10-14 carries a 3000-word article titled "The Triumph of Leninist Nationality Policy" by Lt Gen Ye. Nikitin. The article notes that "Major work toward the further internationalization of the composition of military cadres and especially of command political and technical military cadres is being carried out in the Soviet Armed Services. The party constantly points to the necessity of being concerned that all nationalities of the country are adequately represented in military training institutions and in the Soviet officer corps."

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BOMBER AVIATION: AIR-SURFACE MISSILE TRAINING EXERCISE

Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 31 Oct 82 p 4

[Article by Special Correspondents A. Zorin and Yu. Ivashchenko: "A Flying Island. Report From on Board a Strategic Missile-Carrying Aircraft"]

[Text] The flight has already lasted many hours. The fragrance of steppe wormwood, seized from the ground, disappeared long ago. We are in oxygen masks, our shoulders are embraced by parachutes. Time passes like a slow river in autumn. The instruments on the control panels flicker in unison, indicating that all systems—propulsion, electrical and power supply—are functioning smoothly, without malfunctions. Clouds like snowdrifts, etched by the sun to an unnatural whiteness, are beneath us. The firmament is piercingly blue, but it lacks the warmth that characterizes a person's eyes and the tranquility of sea. The thermometer indicates that there is Antarctic cold outside.

And in the helmet's earphones, the radio sightings make soft and somewhat domestic noises, with a slight crackling sound. Their rustling sounds are similar to the sounds of an old house at dusk, if you turn off the lights and hide in the dark. At first it seemed that a puff of smoke was about to issue forth from a stove. But, the sterile after-taste of oxygen has no nuances. It is pharmaceutically dull and doesn't even remotely remind one of anything.

Yet, why is it that here, many kilometers above the earth, we want the earth to remind us of itself in some way? Probably because we have parted with the earth for a long time.

The crew's conversations are very intense during the take-off and entry into the flight route. We soon learned to tell by ear, who was who.

"Commander, I request permission for a comprehensive check of the system," said navigator Vladimir Tarasenko.

"Permission granted," consented Lieutenant Colonel Morgatov.

"We are at the attack position."

"Roger. Switch on the bar feed and the instrumentation."

Yuriy Kosikov, the assistant navigator joins the conversation: "I am switching over to the other scale. I report that the controls are in the starting position."

Wait a minute! It seems that something interesting is starting to happen.

"Correct the heading instruments."

"We are attaining the launch altitude."

We gulp convulsively and our ears are stopped up. The plane climbed sharply. The needle of the altimeter swiftly moved in a circular motion.

"We have reached the launch altitude."

"I am determining the trajectory mode."

The assistant navigator flips the switches. It seems that his hands automatically make pencil notes in his note-pad and flip the equipment's toggle switches. Human thought is instantaneously illuminated by numbers on the instruments' screens. Numerous multi-colored lights flash on the control panels, providing a flood of information. One can't believe that a person could comprehend it all, but Kosikov is calm although his eyes dart continuously. However, their darting from side to side is not disorderly. Taking note of our attentiveness through his peripheral vision, the Captain even manages to give us a wink--"Everything is in order."

His voice resounds evenly in the helmet's earphones: "Semiautomatic mode. Ready for launch" ...

The missile started hissing. A dagger-shaped flame blew out of its nozzle. The fiery tornado blew the dust from the cobblestone surface of the old Tbilisi street. As though it were faced with a task beyond the strength, the missile gave out a heavy sigh and shook. The missile body shook for a second or two, then it began advancing clumsily. The missile leapt forward, but after flying several meters, it crashed to the earth. It raced down the street, hissing and snorting, and frightening the passers-by.

Turning around in mid-step, Yura Kosikov and his friends unwillingly made their way to the other side of the street. The "general designer" was painfully experiencing the failure of the newest product from his design bureau. He intuitively sensed the reason of the catastrophe.

"But I said that the missile must be fueled with coral from puppets, not from soap-dishes. And there shouldn't be so much sulphur from the matches" ...

The calico pattern of the airfield was bursting with colors. Kosikov, a student in the Kirovograd Flying Club, headed for the neat and lean "YaK" [Aircraft from Yakovlev Design Bureau].

Within 15 minutes, he was already in the air. The sun was implacable in piercing the cockpit and was merciless in blinding Kosikov. After making a turn, darkness was visible, with some sort of blue-grey bubbles floating in it. Kosikov didn't have time for his eyes to adjust, before the horizon rose up, stood still, then began to spin like the hand of the clock which has gone mad. From out of nowhere, a gripping force pressed upon his head and shoulders, and hung on his arms as though it were hundred-pound blocks. Again the sun beat into his eyes as a piercing beam of light. Kosikov wanted to take a breath and drive the raging nightmare away from himself. But he didn't have time for that. The aircraft fell into an abyss and his chest felt empty. seemed that even his hair stood on end beneath his helmet.

But the pilot instructor turned the aircraft again and again, not giving Kosikov's a moment's respite. There was a roll, then another, then a break-out, a zoom, a loop and a turn. Yuruy used his remaining strength to restrain the panic which was coming to the surface. At first, he didn't even notice that he was guessing at the aerobatic figures.

An attentive voice in his earphone asked: "How do you feel, Yura?"

Kosikov rasped out, through a throat as coarse as an emery board: "I'm fine."

With a great deal of effort he added: "I'm feeling hostile. Do it again, do you hear me?"

The flight instructor asked, not without spite: "Why don't you tell me where the airstrip is at?"

Kosikov tried to get his bearings, but immediately realized that it was hopeless. He wouldn't even have tried to answer where the sky was, or the earth. Everything was mixed up. But, to the right and slightly

behind, there was a glimmer of feeling--they had started from that direction.

"It's to the right, commander."

They landed. Yuriy walked several steps from the airplane and dropped into the grass. He lay face down. A flotilla of clouds, looking like old sailing ships, floated in the sky.

After turning the airplane over to the mechanics, the instructor walked up to Yuriy.

"Way to go, Yurka! I gave you a real test and you did alright. You will fly, lad. But you should be a navigator. You have a God-given talent for it, mark my word."

And so, now Kosikov launched a real missile from a strategic aircraft. At that stage of the flight, the Captain summed up the work of the entire crew. We observe Yuriy's colleagues attentively. They continue to do their jobs. Thus, they trust their comrade implicitly.

After the "ready for launch" report, only the crackling in the helmet earphones and the slight vibration of the missile-carrying aircraft reminds us of the flight.

Yet, even with total calm on our flying island, there is no laxness. Each crew member was as alert as possible, so as not to prevent Kosikov from operating precisely.

"Aft weapons officer, observe the missile."

"Yes, sir," answers the weapons and radio officer. "The missile is in normal position."

"Fire!"

Yuriy immediately reacts to the order. "Attention, crew. The missile has been launched." The mask covers his face, but his eyes are expressive enough for us to gauge his level of concentration.

The lightened missile-carrying aircraft jumps upwards after it is free of its load. The fiery point gradually fades into the distance. The missile has left for its target.

We changed course abruptly and again returned to our flight route. Now we must await information from the ground. Time and again we glance at Warrant Officer Murat Azambayev, the chief radio operator. Or more precisely, we glance at his legs. He sits beneath the cowl of an airframe "blister," and all we see are his knees and shoes. Then he begins to fidget; most likely, he is receiving a communication. That is exactly what he is doing.

A mournful voice says: "Commander, we missed by three whole..." The intonation instantly changes here, "...centimeters."

Morgatov nodded, and the happy wrinkles around his eyes give away the smile which is hidden beneath his mask.

"Three centimeters is three centimeters. I will issue a reprimand for making fun of the commander."

We heard Azambayev's laughter. "I am ready to atone for my guilt by preparing a decent dinner."

The commander mercifully interjected: "Atone."

Murat handed over his duty to the weapons and radio officer seated in the aft, and crawled out of the "blister." Everyone livened up after the launch and the facetious bantering. We notice that one gets just as hungry as when one is on the ground. Azambayev solemnly labored over a box containing the flight rations. Murat skillfully wielded the knife and created real masterpieces of the sandwich art. Even under the mask, it seemed that one could smell the garlic and parsley.

Azambayev loudly announced: "The table is set. Dinner is served! Shut off the engines, commander. We'll hand out the "at supper" sign on the back. Yura, we don't have enough beer. Could you go out and get some? It isn't far from here. Take a parachute, put on a knapsack and go get it. The door pushes open."

Warrant Officer Azambayev is a jolly fellow.

We ate our snack and returned to our posts. We put on the oxygen masks again. The breathing apparatus gauge, measuring the breaths, presses against our lips.

The crew members call Murat their "flight-spirit." This is by way of analogy with a house-spirit, who preserves traditions, loves to joke, and in general, keeps an eye on things so that everything is done properly. Although being a "flight-spirit" is an important job, it is nonetheless a social duty. But Azambayev's official duties are more responsible. He is responsible for communications.

The sky is a foreign element for humans. Granted, humans have learned to travel through the sky from one continent to another, and from one continent to another, and our airplanes speed along faster than sound. However, the work of a pilot continues to be very difficult. And it is not just a question of the physical demands. Of course the physical demands are greater for a hammerman or a steel smelter. But, if you are in the sky for many hours,

there is even greater erosion of the necessary concentrated attentiveness. It is very difficult to maintain such attentiveness.

The continuous vibration in the airplane deadens one's sense of touch. The constant rumble of the engines erodes the keenness of one's hearing. Vision is wearied by having one and same scene before one's eyes. The senses of smell and taste cease to function under the oxygen mask. In a word, all the channels through which we communicate with the world practically dry up during a long flight. A person gradually begins to cease feeling his very self. It is as if the sky strives to dissolve a pilot into itself. The boundary between dream and reality imperceptibly fades; reality becomes eroded and floats away somewhere.

But one must not yield to these enticements. They are ruinous, like the voices of the mythical sirens who enticed men to destruction.

Only communication with the ground, like a liferaft, sustains a person on the edge of the fathomless abyss of the sky.

There is spiritual communication, first of all. But there is also simple communication—radio.

Through radio communications, the ground warns of dangers, directs a plane back on course if it has strayed, transmits joyful news and reminds the crew of what lies ahead.

However a radiogram might be transmitted—in code or clear text—, the information contained in it will nevertheless be based on words. They will be Russian words, since those are the kind understood by the entire crew. A young Kazakh, to whom life itself taught Russian, receives the words on board our aircraft. He learned Russian from life.

We heard Warrant Officer's Azambayev's voice in our earphones: "Commander, they are telling us the refueling area."

The fuel is running out. We must refuel and will do so in air.

Lieutenant Colonel Morgatov nudged the elbow of his assistant, Captain Pavel Rodin, and pointed ahead, with his black-gloved hand: "Look!"

Rodin squinted and peered into the distance. Some land was visible on the very horizon, against the grey background of the ocean. Pavel checked his

map and his heart ached. It was as if a gentle, affectionate, albeit powerful hand, had squeezed a trembling lump in his chest. Straight ahead was Sakhalin--Captain Rodin's native land.

In the stress of the flight, he had not thought beforehand about this encounter, and now it had taken him unawares. In his helmet's earphones, Rodin heard the pounding of the waves washing the sand of the beach. Pavel imagined how the tufts of foam on the shore tremble in the wind, how a squall tangles up a flight of sea gulls.

Morgatov estimated something with his watch and said to Rodin: "Have a little rest now; I'll have a rest later. Refueling will take place soon."

The assistant nodded thankfully and reclined in a chair. And immediately it was as if he had drawn back on all sides the heavy blinds covering the window which was open to the past. And Rodin seemed to be not just 10 kilometers from his native area, he seemed to be in his recently-passed youth.

Captain Rodin awakened and immediately opened his eyes. It was getting dark. The instruments glowed dimly. Pavel looked at his watch and computed that he had slept for 32 minutes.

The captain reported: "I am ready, commander. It is your turn to rest."

Morgatov handed over control of the missile-carrying aircraft to his assistant, then took off his gloves and slightly loosened the fastening of his oxygen mask.

The airplane changed course again. The sunset floated past, on the left side. Like a scarlet wedge, the sunset severed the sky from the ground. Night was already getting dense on the right side.

After jumping over the aircraft, the sun departed to the west. The clouds below, covering themselves with grey blankets, prepared for a night's sleep.

In the cockpit, it was as if some one had suddenly opened a treasure chest. The equipment began to sparkle like emeralds. Their cold flame made the gathering gloom even more impenetrable. But, as a result, you begin to sense, very acutely, the closeness of the people sitting next to you.

In our helmet earphones, we hear the voice of Major Vladimir Tarasenko, the squadron's navigator: "Pasha, we are fast approaching the refueling area. Reduce speed by 40."

"Roger. I am reducing speed. Pour me some more tea," requested Rodin.

Tarasenko again consulted his navigation protractor. Once again he checks his calculations and makes some notes on his map. Now he is playing first fiddle. Or more precisely, he is conducting the crew.

We must note that a tiny error in his calculations will result, at our speed and range, in a 100-kilometer deviation. Thus, Major Tarasenko must be especially precise.

He glances over the columns of figures and nods to himself with satisfaction. It would appear that he had not expected to find any errors. Vladimir straightened his back and spread his shoulders.

The tailor raised his glasses onto his forehead and bustled around Volodya Tarasenko with a tape measure. "You mustn't stoop. A good suit must be nicely worn, so people can see that it is being worn not by a bum, but by cultured young man from a good family. Your mom wants you to meet a nice young lady and is giving you the money to buy a suit. But, yet..."

"We earned the money ourselves," said Anarbek from the broken-down divan, while awaiting his turn.

"That's right!", Nikolay affirmed sitting next to Anarbek. "We built a road."

After eighth grade, they had decided not to just loaf around in Frunze, but to work. One of their acquaintances had heard that the road builders were hiring teenagers as unskilled laborers during summer vacation. The three boys signed up for temporary work at an office. Granted, they had to add a year to their ages, but this fib didn't cause them pangs of conscience.

Next morning, they were taken rather far from the city in a truck and their work biography began.

For 2 months, Volodya, Anarbek and Nikolay built a road. Their muscles increased noticeably; callouses as hard as rocks and polished to a shine appeared on their hands. Their parents had at first considered the boy's venture to be a strange whim, but came to believe in the serious nature of what was taking place.

As so the boys had come to order suits for themselves, before the start of school.

They were called the Three Musketeers. It was Volodya Tarasenko's idea to wait until they were 16 years old and then all join the aeroclub together. For a long time he had dreamed and envisioned himself parachuting.

This dream had been engendered when he first saw his father, a military pilot, parachuting.

After the 10th grade, all three decided to continue their studies. As always, they studied together before the entrance examinations. Anarbek helped his friends with mathematics and physics and applied himself more in biology and chemistry. The boys' paths were diverging.

Once, Nikolay started up a conversation anew: "Anarbek, let's all travel together. We will fly. We'll stay together our whole lives, like in school, understand?"

"No, I'll stay here in Frunze. I'm going to medical school. Why should I leave? This is my homeland, I grew up here."

His voice was gentle, yet firm.

Vladimir, with a quick temper, joined in the conversation. "What about Kol'ka and me? Didn't we grow up here? Kirghiziya is my homeland, as is the Ukraine where I was born, plus Chelyabinsk where I will study and the place where I will serve. The whole country will be my homeland."

The brotherhood of these musketeers was not destroyed by distance or the passing years. Like men, they wrote infrequently. But when a daughter was born to Tarasenko (he was on a flight, incidentally, at that time), a package from Kirghiziya arrived at his address. The package contained walnuts, pomegranates and wisps of some herb. Doctor Anarbek Shabdanaliyev wrote how the herb must be brewed and its tincture added to the baby's bath water. "Don't worry about the herb. I gathered it myself."

As for Nikolay Tregubov, he serves in the Baltic area. He sent an entire case of special "Baby" powder for washing baby clothes.

"Commander, we are in the refueling area."

Major Tarasenko draws a circle on his map. Morgatov puts on his gloves and adjusts his oxygen mask.

"The crew will increase its state of watchfulness."

The voice is firm and dry.

The minutes pass slowly. We also press close to the windows and try to discern a tanker in the darkness. But nothing can be seen among the scattered stars. Could we have gone to the wrong area?

Private Anatoliy Tolyarovskiy, our weapons and radio officer in the aft says: "Commander, I see the tanker."

"Roger. Continue your observation."

We carry out the order and press close to the glass.

A distant flickering light slowly approaches us. Within a few minutes, the light is directly ahead of our aircraft. Now the tiny spark has been transformed into an entire glittering house, or rather an entire palace illuminated by searchlights.

Morgatov puts his missile-carrying aircraft in the wake of the tanker and begins to approach it slowly. This probably seems rather spectacular from the outside: one gigantic bird, among the stars, sneaks up to another bird.

We are about 100 meters apart; Morgatov and Rodin have turned to stone, as it were. Only the commander's hands are working; his assistant uses his feet to control the "gas."

By the slightly changing sound of the engine, we note that our speed has increased. Yes, the tanker has gotten noticeably closer. We are about 50 meters apart.

Murat Azambayev directs a search light onto the hose extending from the refueler. We are slightly lower than the tanker, so the shadow from the hose falls exactly in the middle of the tanker's belly. There is a cone, one and a half meters in diameter, at the end of the hose. The cone flaps around randomly in the air. You simply can't imagine that the rod attached to the nose of our airplane must be thrust into the cone. It is as if someone were to thread a needle which someone else was swinging in front of him.

The cone continues to flap around in a frenzy. The tricks which it plays are sometimes frightening. You unwittingly feel like jumping back when it comes within a meter of the glass.

The cone had been jerked upwards and began to come down, but it suddenly stopped. We noticed our mistake. The cone was stationary, only due to Morgatov who forced the missile-carrying aircraft to follow the cone.

"Accelerate!"

The Lieutenant Colonel's order was carried out immediately. The rod langorously crawled into the cone's funnel. A red light flashes on the control panel.

"We have contact!"

Rodin is a bundle of nerves. The indicator on his oxygen mask shows how unevenly the Captain is breathing.

After glancing at the instruments, Morgatov orders: "Disengage!"

At that point, the glass got dark. This was caused by the last drops of fuel splashing out onto the canopy. But it is no problem: after a few seconds, the head wind blows the moisture away. "Make a 180 degree turn!"

The tanker disappeared. The horizon went into motion, as though we were in a planetarium. The stars began fluttering and moved smartly in a circular pattern.

The refueling had been completed and the flight continued.

After the 180 degree turn, Aleksandr Tolyarovskiy saw the tanker again.

The gas truck approached. It had a hard time climbing the hill, having to strain its engine. When it reached the dredger, a man about 30 years old jumped out of the truck's cab.

He smiled and said: "Hello, lads! Take your fuel and tell me which one of you is Tolyarovskiy."

"I'm Tolyarovskiy," responded Sasha.

"Here is a notice from the military registration office."
The driver took out of his pocket a sheet of paper folded four times. "You are being called to military service."

Things had worked out so that Sasha's only comrade and adviser was his mother. He had grown up without a father. And now for the first time, they were parted for a long period of time. He had had to leave home before, after completing PTU [vocational and technical school]. He had become an electrical equipment operator on a dredger and began working in the taiga. There they built up foundations for drilling rigs and a road through marshes. It happened that he was away from home for weeks at a time. But a week or even a month is not like the 2 year separation which they had now.

After completing junior air specialists' school, Tolyarovskiy began flying and right away understood that he was trusted. A weapons and radio officer sits in it aft of the plane, cut off from the main part of the crew. During flight, no one can check his actions.

Morgatov said once: "You have suited us just fine. If you want, you can become a warrant officer and continue to fly."

But Sasha answered: "No!"

Not long before this conversation, a letter arrived from his mother in Nizhnevartovsk.

"Hello, son! I haven't written to you in a long time. But you know what the end of a quarter is like for me. I was drawing up the report. Yesterday I collapsed. Now I can rest for a day or two.

Recently I saw some fellows from your work crew. They asked when you will return and were sad when they learned that even when you return home, you will fly in a helicopter as a radio operator.

I went to the airport as you requested, and found out about everything. They told me that they need people like you. They will send you for some more schooling and you will fly.

I'm glad that you decided to return home, and not only because we will be together in the future again. It's good that you aren't rushing through life, searching for a place where you will be a little warmer and a little more satiated. Even birds return to their home nests. All the more should a man return home.

According to the calendar, you haven't been away so long. But, how everything has changed in Nizhnevartovsk! They have built so many new apartment houses. There are even nine-storey buildings, as in Moscow. They are beautiful!

I give you a hearty kiss, my dear son. I am waiting for you!"

We estimate by our watches how long we have been in the air, and where we are presently. We examine our heading. It appears that we will be home within a few hours.

Morgatov presses the microphone up against his throat: "The engineer will prepare the flight documentation."

"Roger." Major Suslin obeyed the order and opened up a thick file containing some papers.

Day is breaking on the horizon. The sky has brightened up and is smoothing out the nocturnal wrinkles. Yet, the moon is still shining brightly.

The commander put the plane down onto the runway and brought it to a hard stand. The engines got out of time, started to rumble unevenly and began to come to a stop. Everyone hurried to put their oxygen masks into their handbags, and to take off their parachutes while there was still light.

The bustle filled the cockpit and completely supplanted the tension of the long watch.

Oh! Our feet seem to have forgotten how to walk. We descend carefully through the hatch onto the concrete of the airfield and feel a desire to have a smoke.

It is warm. There is a smell of a river from somewhere. It's nice.

Lieutenant Colonel Aleksey Petrovich Morgatov was the last to reach the ground. He is a short, lean and quick-moving man with dark, attentive eyes. It would be interesting to know whether he feels the same way we do, or whether he is already so accustomed to such flights that he is bored with returns. But it would be useless to ask. He wouldn't answer. He is the silent type. Yet, there are legends about him in Long-Range Aviation. Even the recognized masters of refueling unreservedly accept the authoritative reputation of Aleksey Petrovich.

Morgatov formed up the crew. "We had a normal flight. I have no criticisms to make. We'll take a rest now. At 1500 hours, we'll form up here. Crew dismissed!"

The awakened sparrows had already begun their continuous twittering. The morning was filled with fresh colors. Our missile-carrying aircraft with its covered engines looked like an exhausted man returning home at dawn.

With quick strides, Morgatov walks to the bus.

The island beyond the clouds has returned to earth. Its crew has yielded the watch.

9887

CSO: 1801/107

GROUND FORCES

SQUAD RECONNAISSANCE TRAINING DESCRIBED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 10, Oct 82 (signed to press 23 Sep 82) p 5

[Article by Colonel V. Zhukov, Order of Lenin Transbaykal Military District: "Squad Search, Tactical Fire Training"]

[Text] Sergeant B. Svyatov always conducts his drills and exercises on a high methodological level and in a well-organized manner. Having thoroughly mastered the most important principles, modes and methods of training and instruction, he adheres unfailingly to them to them in the course of his practical activities.

"The sergeant's success," the subunit (podrazdeleniye) commander says of Svyatov, "is a result of the fact that he creates intense, stressful tactical situations in his exercises and gets skillful, efficient performances out of his men under conditions approaching those they would encounter in actual combat. He reinforces the material they study with outstanding examples from the experience of reconnaissance personnel during the difficult years of the Great Patriotic War, taking into account in the process the level at which reconnaissance operations are conducted today both on foot and in combat vehicle.

He recently organized and conducted a platoon exercise focusing on the topic "Squad Search Operations." During the hours allotted for independent self-instruction and preparation personnel studied the distinguishing characteristics of the weapons and combat equipment used by the enemy they would probably encounter and his uniform and insignia of rank as well as the operational organization and tactics small subunits employ in different types of combat situations. They devoted their attention in this connection primarily to the enemy's conduct of defensive operations.

In the course of preliminary practice drills the platoon worked on methods of negotiating mine fields using both organizational equipment and improvised devices. Particular attention was devoted in this connection to methods of negotiating electrified obstacles.

The exercise was conducted in accordance with the tactical drill method. Trainees mastered each procedure until it came automatically to them, a technique which had long since been standard practice for this outstanding sergeant. He conducted his exercise out on one of the sections of the tactical training grounds equipped with a mine field, barbed-wire obstacles, antitank post obstacles and hedgehogs and "enemy" earth-and-timber and reinforced concrete pillboxes in strict accordance with their tactical-technical characteristics.

The object of the search was a machine gunner (a dummy in this instance) in a foxhole. On the flanks and to the rear of the strong point weapon emplacements alternated targets. The muzzle flashes in the darkness revealed their position. All this created a situation on the exercise approaching to the maximum possible extent the actual conditions of modern-day warfare and required on the part of the trainees involved a demonstration of intelligence, an ability to employ stratagems, initiative and solid skills in capturing models of weapons, documents and prisoners.

Before twilight Sergeant Svyatov positioned his men in their entrenchment and pointed out to them the trace of the forward edge of the "enemy" battle area, his weapons and the mine, electrified, barbed wire and other obstacles these reconnaissance scouts might encounter as they make their way toward the object of their search. He explained that the appraoches to the forward edge of the battle area are under close observation during the day, while posts with night vision devices are set up at night, part of the area being periodically illuminated as well. The commander then assigned his squad its operational night search mission—capture a "prisoner" from among the members of the machine gun crew and return with them to the subunit. To accomplish the mission he named a capture team, obstacle-removal team and a fire-support team; defined the procedure to be employed during the operation; announced the signals, readiness time, password and response, actions to be taken in case the situation suddenly changes, camouflage measures and steps to take to maintain military secrecy and named a second-in-command.

While it was still light Sergeant Svyatov used targets to create a number of possible variants of the situation to be encountered in capturing a "prisoner" and worked with his men on methods of observing the objective of their search, directing their attention in this instance particularly to the need to study the terrain and reconnoiter concealed approaches for movement toward the planned objective for their attack.

At twilight the obstacle-removal team began its advance. Maintaining strict camouflage discipline, the soldiers low-crawled from one concealment to another. They maintained the direction of movement along the azimuth assigned in their operational order, checking it against terrain features designated previously and now visible in the darkness, the tops of hills in this instance.

The "enemy", however, suddenly illuminated the area around the object of the search. Private Z. Islamov was unable to react in time and continued to crawl forward. There's no point in going into what this could have led to in a real combat situation. Sergeant Svyatov formed up his squad, pointed out this grievous error to his men and then once again reminded the trainees of the proper actions to take when the "enemy" suddenly illuminates an area.

The sergeant put his squad back at their starting position and, element by element, went over the training problem again. The next time the terrain was illuminated, all the scouts performed properly and confidently, this including Private Islamov as well. No sooner did they hear the hiss of the rockets than they took timely cover on the dark side of a stone.

The silent reconnaissance then continued. It came to a brief halt when it reached the mine field. Using a probe and a mine detector, Privates O. Gureyev and B. Namokonov detected and disarmed a number of "mines", carefully checked the barbed-wire entanglement to make sure it held no "surprises" and then gave the agreed-upon signal—the way was clear.

It was now the fire-support team's turn to move out. After making their way across the mine field, the scouts took up a fire position in a crater where a bomb had exploded.

The capture team with the squad leader advanced toward the objective of the search from the lee side. In addition to their machine guns, knives and hand grenades, the men had brought with them some ropes, a sack and a gag as well as a spare camouflage robe for the "prisoner."

They stole carefully up to the entrenchment, then two of the scouts threw themselves upon the machine gun crew... It looked like things had turned out the way they were supposed to: they had the dummy in their hands. An experienced methods specialist, however, noticed that Private Yu. Vinnikov had failed to act decisively, confidently. He had hesitated for an instant and had failed to stun the "machine gunner" in a timely manner and to stuff the gag in his mouth. The sergeant held a brief critique and then reviewed the procedure again. This time the trainees performed efficiently and confidently. They thoroughly mastered the points that the most favorable moment for a surprise attack on a machine gun crew is when they are reloading their weapon, on an illumination post—when an illuminating rocket finally goes out and on an observer—when his attention is diverted by noises coming from another direction.

The squad leader then described the tactical situation. Targets were used to designate the movements of an "enemy" infantry squad opening fire on the scouts as they were preparing to make their dash.

Before turning to the practical execution of this exercise mission, the squad leader explained to his men the procedures involved in capturing a "prisoner" under the cover of fire delivered by the fire-support team. He stressed the fact that success will depend upon effective cooperation and upon the speed and decisiveness with which they attack the "enemy" entrenchment.

In the second assault upon their objective the trainees executed their mission without error.

The exercise had been instructive. It had improved the state of these reconnaissance scouts' specialized training.

8963

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GROUND FORCES

DISCIPLINARY PRACTICES IN TANK REGIMENT DESCRIBED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 21, Nov 82 (signed to press 19 Oct 82) pp 42-46

[Interview with Lt Col A. Palamarchuk: "By the Pooling of Efforts"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] A talk conducted by our correspondents with Guards Col A. Palamarchuk, commander of the X Guards tank regiment on the strengthening of proper order and military discipline in the unit.

[Question] Anatoliy Vasil'yevich [Palamarchuk]! Even before our arrival in the garrison, we knew that the regiment which you command for several years has not had a single disciplinary infraction. For the troops and naval forces such a situation as a whole is natural. As was pointed out at the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, many leading units and formations live without infractions. Yet we would like to know how you achieved such a state of affairs in the regiment and what were the main directions of organizational and indoctrinational work which helped to unite the military collective and to strengthen proper order and discipline.

[Answer] In the report at the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, emphasized that for strengthening aware military discipline it was essential first of all to reinforce its foundation which is comprised of the ideological conviction of the men and the spiritual maturity of the collective. The main thing in this work, the USSR minister of defense said, is to ensure a selfless personal example set by the communists and Komsomol members in the carrying out of military duty and in observing the requirements of discipline. If it is considered that in our regiment the communists and Komsomol members comprise 95 percent, then it becomes perfectly clear that to ensure their example means to solve more than nine-tenths of the problem of further raising the level of discipline.

In what do I see the initial phase in the work in this area? Primarily in ensuring the personal example set by the indoctrinator-commanders. For their activity provides a greater effect the higher their authority, the richer the ability of the solely-responsible commander to work with the men and the profounder the party conviction. It is important that the commander's exactingness

be inseparable from concern for the men, from a closeness to them and from a knowledge and constant consideration of their moods, interests and needs. All of this was considered in the work by the unit command and party organization and this, in my view, became the crucial factor in achieving the main goal which we set for ourselves, that is, the regiment would successfully fulfill the socialist obligations in the competition to properly celebrate the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, the training plans and the programs of the jubilee year; it would live without infractions.

How would I explain the successes in the competition, for example, of the first battalion? Primarily by the fact that such communists as the battalion commander Guards Maj Dubchak, his deputy for political affairs Guards Maj V. Vivcharchin and the platoon commanders Guards Sr Lts V. Shikula and A. Chernyshov had a great influence on the personnel. Personal organization, great demandingness on oneself and one's subordinates, capacity for work and responsibility, the ability to utilize the mobilizing force of the competition, including in the interests of strengthening proper order--here are a few components in the successes of the named officers and the subunits headed by them.

Something else is also important if one wants to fill out the picture. The commanders, the party and Komsomol activists, on the question of strengthening military discipline, have achieved steady results due to the fact that their work in this area is of a comprehensive nature.

[Question] A comprehensive nature for the work of strengthening discipline. Please tell the journal's readers more about this.

[Answer] The maintaining and strengthening of discipline in our unit is achieved by an entire complex or system of measures. Above all, we proceed from the requirements of the Disciplinary Regulations which state that high discipline is achieved by indoctrinating in the servicemen a communist ideology, high moral-political and combat qualities and conscious obedience of the commanders, by maintaining proper order in the units and subunits, by the daily exactingness of the commanders on subordinates, by respect for their personal dignity, by constant concern for them, by the able combination and correct use of measures of persuasion and coercion.

How do we carry out these demands of the regulation and achieve comprehensiveness? In fighting for strong discipline, the commanders, the political workers and all the communists in the unit focus their basic efforts on improving the ideological-political and military indoctrination of the servicemen and on explaining to them the domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU, the historic purpose of the Soviet Armed Forces and the tasks confronting them, as well as the demands of the oath and the regulations. This is the first thing. Secondly, in the question of fighting for a further strengthening of discipline in our unit, great attention is given to a clear organization of training and service and to the strict observance of the provisions of the regulations by all categories of the unit's personnel. Here of great importance is the prompt issuing of orders to the executors as well as the checking on their complete and high-quality execution.

A third aspect. For the commanders, the political workers and all the communists of our unit it is indisputable that in the struggle for strong military discipline and proper order, individual work with the men is a reliable means. This work is aimed at eradicating vestiges [of the past] in the conduct of the servicemen and at raising their personal responsibility for the success of the matter.

Then come the socialist competition, legal indoctrination, the indoctrinating of the servicemen in the military and labor traditions of the people and army... In speaking about the comprehensive nature of work in the area of strengthening discipline, one could also mention a number of other areas. But probably the crux of the matter is not one of a list. The main thing is that the commanders and party organizations of the subunits have recognized the comprehensive method as an effective form for indoctrinating disciplined soldiers and, having joined their efforts, skillfully rely on it. In the unit there are fewer and fewer men who are only concerned for the job assigned to them and do not want to look more widely, on the scale of the entire collective.

In order to provide commentary on what has been said, I would like to touch upon a narrow and just one area but which, in my view, is indicative of the work style of our party organization. After the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, the deputy regimental commander for political affairs, Guards Maj A. Shpilevoy (incidentally, he was a participant in the conference), in summing up the results of an inspection of troop service, posed the question as follows: "We are monitoring the course of service and are reporting shortcomings up the chain of command, but who of the officers from the regimental staff, who of the subunit political workers himself has recently participated in the training of the guard personnel?" And he brought up the question of the need for a decisive turn from recording shortcomings to an active influence on the part of each staff communist on their elimination and on increasing the effectiveness of all elements of troop service.

The other communists from the party organization of the regimental headquarters and I decisively supported the political worker. In fact, just take the battalion where Guards Maj P. Lega is the chief of staff. Here the same violation of guard duty had been repeated several times. Individual sentries had allowed persons to come closer to the posts than the distance indicated in the post table. The officers from the battalion and the regimental staff who had inspected the state of guard duty noticed this shortcoming in the post logs. But it was repeated and the situation did not change.

Only the party posing of the question and a thorough inspection by me and the deputy regimental commander for political affairs made it possible for us to achieve a turning point in the struggle to eliminate shortcomings in guard duty. In other words, the control system becomes truly effective only when the communists from the headquarters party organization began to not merely record positive and negative facts, but rather generalized and reinforced the better and eliminated the shortcomings.

Probably the following facts also tell about the comprehensive nature of the work in the area of strengthening discipline. The unit's staff provides for the systematic holding of quizzes on a knowledge of the regulations from the officers and warrant officers ["praporshchik"] at the end of the training year and for the soldiers and sergeants at the end of each training period. The results with the announcing of grades are analyzed at conferences and at party and Komsomol meetings. The training of all levels of commanders in the practical work of strengthening military discipline and improving troop service has developed into a system, and we have begun to regularly hold procedural conferences on the questions of improving the work style of the commanders and political workers in instilling firm proper order. The leadership of not only the regiment, but also the formation and district participates in these. Also valuable are field exercises. For example, demonstration exercises involving the battalion and company commanders and the chiefs of the branches of troops and services in organizing guard and internal duty as well as supervising its state. There are also competitive reviews for the maintaining of exemplary order in the barracks and for the best equipping of the barracks rooms and installations. There are also lectures related to everyday life and talks by military lawyers on the questions of legal indoctrination....

[Question] Thus, as is seen from the already-given example, all of this helps to instill in the personnel an awareness of the need for strict and precise observance of the demands of the oath, the regulations and the orders?

[Answer] Yes, all of this as well as the fact that the work in the area of strengthening discipline and proper order for us has an all-round nature makes it possible to see to it that each man's position in life is determined by a conviction that the requirements of the regulations must be carried out unfailingly and unquestionably by everyone without exception. The staff, the party and Komsomol organizations of the regiment concentrate on this indoctrinational It is planned ahead of time. This includes lectures by members of the agitation and propaganda group on the social responsibility of the Soviet soldier, on his honor and dignity, talks by war veterans on Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism and on love for the motherland and loyalty to military duty as well as the special subject morning "You Are Obliged." Our tank troops prepare with special care for the day which is held under the motto "Hello, Crew!" On this day the commanders, the political workers, the party and Komsomol activists introduce the young soldiers to their future crew comrades and tell in detail about the traditions of the outstanding subunits and the accomplishments of the best specialists.

We must also mention the special subject evening "Pettiness for a Feat." This ended with a debate on discipline as the basis for readiness for a feat. Or such other aspects. In one of the companies the political exercises were conducted by a sovkhoz director. The secretary of a party gorkom spoke at a meeting bidding farewell to soldiers entering the reserves. In the form of relaxed talks, meetings have been held between the servicemen and production pacesetters, in particular with Sr Lt (Res) O. Zhurbenko who did his regular service in our regiment.

One can decisively say about these measures that they help the young servicemen more profoundly understand their duty to the motherland and the importance

of strong military discipline for the combat readiness of the unit and subunit. But I would like to reemphasize that it is not a question of the number of measures. Rather something else is important: that all that we do to strengthen discipline has an active impact on increasing the responsibility of each man, on his awareness of the social necessity and importance of military service and on a conscientious attitude toward carrying out the demands of the oath, the regulations and orders.

Thus, the regiment's command and party organization employs all the strength of its authority and influence to maintain proper order in the subunits.

[Question] However, in certain units not everyone is inclined to identify proper order merely with internal order in the barracks or the external appearance of the men. What would you say on this issue?

[Answer] In our unit, the concept of "proper order" is viewed widely. Of course, we are concerned about comfort in the barracks, the external appearance of the quarters and the men themselves and we pay great attention to this. But at the same time we are aware that proper order presupposes primarily the exemplary standing of guard and internal duty, it includes the precise organization of combat and political training, the operation and upkeep of equipment and presupposes correct relationships between the servicemen, the strict observance of the daily regimen, the reasonable organization of the personnel's leisure and their high, aware inner discipline. And we go beyond merely understanding this. To put it more accurately, in the regiment we have elaborated a line of work which is clear in its analysis and planning where there is nothing that is secondary or complacent. Just how this line is being carried out is frequently brought up at officer conferences and party and Komsomol meetings.

There was the following instance. The commander of the 5th Company, Guards Capt G. Shportko, concealed one violation of military discipline and then another. Some might be inclined to reason that there was no particular harm in this. However, the party committee dealt strictly with the communist and with the battalion party organization secretary Guards Capt V. Bakhmat. But this was not the end to it. The state of affairs was critically assessed in the other companies. Using living examples, they demonstrated to all the companies what such protectionism can entail.

Each violation of proper order or military discipline involves my work, the work of the deputy for political affairs and the party committee members. Each communist who commits a deviation from the requirements of the regulations is dealt with strictly and in an exacting manner.

For example, take the ranging of the weapons on the eve of weapons training exercises. Seemingly this question would be removed from the tasks related to the strengthening of proper order. However, the party committee member, Guards Maj V. Yurin, looked at the question differently, in analyzing why at times there is a delay in carrying out the firing exercises and training time is wasted. It turned out that certain subunit commanders had completely put the ranging of the weapons on the shoulders of the rocket and artillery weapons specialists, although they were obliged to do this personally on the day before the exercises. Thus, due to the fact that what was prescribed by the documents

was not carried out, an unique break arose in the organizing of the training process. In other words, customary order was broken. In line with this at one of the party meetings the question was posed as follows: there are the regulations, instructions and orders and there is your attitude toward them which, unfortunately, is not the same for all. Here the position should be just one: each communist officer must devote to service as much time and energy as is needed for success in the matter and for ensuring firm proper order. This is precisely how the party members work.

[Question] At the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries it was pointed out that concern for the men and for satisfying their needs and requests plays an enormous role in strengthening discipline. How is this question solved in the regiment?

[Answer] Let me give the following example. I happened to begin one of the service meetings in not the usual way, but rather by the posing of questions: what are the standards for one day's rations for the personnel, the procedure for medical services and the service life of uniforms? Not every company commander could answer these clearly and fully. But could one be truly concerned for subordinates without knowing what is due them? In this regard a broad field of activity has been laid out for the party activists and the officers of the rear service. I have repeatedly witnessed the party committee secretary, Guards Maj R. Miloshich, the deputy regimental commander for the rear, Guards Maj V. Baynak, and other members of the party committee correcting officer communists who were not concerned for their subordinates.

For a communist this position should always be an active one. When a person feels a good attitude shown toward him, he will do even more than he is capable of.

[Question] In conclusion, Anatoliy Vasil'yevich, possibly you might briefly outline where you see reserves in the struggle to strengthen military discipline?

[Answer] Primarily in strengthening that experience which has been acquired in the course of the socialist competition. Life convinces us that in those subunits where the servicemen assume specific obligations and actively fight to carry them out, where the results of the training and the conduct of the servicemen are carefully analyzed, here, as a rule, results are higher in military and political training, discipline and military order are firmer. A well organized competition is an excellent indoctrinator! This must be remembered.

There is one other important aspect. All reserves in the struggle for strengthening discipline can be put into operation only under the condition of close and coordinated work by the commanders, the political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations. Joint efforts make it possible for us to create and maintain in the regiment a healthy moral-political atmosphere. This provides an opportunity to assess the state of affairs according to party principles and exactingly and to instill in the personnel an implacability for shortcomings.

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STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES

EXERCISE AND TRAINING RESULTS DISCUSSED

Results of Special Tactical Exercise Examined

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jun 82 p 1

[Article by Colonel A. Fedorov: "The Dynamics of Growth, With Initiators of Competition"]

[Text] On one particular special tactical exercise, personnel of a unit (chast') which had come out as an initiator in socialist competition within the Strategic Rocket Forces were required to perform in a difficult, stressful situation. So much the more creditable then was the accomplishment of these rocket force troops who had demonstrated their skill under exceptionally difficult conditions. Their senior commander gave their performance the highest possible rating.

Success is always gratifying. And what frequently happens is that once we have it behind us we fail to take note of individual deficiencies and errors. Its really no big deal, you'll hear people say, if some specialists don't perform as efficiently or as confidently as was to be expected—the subunits (podrazdeleniye) and crews were, on the whole, successful in accomplishing their assigned mission.

This, however, is not the view unit commander Lieutenant Colonel I. Shelestov and his political and staff officers took of things. They were disturbed by the question of why it was they were not seeing any improvement in the operational skills demonstrated by officers V. Sukharev and V. Balakonenko, men under the command of Captain A. Vyalov. Both men are experienced specialists and have more than once turned in virtuoso performances on their equipment, but now during this particular exercise they performed less confidently. A random incident perhaps? No, behind cases like this are usually to be found deficiencies in the organization of combat training and competition.

Staff officers and members of the methods council worked in the subunit for several days. They monitored the drills and exercises, attended meetings at which training results were computed, compared data on improvement in specialist skills and analyzed the officers' independent study program. As far as the decline which was to be observed in Sukharev's and Balakonenko's performance was itself concerned, it did not require much effort to discover the reason. The fact was that, in relying upon their experience and independence, Captain Vyalov, the subunit commander, had reduced the demands he had been making on them, had become less exacting with them. At the same time, however, there were to be observed serious deficiencies in the very method employed in conducting the drills and exercises here.

A subunit commander's desire to achieve high levels of operational crew coordination in a brief period of time is, of course, understandable. The path toward this goal lies through drill. The rule has become that in the first phase of training, when specialists are only beginning to acquire the skills required for coordinated operations, the drills will not be characterized by any great degree of intensity; with time, however, the pace of combat training exercises will increase.

Captain Vyalov decided to gain time by shortening the preparatory period in the training of his specialists. His men began to perform as crews without having properly mastered their functional responsibilities. It would accordingly not infrequently happen that a crew member would make one error one day and then could repeat it the next—the subunit commander would not always have time to analyze crew errors. So while the speed at which an operation was performed would increase, the quality would suffer accordingly.

Captain Vyalov didn't have far to go, as we say, to find other experience he could have drawn upon. It was to be found right there next door in his neighboring subunits. Here were no few "outstanding"-rated crews. But why is so little advantage being taken of his neighbors' experience?

Others besides the staff officers and methods council members were giving thought to this question. The unit party bureau, headed by Senior Lieutenant S. Bukan', decided to include the question of communists' tasks in publicizing innovative ideas and practices on the agenda of the next party meeting. Speakers at the meeting not only pointed out to Captain Vyalov his deficiencies, they also—and this was the main thing—they also gave consideration to what could be done to help him. Among others, the suggestion was made that more intensive use be made of such modes of exchanging experience as demonstration exercises to be put on by the best commanders.

One such demonstration exercise was given by Captain V. Sushchenya. It was no mere coincidence that he was selected to do this. A master of military skills and an experienced methods specialist, he prepares for every training session as if it were his first session as an instructor.

Captain Sushchenya gave a demonstration exercise for two crews simultaneously. This enabled him to pursue yet another objective—to show in what form the organic unity of the training process and competition can find expression in practice.

Men under Senior Lieutenant A. Yakushkov's command took their places. They begin a "warm-up" period in which they work on meeting individual norm requirements. This, however, conveys no small amount of information to the thinking instructor. It helps identify the strong points and the weak points in the training of a specialist. It then becomes useful in determining upon the appropriate training problems to be employed.

The transition to integrated combat training missions occurs without being noticed. The speed attained in performing to achieve group norms is one of the important criteria to be employed in evaluating specialist performance. But not the most important. While Senior Lieutenant A. Yuferev's men, now in the role of instructors, do glance at their stopwatches from time to time, they as well as the primary instructor are paying attention primarily to the accuracy, the "purity" with which their competition rivals execute their tasks.

It cannot be expected, of course, that a single demonstration exercise, even one conducted at the highest possible level, will alone be enough to enrich subunit commanders and crews with all necessary methodological skills. There is no doubting, however, that it will give them some momentum in the right direction. This was precisely the primary objective the staff officers in this instance had set for themselves, and they achieved it. Not only Captain Vyalov, but other commanders as well, took an interest in the methodological innovations Captain Sushchenya was using.

After the first demonstration exercise, Major Yerzonov conducted another one, this one devoted to the use of programmed instruction devices. This, too, aroused the interest of many subunit commanders and crews. The next step now suggested itself—organize a meeting for an exchange of experience. This led to the idea of putting on a crew competition.

Turning in the best performance was the crew led by Senior Lieutenant Yakushkov. But Captain Vyalov's men achieved good results as well. This was to a great extent owing to the fact that the subunit had begun to make active use of innovative ideas and practices.

The unit began to see a noticeable increase in the number of its rated specialists and masters. It was as if life itself had launched a new initiative: "From master in a crew to a crew of masters!" The subunits themselves are now taking up this initiative. Competition to render a fitting salute to the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR during the summer training period has now reached a new level of intensity.

Year's Training Results Viewed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Oct 82 p 2

[Article by Colonel I. Shelestov: "Discover, Test, Adopt, Results of the Training Year: The Leaders' Experience"]

[Text] Let me begin with the party meeting, memorable for all of us, held at the beginning of the training year. Discussion on that occasion ran to the question of how to stimulate creative activity and initiative in our people and mobilize them for successful fulfillment of socialist obligations. That turned out to be a really pointed, businesslike discussion. The accent was on the question of how we can identify what is new and instructive in the efforts of the leaders in one area or another and then as quickly, effectively and extensively as possible introduce it into the practice of all rocket troops. This was the subject of particularly heated discussion.

The fact is, of course, that we will frequently observe the following sequence of events: an innovative idea or practice will emerge somewhere, it will be tested, its advantages demonstrated but then some elements [zveno] will be slow to adopt it. Why? The passivity of individual comrades will have come into play here. And communists subjected it here to uncompromising criticism. Accusations were also brought against a number of unit (chast') staff officers, who occasionally failed to demonstrate the bold creativity and originality, energy and persistence in carrying things initiated through to completion.

The meeting served to provide us with a good mobilizing impetus. As I think back to it my thoughts turn to the forceful, effective role the party organization played on

this occasion, demonstrating as it did its ability to build fire under people and stir their enthusiasm for accomplishing difficult and important tasks.

We will occasionally hear people express the opinion that the experience is there and it's really no difficult thing to adopt it for practical use. This, unfortunately, is a misconception. In the first place, that which is valuable and instructive which every commander and political officer will have to offer, assuming he demonstrates creativity and originality in his work, will not always be found to lie on the surface. You have to know how to identify it. Second, even the experience our recognized leaders have to share, experience which can speak for itself, requires that we approach the task of publicizing it in a thoughtful, creative manner.

The experience acquired by master Captain Sushchenya, for example, has quickly become an asset we now hold in common. The techniques and methods of instruction he employs were studied by members of the methods council. They then developed specific recommendations, which all subunits have been implementing with success.

It would have appeared that things were on the right track. But there was the undeniable fact that once having achieved positive results, officers who had borrowed from Sushchenya's experience began in time to return to their old ways. What was the problem? Somebody was inclined to explain this phenomenon by pointing to what he thought looked like inadequate purposefulness and consistency in these officers' efforts. But when the whole business was examined more carefully, the real reason turned out to be something else entirely. It was simply that Captain Sushchenya himself had not been marking time; he was continually on the search for and adopting was new and innovative and achieving ever greater success.

To make it possible for everybody else to see this for themselves, Captain Sushchenya was asked to prepare and then put on a demonstration exercise. It proved to be highly instructive. On the surface at least, the plan in accordance with which this officer organizes his instruction and drill isn't anything particularly out of the ordinary. The training and instruction of a new specialist initially proceeds on an individual level. Particular attention here is given to both the completeness and correctness with which each operation is performed as well as the efficiency of the methods and procedures employed in these operations. Training continues in this manner until the trainee learns to perform his operations with confidence and without errors. At this point begins the shift in concentration to the development of crew coordination. The final phase consists in the execution of integrated combat training missions on a simulator. This phase will characteristically see a situation become gradually more complicated and saturated with a variety of hypothetical technical and tactical problems.

What is it that's particularly valuable and instructive about Captain Sushchenya's approach? The fact that he will be drilling two crews simultaneously: specialists of one of them will work on the equipment, while those of the other crew will play the role of instructors. They then change places. What does this do? It creates high levels of activity and sets up direct competition between specialists in the training process.

Before the beginning of each training session, Captain Sushchenya conducts what he refers to as a "warm-up", during which he has the trainees concentrate on individual norm requirements. This would appear to be a simple business at first glance. The thoughtful officer, however, can turn this to no little benefit as well. In the process of

going through these preparatory "limbering-up drills" day after day he obtains information for systems analysis; he monitors the progress his men are making in the development of practical skills, gives them helpful recommendations and follows their progress.

Captain Sushchenya's creative bent shows itself particularly clearly in the individual work he does with his young officers. Their theoretical training, their physical condition, sense of responsibility, the peculiarities of their personal character, their reaction times—he is continually studying all these things and taking it into consideration.

Lieutenant V. Biryukov's course of training and professional development is instructive in this connection. Upon completing his work at the military academy, this young officer was full of optimistic plans and high hopes. After encountering serious difficulties in mastering his operational duties and in developing the practical skills required for being placed on operational readiness status, his spirits flagged, dropping him into the ranks of those found to be "unpromising." It was at that point that Captain Sushchenya came to his aid. He was able to hearten the lieutenant and helped him put together a detailed plan of independent preparation. Biryukov did indeed begin to make progress and successfully passed the tests for 3d class; he was at the same time placed on operational duty status.

Our innovators, officers A. Yerzunov, G. Voronkin, A. Yakushkov and G. Rodionov and Warrant Officer V. Chulkov, have also turned in good performances this year. Thanks to their efforts we have been able to make substantial improvements in our training materials base. In this regard, we have gone the route of developing training equipment which, in combination with the organizational simulator, would allow us to create highly accurate models of processes occurring within a piece of hardware and reduce the arbitrary, hypothetical aspects of the execution of a practice mission to zero. Experience has shown this to be the correct route. Some subunits have been able to reduce the time required to prepare new specialists for operational duties by almost 20 per cent.

We have at the same time been giving thought to something else: are all instructors using their simulators effectively enough? are they able to get the maximum possible benefit out of them? This question has arisen in connection with the fact that the reductions which have been achieved in the time required to prepare new specialists for operational duties have not everywhere been as great as those achieved in our leading subunits. Analysis has shown that not all officers serving as instructors are developing the knowledge and skills required to exploit their training materials and equipment to, as we say, to the fullest extent of their capabilities. We have to help them acquire this knowledge and these skills.

We have placed particular emphasis upon exchanges of experience in the process of preparing trainees for operational responsibilities and of conducting integrated exercises and demonstration and intructional methods instruction based upon the example of our best subunits. We have also utilized such forms as seminars devoted to publicizing innovative ideas and practices. I should say something in particular about how these seminars are organized and the nature of the occasions they offer. Here are opportunities for lively exchanges of opinions, creative discoveries and ideas. Not only experienced commanders, but young officers as well have a chance to have their say. If their point of view on one question or another proves mistaken there's no

problem. Their comrades will correct them, but the most important thing is that in the course of seminars like this the discussion will generate useful suggestions for individual work with instructors.

We have also taken an interest in our innovators' suggestion that we develop special combat mission algorithms with the objective of accelerating the process of crew specialist training. What are we talking about here? There are two descriptions. One comprises the most typical training tasks as well as variants of possible complications to be encountered in accomplishing them. The other will consist of recommendations having to do with operational procedures. Algorithms make it possible for an instructor within the shortest possible period of time, on the one hand, to present trainees a mission and vary the situation and, on the other hand, for crew specialists to respond immediately to these changes by taking the proper actions. The intensity of a drill may accordingly be varied through the broadest possible range depending upon the instructor's plan.

We have decided this year to conduct our monthly competition for the "best crew" title in a new way as well. Each subunit will no longer continually enter one and the same crew made up of the best specialists, but rather a new one each time. This will deprive commanders of the possibility of using only his leaders and of creating any kind of special conditions for them and at the same time will force them to give greater attention to insuring high and consistent levels of training for all crews.

Careful study by unit staff officers of the situation in the various subunits has made it possible in a timely manner to prevent instances of unobjective approaches being taken to evaluating combat crew training, particularly on the part of young officers. Lieutenant S. Pribytkov, for example, was found to be taking such an approach. On one particular occasion, after he had presented his report on the accomplishment of an operational training mission, the deputy for political affairs, the party bureau secretary and I discussed the situation and decided to check and see how accurately the lieutenant had evaluated the crew's performance. His results unfortunately proved to be overstated. We had to give the young officer a strict warning. Other unit officers, too, drew their own conclusions from this incident.

We have also taken steps to give more concrete publicity to leaders in competition and their achievements. We are going about this task in a substantially different way now. We have, for example, initiated the practice of awarding personnel the title "best specialist, for distinguished operational performance." Candidates are selected on the basis of results achieved in execution of an operational assignment after full discussion between the subunit commander, his deputy for political affairs and the secretaries of the party and Komsomol organizations. The first announcement in an order that this title had been awarded to Senior Sergeant S. Demenyuk, PFC S. Vlasov and other personnel stirred the most enthusiastic response among their fellow service members and a desire to be counted among the ranks of the best.

...I would like once again to return to the example of Lieutenant V. Biryukov, whom I referred to earlier in this article. Over the course of a year's time he developed into a good specialist. This fact is evidence that the senior personnel upon whom the development of this young officer depended went about their task in a conscientious manner. Through their own exertion, enthusiastic involvement and words of encouragement they were, it seemed, able to double his efforts, and he achieved much.

There are, in fact, no few such examples to be discovered in the life of the unit, and taken as a whole they consititute a remarkable development.

As our most valuable asset we, all of us together—commanders, political officers and communists, are striving to preserve and nurture the great creative drive and spiritual uplift of our people and develop initiative such that each individual becomes enthusiastic about his work and inspired in his labors, in his service, that he discover the full extent of his creative capacities and that he put forth more vigorous efforts to remedy existing deficiencies in training, discipline and competition.

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LOGISTICAL SERVICES AND SPECIAL TROOPS

FOOD PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION IN MILITARY UNITS DISCUSSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 21, Nov 82 (signed to press 19 Oct 82) pp 29-34

[Article by Lt Gen Intend Serv Ye. Gol'dberg, Chief of the Main Trade Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense: "To More Fully Satisfy the Needs of the Personnel"]

[Text] The 11th Five-Year Plan is an important stage in the further advance of Soviet society along the path to communism, in creating its material and technical base and in strengthening the nation's economic and defense might. Only its second year is ending, but how much the party has done to improve the life of the people and for the good of the people! The May (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee became a major event as this discussed the USSR Food Program for the period up to 1990 and outlined the ways and means for realizing it. The plenum decisions are of exceptionally important significance. The Food Program presupposes a profound reorganization in the national economy considering the modern scientific and technical achievements and the experience of socialist construction. This is an outstanding plan of action for our party in terms of its goals and scale and is aimed at creating a new economic basis for the agroindustrial complex.

In speaking at the Plenum, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev pointed out: "...In order to make headway in solving the food problem, it is essential to pay more attention to all the links of that chain through which agricultural products are delivered to the consumer." Trade is an important link in this chain. To a large degree the successful carrying out of the tasks posed by the plenum depends upon its organization, clarity and continuity. Trade should bring the consumer the products produced at the enterprises of the agroindustrial complex in a whole and well preserved state. The level of trade, the party has pointed out, should be significantly raised.

Among the military trade workers the Food Program elaborated by the party has encountered unanimous support and it is viewed as a specific guide to action. At regional conferences for the leading workers of military trade held by the Main Trade Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense in Moscow and Sverdlovsk, practical tasks were discussed stemming from the decisions of the May (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. After this, everywhere in the trade directorates of the districts and fleets and in the military trade organizations,

meetings were held for the party-economic aktiv and also meetings of the primary party organizations. The activities of the trade enterprises were profoundly analyzed and unutilized reserves were disclosed. For example, it was established that along with a fundamental improvement in the trade services for the servicemen, the trade workers could also expand pig fattening using waste food, increase the production of semiprepared foods, prepared foods, candy and flour products as well as develop hothouse farms for the military trade organizations for growing vegetables.

The decisions of the May (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee were also discussed at trade union and Komsomol meetings and studied in the party education network. Systematic ideological indoctrination has been carried out with the personnel and the party and government decisions are steadily being carried out. Everywhere they are seeing to it that each military trade worker knows that he is an active participant in carrying out the Food Program since this program involves each and every person.

An interested and creative discussion of the tasks stemming from the party's instructions and the collective elaboration of decisions strengthen in the men a feeling of involvement in the common cause and arouse them to work with initiative and in a shock manner. Many collectives have revised the previously accepted socialist obligations and are adopting additional tauter ones. A plan for carrying out the Food Program has been elaborated by each directorate.

All of this has produced positive results. It can be pointed out, for example, that in recent months there has been a significant rise in the number of military trade organizations participating in pork production. New kitchen and subsidiary farms are being organized. Ties are being established with the local gosbank divisions and with loans from them pig sties equipped with modern facilities are being built by the direct labor method. This work has been particularly well organized in the Kiev and Urals Military Districts and in the Northern and Pacific Fleets. In our view, indicative is the experience acquired in the trade directorate of the Pacific Fleet (directorate chief, Lt Col V. Rezyapov). Here they have built seven pig sties for 950 head. Brick quarters have been built onto each pig sty and here are located the feed kitchen, a storeroom for the combined feed and a rest area for the pig keepers. The rest areas have good furniture, there are colored televisions, radios and refrigerators. After work the people can rest in a cultivated manner. Here also are stands with the basic indicators for hog fattening, the socialist obligations, recommendations for tending the animals as well as other visual agitation. Such an approach to the question is particularly important now, when intense work has commenced to increase meat production and to improve the supply of food products for the people.

We would point out that since 1981, pig sties have been constructed according to plans of the Main Trade Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Over this time, 21 pig sties for 3,700 animals have been built in the districts. This has made it possible to increase the number of animals fattened over the 8 months of the current year by 42 percent and to obtain 28.5 percent more meat than over the same period of last year. Again, we would like to point out the Urals as well as the Carpathian Military Districts (chiefs of the trade directorates, Cols G. Kolosov and G. Luk'yanenko) and the Pacific Fleet. In each of

these trade directorates, per military trade organization there is an average of 100 hogs and the Pacific Fleet workers, along with purchasing young animals, reproduce them in specially-created small sties for breeding sows.

The activities of the trade directorate collective in the Urals Military District should also be noted. Here there is a subsidiary farm which includes three pig sties for 900 hogs, a poultry farm for 15,000 chickens and two hothouses for raising vegetables. Last year, for example, the Urals workers produced 1,977 quintals of pork, 900,000 eggs, 740 quintals of cucumbers, 16 quintals of tomatoes and 111 quintals of green onion. This was a good addition to the table of the servicemen and the members of their families. The farm is continuing to develop and improve.

At present, the trade directorates are working on bringing the number of pigs up to 100 for each military trade organization by the end of the current year. This task has been set for all the military trade organizations in all the districts and fleets. Its realization will make it possible to double pork production and significantly increase the proportional amount of own-produced products in the total meat consumption in public dining.

But 100 head per trade organization is, of course, not the limit. In the military trade organization led by V. Tsyupko, for a number of years now they have annually fattened 200-250 hogs. Here they have also organized the reproduction of young animals and the raising of vegetables to fatten the animals.

In the military trade organization headed by Lt Col V. Gal'chanskiy, around 200 hogs are now kept for fattening. In the first 6 months they obtained 72 quintals of meat here and in the second they intend to significantly surpass this figure. Indicatively, pig fattening in this trade organization has been put on a scientific basis, there is no overexpenditure of concentrated feed, the gross weight increase exceeded the planned limits by 23.3 percent, and the cost of 1 kg of meat was 76 kopecks. This is the lowest cost in the entire military trade system.

We already have many military trade organizations which are fattening 200 and more hogs. These organizations are led by experienced workers such as L. Litvinenko, D. Berezhnoy and others. The collective of the military trade organization led by Yu. Pavlov in the Kiev Military District has come forward with a valuable initiative. During the second year of the 11th Five-Year Plan it will bring the number of pigs being fattened up to 250 head; for providing the pigs with their own feed they intend to plant cereals and perennial grasses on up to 30 hectares; in 1982 they will prepare 500 quintals of non-standard fruit and vegetable products. The meeting of the party-economic aktiv of this military trade organization urged all the district military trade workers to take an active part in the struggle to increase the production of livestock products. We are hopeful that this appeal will be supported by all military trade workers.

Unfortunately, there are also examples of another sort. Pig fattening is being slowly carried out in the trade directorates of the Northern Caucasus, Transcaucasian and Baltic Military Districts. Obsolete views continue to prevail over individual chiefs of military trade organizations. In their mind

"we are trade and the fattening of pigs is not our concern." As a result, such phenomena are observed as the poor collecting of waste food, the lack of own feed for the animals, the overexpenditure of concentrated feed and high product costs. Great explanatory and indoctrinational work by the party, trade union and Komsomol organizations in the miltiary trade organizations is needed to eliminate such shortcomings.

Well-organized public dining is also of important significance in carrying out the Food Program. The CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers have demanded during the current five-year plan a more rapid (in comparison with foodstuffs trade) development rate for public dining and a greater role for it in satisfying the needs of the public.

In the military trade enterprises, definite work is being done to carry out these instructions. However, the development level of public dining in a number of places still does not meet the demands made. In particular, it is essential to introduce progressive methods for preparing the food by converting the public dining enterprises to complete supply for all types of semiprepared foods (meat, fish, vegetable and peeled potatoes). For this, it is essential to build our own preparatory enterprises, and primarily shops to clearn potatoes and vegetables, under the trade-purchasing bases and warehouses of the military trade organizations, as well as reconstruct the existing enterprises, in specializing them completely or partially in producing semiprepared foods.

At the same time it is essential to significantly increase the production of semiprepared foods by the local trade organizations. This would be a great support for the public dining bodies during the period of reconstructing the existing enterprises and the building of new ones; this would provide an opportunity to convert more quickly to self-supply and complete feeding of visitors in the dining rooms of the military trade organization.

Particular attention must be paid to increasing the production of prepared, candy and flour products in order to increase their output volume by at least 2-fold in 1983 and by 3-fold in 1985. For this, it is essential to build larger confectionary shops and increase the operating efficiency of the existing ones.

The very organization of trade requires a further improving. The Food Program has set the task of adopting measures to expand and rationally locate the network of stores, dining rooms and other trade enterprises and to improve their operating hours in the aim of creating maximum convenience for the public. In the military trade organizations at present, a great deal is being done to carry out these instructions. In a whole number of garrisons, comprehensive trade centers have been organized consisting of stores, dining rooms, soldier tearooms and service enterprises. Particular attention has been paid to mobile trade and to the selling of essential goods directly in the troop units where fairs and bazaars are organized. In the first half of the current year, in comparison with the same period of last year, this form of trade has increased by 10 percent.

The trade directorate of the Moscow garrison (chief, Lt Col Ye. Kruglov) has set an example of the able organization of mobile trade. In observing an

effective system of cooperation between trade and farming of "field-to-store," this directorate has organized the delivery of early potatoes as well as vegetables and fruits from the southern regions of our nation. And all these products have gone into mobile trade, directly to the troop units.

The Central Department Store of the Main Trade Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense (chief, Col A. Dolzhenko) has also done a good deal to introduce progressive forms of trade. In broadening the concluding of direct contracts with agricultural organizations in the southern regions of our nation, during the current year it has sold 30,000 rubles of fruit. One-half of this amount was received from mobile trade. The department store has skillfully organized the selling of foodstuffs in trays during the conducting of various measures.

Certainly we are not inclined to delude ourselves with the successes. Along with the accomplishments in military trade there are also many unsolved questions. Particularly intolerable are the interruptions in the selling of individual foodstuffs in the troops. There still are instances when bread, dairy products or vegetables have not arrived by the opening of the store and it also happens that none of these has arrived. As a result, the purchasers are forced to become anxious and waste precious time waiting in lines for the delivery of these goods. As we see, certain responsible officials must immediately set to eliminating the stoppages in trade and establish firm operating hours of the stores which would conform to the daily regimen of the troop unit and would satisfy the needs of the garrison inhabitants. This is a matter of daily essentials. The population of the garrisons should actually feel that the immediate tasks of the Food Program as raised by the party are now being carried out. And carried out successfully.

Among such tasks is an improvement in preordered trade, particularly directly in the troops. It is essential to accelerate the broadening of this form of trade and see to it that no troop unit remains outside of it. The receiving and issuing of the orders must also be well organized.

The Food Program envisages effective measures to improve the supply of fruits, vegetables and potatoes to the public, since the supply of these valuable food products to the public significantly lags behind the recommended standards. This also applies to military trade. As of 1 October 1982, in the military trade system significantly more potatoes, vegetables and fruits had been purchased in comparison with last year. In addition, 267 tons of strawberries and around 1,000 tons of peaches had been flown in from Bulgaria to the garrisons of the Far North, the Transbaykal Area and the Far East.

However, we must not be complacent. It is essential to continue and further seek out the necessary resources for these products on the spot. They must be purchased from the agricultural organizations and from private individuals. Wild berries, nuts and mushrooms should be purchased. Measures must be carried out to improve the organization of trade and expand the sale of foods in pavilions and booths at convenient times for the public.

At the same time, particular attention must be paid to the safekeeping of fruits, vegetables and potatoes. "In each rayon, in each oblast, in each republic," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the May (1982) Plenum of the CPSU

Central Committee, "a precise system of measures should be thought out and implemented to combat losses and to ensure uninterrupted operation of the procurement, transport and trade organizations. The shorter and simplier the ties between the field and the store, the better it is for the business and for the consumer." We, the military trade workers, must draw the appropriate conclusions from these instructions.

The Army and Navy are already concluding the purchasing of potatoes, vegetables and fruits from the 1982 harvest. Each year the party and government allocate us sufficient funds for these most valuable food products. Regardless of the bad weather conditions in the current year in a number of our nation's regions, the military trade workers as a whole successfully handled the tasks assigned to them. The procurement plan was overfulfilled. Now the main thing is to protect the created supplies and not allow their spoilage.

The chiefs of the military trade organizations, the heads, storekeepers and merchandising experts of the fruit and vegetable bases and warehouses must pay particular attention and show high professional skill in order to preserve the stored products until the new crop. Everything necessary for this exists on the spot. An absolute majority of the military trade organizations has a modern physical plant. During the summer season this was carefully overhauled and significantly improved. Many new refrigeration units as well as potato and fruit storage capacity were built in the garrisons. It is essential to correctly utilize these facilities and organize the storage of potatoes, vegetables and fruits in full accord with the existing rules. Our party, trade union and Komsomol organizations must focus the personnel on carefully storing the purchased products.

Here it is essential to consider the mistakes and oversights which occurred in the not distant past. Certain military trade workers evidenced a negligent attitude toward the safekeeping of these valuable food products. As a result, we had tangible above-norm losses of fruit and vegetable products. As inspections showed, in a majority of instances these losses occurred due to the fact that the proper temperature and air humidity were not always maintained in the storage facilities, the products were not promptly sorted, and the selecting for sales was not correctly carried out. Weight losses also occurred in loading work and in transporting the products by motor vehicle.

But there are also many examples of how the military trade workers have shown a careful attitude toward protecting the fruits of nature and year after year have achieved high results in the winter storage of potatoes, vegetables and fruits. They realize that the agricultural workers have devoted much effort and energy to growing a good fruit and vegetable crop and they show great respect for their labor. The matter has been organized precisely in this manner in the military trade organizations of the Leningrad Military District (chief of the trade directorate, Col V. Shvilikh), the Belorussian Military District (chief of the trade directorate, Lt Col A. Rodionov), the Odessa Military District (chief of the trade directorate, Col R. Shkhnazarov) and the Moscow Military District (chief of the trade directorate, Col V. Tsyplakov). They did not have above-norm fruit and vegetable losses either in 1981 or in the first half of 1982. It is essential that the positive experience of the military trade pacesetters become widespread everywhere.

The participation of the military trade workers in carrying out the Food Program is largely determined by the fulfillment of the retail commodity turnover plan. This is our basic indicator for operations, and constant attention should be focused on it. Here we cannot say that everything is going well. In the first half-year, the commodity turnover plan was not fulfilled by the trade directorates of the Transbaykal and Central Asian Military Districts or the Northern Fleet. They must more effectively revise their work and bring it into accord with the demands of our party and the needs of the purchasers. For this, there must be a decisive improvement in the organizing of commodity sales and all existing opportunities must be effectively utilized.

Here the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Measures to Further Develop Trade and Improve Trade Services for the Public in the 11th Five-Year Plan" is a guide for action. This decree places great tasks for the trade workers. In carrying them out, it is essential to show a high feeling of responsibility as well as initiative and creativity.

In carrying out the outlined plans, much depends upon the level of political indoctrination in the military trade collectives. The political bodies and the party and Komsomol organizations must in every possible way support all that is new and advanced, they must fight decisively against manifestations of mismanagement and indifference, they must constantly mobilize the trade workers to improve the quality of labor and fully satisfy the needs of the servicemen and the members of their families. A clear understanding of one's tasks, a critical assessment of the work results and the search for reserves to improve its efficiency—this is what will help us make a worthy contribution to carrying out the USSR Food Program.

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MILITARY SCHOOLS AND ACADEMIES

MILITARY PSYCHOLOGY AND TROOP TRAINING DISCUSSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 21, Nov 82 (signed to press 19 Oct 82) pp 59-66

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Lt Gen I. Ovcharenko, Chief of the Political Section of the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze: "Military Psychology and the Process of Instructing Students"]

[Text] The Communist Party has given constant attention to the training of leadership personnel. Having noted the successes of the Soviet higher school, the 26th CPSU Congress emphasized that in the future it is essential to improve the quality of instruction and to broaden and strengthen the ties of the training and educational process with practice and life. The Decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers "On Further Developing the Higher School and Improving the Quality of Specialist Training" has become a new manifestation of concern for personnel. The decree outlines a specific program of higher school activities at the present stage, and these apply fully to military schools.

The rapid development of military equipment, weapons and military affairs as a whole has confronted the military academies and schools training command, political and engineer personnel with evermore complex tasks. This is quite natural. A most important demand of the party's is not to restrict graduates to just high professional training. They must have an integrated Marxist-Leninist ideology, communist conviction and firm skills in leading the military collectives. The military school graduates, the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, has pointed out, should be given "a feeling for the new, they should manifest initiative and creativity in solving the problems raised by life, they should have firm pedagogical and psychological knowledge and be a model of moral purity and general culture."

It is particularly essential to emphasize the influence of psychology on the effectiveness of the instruction and indoctrination process. Recently, its role has risen noticeably in all spheres of social life. In the pedagogical process, as is known, man holds the leading place. Both as the control element and as the object of control. This also determines the inevitability, in the course of training a military specialist, in turning to military psychology and to the practical employment of its conclusions and recommendations. Certainly no improvement in the pedagogical process or rise in the results of the instruction and indoctrination of the students and officer candidates are possible

without considering their intellectual and emotional reserves and the potentials of the human psyche.

In pedagogical practice, the recommendations of psychology have long been resorted to. For example, in our academy great attention has been paid to the studying of these since its inception. Even during the years of the Civil War, prominent civil military leaders such as N. I. Podvoyskiy, M. V. Frunze and M. N. Tukhachevskiy in their speeches repeatedly emphasized the importance of military psychology for increasing the combat capability of the young Red Army. "Our army," said M. V. Frunze after whom the academy is named, "should be technically and psychologically prepared to carry out any sort of task."

The first systematized course of lectures on military psychology was given in the 1919-1920 academic year personally by the chief of the academy A. Ye. Snesarev. The lectures and seminar exercises provided a great deal for the graduates. The Red officers who came from the people in the fire of the battles on the Civil War fronts demonstrated their superiority over the command personnel of the White Guards and interventionists. This included in their operational-tactical thinking, in their knowledge of the laws of relationships between people and collectives and in their ability to unite them and lead them.

A course in military psychology has existed in the academy starting in the 1920's. During this period there was a special psychological laboratory which had been created upon the orders of the Revvoyensovet [Revolutionary Military Council] of 2 March 1920. Its co-workers were concerned with studying the behavior of individuals and entire collectives under various conditions of troop activities and provided recommendations on the use of graduates in various positions and on selecting candidates for instruction.

The psychological laboratory generally proved effective. It obtained very interesting materials which were employed not only in the academy, but also in the Red Army units and institutions. Its activities were generalized in the book "Opyt psikhologicheskoy raboty v Voyennoy akademii RKKA" [Experience of Psychological Work in the Red Army Military Academy]. The book attracted the attention of leading workers at the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff. Upon the initiative of M. V. Frunze who held the post of people's commissar, a system of psychophysical laboratories was organized in a number of military schools and institutions. The people's commissar showed constant interest in their work and utilized the results obtained by them in his speeches, articles and so forth.

The military psychological works of M. V. Frunze and other Soviet military leaders, in being based on Marxist-Leninist methodology, are marked by a high party approach and scientificness. They have not lost their practical value and for the command, the political workers and the faculty serve as a model for working out military psychology problems in relation to carrying out the tasks of instructing and indoctrinating the students, preparing them for leadership of the units in modern combat and carrying out political indoctrination in the troops.

Over the more than half-century of its existence, the academy has acquired great experience. On the basis of this, all categories of servicemen make a planned and profound study of psychology. For the young instructors, the course is given on "psychological and pedagogical bases in training and indoctrinational work." After studying this, each man takes an exam. For the remaining instructors, in the system of commander training lectures and seminars are organized on the urgent problems of the higher military school. In the instructing of the students, basic attention is given to the psychological problems of the leadership of people, to the psychology of individual soldiers and military collectives and to the methods of preparing them for active operations in a combat situation. For the students of academy courses where the instructors from the military schools of the Ground Forces improve their skills, the accent is put on studying the particular features of psychology in the officer candidate collectives as well as on the ways for increasing the effectiveness of their cognitive activites and their control. The shaping of psychological knowledge, abilities and skills is one of the most important tasks in the military professional training within the academy.

The questions of military psychology are organically incorporated in the content of the training programs for Marxist-Leninist philosophy, military pedagogics and operational-tactical disciplines. These problems are also taken up in the course of the training process. In addition to planned exercises, extracurricular lectures, conferences and meetings with prominent military psychologists are organized. The command and political section of the academy have provided clear cooperation between the chairs and faculties, directing their efforts toward a single goal. They actively intervene into the course of the training and indoctrinational process, they provide specific recommendations in accord with the party's instructions and the demands of the USSR minister of defense on the training of personnel and provide help in their practical implementation.

During the winter of the last training year, upon the political section's initiative, a thorough analysis was made of the work done by the chairs in the area of the moral-political and psychological training of the students. The obtained results were examined and discussed in detail by the academy council. Speaking before it was the deputy chief of the academy, Lt Gen L. Kadatskiy, who disclosed a series of shortcomings in this area. The facts given by him helped in critically assessing the pedagogical work and to better and more clearly see the existing reserves and the ways for realizing them.

The academy council obliged the leaders of the chairs to continue improving the psychological and pedagogical training of the faculty, to creatively implement a comprehensive approach to the training and indoctrination of the students, to ensure a party approach in the instruction of all disciplines, particularly for military ones, and to more boldly introduce new, progressive methods in the training process. These recommendations became a subject of discussion at the permanent seminars, at sessions of the chairs and subject procedural commissions as well as at party meetings. Many apt proposals were made the implementation of which provided positive results in the psychological tempering of the future combined-arms commanders.

The moral factor, as is known, plays a major role in raising combat readiness. It is an inseparable component of troop combat potential. In line with this, the demands have been constantly growing on further strengthening troop morale and the developing of high combat qualities in the troops. At present, each serviceman must be clearly aware of the moral, physical and psychological hardships he will encounter in real combat as well as what safety factor he must acquire in peacetime, in the course of combat training.

Our academy receives officers who have good ideological and psychological tempering as well as command experience. But this tempering must be raised to a higher level. Arguing in favor of such a conclusion is the experiment conducted by our psychologists during the entrance exams. The following picture was disclosed. Over 80 percent of the persons tested experienced negative emotions before the exam. Some responded slowly to various inputs while others clearly showed poorer accuracy of actions. Yet in terms of the amount of the psychological stress, the exam in no way could be compared with what might be encountered in a combat situation.

The psychological training of the students is a process of forming, on the basis of their ideological and moral convictions, such qualities which are essential for the combined-arms commanders in troop leadership under extremely tense and dangerous situations of modern combat. This training is carried out in close relation and cooperation with moral and political training. These are links in a single chain and they cannot be separated. Only in a unity can they produce the desired result.

Moral-political and psychological training permeates the entire pedagogical process in the academy. Its tasks are carried out by the joint efforts of the command, the political section and the collectives of all chairs. We would particularly like to emphasize the role of the social sciences chair. The party views the teaching of social sciences as an important area of ideological work in the VUZes. The faculty of these chairs also endeavors to honorably carry out their duty to the party.

The basis for the ideological tempering of the students is a profound knowledge of Marxism-Leninism as an integrated teaching which includes philosophical, economic and sociopolitical views, the history of the CPSU and the state as well as the teachings about war and the army. This knowledge is given primarily by the social sciences chairs and the social sciences instructors. Under their leadership the students study the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism, CPSU policy, the directing role of the party in the constructing of communism and in organizing national defense as well as the many-faceted activities of the CPSU Central Committee headed by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. Only a knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory makes it possible to correctly understand the fundamental questions of military-organizational development, the training and indoctrination of the troops, including the psychological capabilities of the men, and the moral consequences of various decisions and actions taken by them.

Naturally, the political section does everything possible to improve the level of the training-indoctrinational and scientific-procedural work of the social

sciences chairs and to more fully utilize their possibilities in shaping the Marxist-Leninist ideology and ideological conviction of the students. Due to this, their authority and influence on the other chairs have increased. The interchair theoretical seminars, the conferences for the leaders of course work and the mutual reviewing of lectures and teaching aids have become more informative. One such seminar conducted at the end of the last academic year was devoted to the problems of the moral-political and psychological training of the students. Participating in it were the instructors from the chair of party history and party political work, the chair for combat training procedures and officers from the political section. The seminar had a professional, creative nature. It helped outline new areas in work.

The course on urgent problems of party political work in the Soviet Armed Forces has assumed particular significance for the academy's students. This is one of the most important social science subjects which arms the future combined-arms commanders with a knowledge and practical skills in the political indoctrination of the men under the most diverse conditions of troop activities. It is closely linked to military psychology. The measures related to party-political and psychological support are conducted simultaneously, according to a single plan. For this reason, the political section devotes close attention to the psychological and pedagogical preparedness of the instructors for the course on party political work as their role is increasing more and more, particularly in working out with the students tactical problems in the field and at command-staff exercises. In the course of such exercises, the pedagogue has an indoctrinational effect on those around primarily through his communist conviction and broad scientific erudition. His sound knowledge of the psychology of conducting modern combat is a dependable prerequisite for the skillful use of the factors favoring the successful achievements of the goals set in the exercises.

In our academy the elements of the psychological preparation of students for active combat operations are incorporated in the plan for exercises and drills in many subjects. As for the direct combat training of the students, in this regard the greatest significance is given to bringing the training situation close to the conditions of real combat. In the training process extensive use is made of various technical devices and trainers which make it possible to simulate a combat situation in the audience. Particularly effective are trainers equipped as troop control points in combat. With their aid it is possible to introduce an entire complex of strong stimuli which operate on the human psyche during combat work.

It is generally known how difficult it is for a commander when in the course of combat he has very little or no inclination on the situation. But, as it turns out, it is even more difficult for him when the flow of information, like an avalanche, increases rapidly. It requires enormous restraint and unprecedented will power to analyze everything and to isolate the main and most essential thing. Such situations are often created in training drills. Here the exercise leaders proceed from the view that in modern combat not only the enemy, but also one's own troops will suffer heavy losses. Under certain conditions, as the Great Patriotic War showed, this factor has a negative effect upon troop morale and on their combat capability.

Research important in its conclusions was carried out on this subject by a collective of scientists from the chair headed by Lt Gen P. Malyakshin. In studying the combat operations of units which differed in composition, training level and equipment during the period of the war, the researchers were convinced that the moral and combat qualities of the personnel influenced the outcome of battle in a dual manner: in the first place, through the activeness of the personnel and their ability to effectively utilize the weapons and, secondly, through the psychological steadfastness and the capacity to maintain a fighting mood in critical situations. With the help of instructors from the social sciences chairs, they outlined the criteria for assessing the moralpolitical and psychological training of the units and subunits which participated in battles. The results of the research were reduced to a table which is frequently employed in exercises. The students can see for themselves that it is possible to avoid the negative consequences of high casualties if the moral-political and psychological conditioning of the troops is carried out not haphazardly but rather constantly. They learn to realistically assess the balance of forces and the ensuing consequences which can develop in the course of combat operations.

There is no doubt about it, modern equipment provides great opportunities for the modeling of a combat situation in exercises. But this situation, of course, cannot fully replace real combat conditions. In this regard much is provided by tactical exercises, particularly those with field firing. The students take an active part in them. Both during the period spent in the academy and in the troops. In going on a service training assignment, they are given specific assignments for moral-political and psychological training. The fulfillment of these is accounted for by the chairs and discussed at colloquiums and seminars.

The academy has long maintained close ties with the troops. These aid in mutual enrichment. Due to them the academy's training process reflects the experience of the units and subunits acquired during the years of the Great Patriotic War, in recent major exercises and in the carrying out of international tasks by the Soviet military.

It should be particularly emphasized that we pay the closest attention to combat experience which is characterized by an abundance of examples of courage, steadfastness and self-sacrifice by the armed defenders of the Soviet mother-Both the students and the instructors constantly turn to the very rich treasurehouse of military glory and valor shown by the heroes of the last war. Frequently trips are organized to the site of battles. For example, last year a large group of students headed by the participant of the Battle of Moscow, Prof, Maj Gen Art G. Biryukov visited the Greater Moscow Area. A detailed analysis of the operations of the units was carried out on the spot. For the same purpose a trip was organized to Volgograd under the leadership of Prof, Maj Gen B. Panov. All of this, taken together, comprises the system created in the academy for the moral-political and psychological conditioning of the students. Also in it we should put the measures provided under the comprehensive plan for the communist indoctrination of future combined-arms commanders. A significant portion of these measures is carried out during extracurricular time. The command and the political section endeavor to ensure the effectiveness of this work.

Another important area is the use of the recommendations of military psychology in the very training process and the increasing of its efficiency. Instruction is a natural, dialectically developing process. It has its own patterns and above all the patterns of the cognitive activities of the students. The instructor directs and controls these activities. But any control is effective only in the event that the essence of the controlled phenomenon or process is clear and comprehensible. The famous Russian pedagogue K. D. Ushinskiy formulated this demand in the following manner: "We cannot say to pedagogues: proceed in such a manner; but we can tell them: study the laws of those mental phenomena which you wish to control and proceed in accord with these laws and those circumstances under which you wish to apply them."

Experienced pedagogues who constantly rely on psychology are well aware that the cognitive capabilities of students are unevenly distributed over each hour of exercises. Initially, these increase gradually then, having reached the maximum, begin to decline. In the ordinary giving of a lecture, there are moments which are short in time when the students' attention lessens and they do not assimilate the material sufficiently well. But if instruction is carried out by active methods, then perception is improved. This, in particular, is the effect from problem studying. Its essence is that the pedagogue starts the exercise by the setting out of problems and then with the help of the students searches for ways to solve them. The problem nature of instruction prepares one to work under difficult situations where the right solution is provided by the capacity for nonstandard thinking. This is why many instructors endeavor to use this method.

A knowledge of human abilities makes it possible to correctly organize the cognitive activities of the students. Instruction which does not consider human abilities runs contrary to the requirements of psychology and cannot produce optimum results. The practical experience of the VUZes convincingly confirms this. For this reason in organizing the exercises the instructors endeavor to weigh and anticipate everything.

In the academy experiments and scientific research have assumed a broad scope in the area of raising the effectiveness of the training and indoctrinational process and further improving moral-political and psychological training. Many of our scientists and instructors participate in the scientific research proposed by the Chief Directorate of Military Schools under the USSR Ministry of Defense. Students are also often involved in the work. Very interesting material has been acquired. On the basis of it teaching aids have been created and their authors include Candidates of Sciences Maj Gen A. Shramchenko, Col M. Zakhodyakin and Col P. Fisenko. These aids have been made available to both the instructors and students.

However, the introduction of new developments into practice does not always occur easily and quickly. This is a major, important problem. The documents of the 26th CPSU Congress emphasized: "A crucial, most acute area at present is the introduction of scientific discoveries and inventions." The academy's political section and the party organizations consider it their duty to provide the greatest possible support for innovators in the practical implementation of their plans.

The new and advanced is introduced into all stages of the training process, including into the method of holding exams and quizzes. This is done with one aim, namely to more fully determine the mental abilities of the students and their ability to employ their knowledge in practice, particularly under complex, critical situations of combat. The use in the training process of systems analysis for various problems and many other methods worked out at the academy have produced good results.

Creative thought does not stand still. It is constantly developing and moving forward. The innovators are continuing the search. A large collective of scientists is working on the compiling of a list of professional qualities for a military leader in the command-staff specialty. This should be prepared by the academy. The list of qualities will provide answers to many questions of concern to the instructors and indoctrinators of highly skilled command personnel. At the same time, an improved procedure for the psychological selection of candidates for our academy is being worked out. It will also influence the organization of the training and indoctrinational process.

Thus, the academy is doing a great deal for the psychological tempering of the students and for utilizing the recommendations of military psychology in the training process. However, this does not mean that everything is going smoothly. There are definite shortcomings and oversights as well as unsolved problems. For example, the negative comments from the troops make it possible to judge this. From them it is clear that individual officers, having taken over the troop collectives, feel unsure of themselves when they must solve sociopsychological problems of human leadership and participate in party political work. Some of our graduates employ their knowledge in practice timidly and looking over their shoulder.

Why does this happen? Obviously, in the course of instruction some of the students have been overlooked by the instructors. The mentors pay more attention to some and less to others. Instruction itself, it turns out, is not sufficiently effective. It must be improved and bettered.

In a word, the academy collective has some work to do. The command and the political section, in analyzing the replies from the troops, have focused the faculty primarily on further strengthening the ideological content of the training process, its practical focus, the posing and carrying out of indoctrinational tasks in each exercise and the wider introduction of the problem method of instruction. As before, military psychology remains a dependable assistant for the pedagogues. Attention to it is growing on all the chairs. The program of instruction is being improved, new sections and subjects are being incorporated in it, in particular, the study of the psychological capabilities of the enemy in various types of combat operations.

The experience of other higher military schools plays an important role in carrying out the training and indoctrinational tasks. Our instructors regularly meet and exchange scientific information with the creative workers from the Military Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin, the Military Academy for the Armored Troops imeni Mar SU R. Ya. Malinovskiy and the Higher "Shot" Officer Courses imeni Mar SU B. M. Shaposhnikov. We have repeatedly heard lectures by

Doctors of Pedagogical Sciences A. Barabanshchikov, V. Davydov and N. Kiryashov and Doctors of Psychological Sciences M. D'yachenko, M. Korobeynikov and N. Fedenko. The instructors from a whole series of chairs are closely following the scientific research by the collective of scientists from the Military Medical Academy imeni S. M. Kirov the achievements of which are of great interest in the area of military psychology. Professional meetings, the all-round discussion of problems and the mutual search for ways to resolve them have brought inestimable mutual benefit.

In truth, such meetings sometimes are of a local nature. The time has come to put the question of disseminating advanced experience on a truly scientific basis. And not on a scale of a single academy, but rather on a basis of at least several leading higher military schools.

As is known, the students of the higher military school must be armed with the most modern scientific knowledge. At present, this demand is particularly timely. At the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, emphasized: "At present it is inconceivable to lead the troops and to instruct and indoctrinate them without scientific knowledge or contrary to science. The military leader of any rank can count on success in his work only when he is in step with the accomplishments of military theoretical thought and when he himself studies and grows."

The collective of our academy is steadily and purposefully working on carrying out the demands and instructions of the CPSU and the USSR Minister of Defense on the training of highly skilled command personnel. We are taking every measure to raise this work to a new, higher level, to increase the results of the training and indoctrinational process and to arm the students with practical skills and the ability to work with others.

Leaving the academy's walls are politically mature, psychologically strong officers who are capable of leading large military collectives. They are always ready to honorably carry out their duty to the fatherland.

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FOREIGN VIEWS ON PARTY CONTROL OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES CRITICIZED

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[Article by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Lt Col V. Kandybo: "The Truth Against Fabrications"]

[Text] The development of international events in the 1980's eloquently shows that the forces of aggressive imperialism and the entire world reaction, as a counterweight to the policy of detente, have set out on a policy of increasing the arms race, intervening into the internal affairs of other states and suppressing the liberation struggle of peoples. A final swing of the imperialist propaganda machine to a status of "psychological warfare" has become a component part in this policy.

In strengthening anticommunist and anti-Soviet propaganda, the bourgeois ideologists, as before, rely basically on the falsifying of Marxism-Leninism and on the denying of its world historical significance. Here the key point of falsification is the question of the leading role of the Communist Party in Soviet society generally and in the Armed Forces in particular.

The leadership of the CPSU over Soviet society is an objective pattern. This pattern operates in all areas of social life, including in the area of military organizational development and improving and strengthening the Armed Forces. "The fundamental basis of military-organizational development," states the CPSU Program, "is leadership by the Communist Party over the Armed Forces and a strengthening of the role and influence of the party organizations in the Army and Navy."

The party's activities in the area of leadership over the Soviet state's Armed Forces consist in the elaboration of military, military-technical policy and military doctrine; in elaborating the principles of military-organizational development and the organizing of their practical realization; in the recruiting, placement and indoctrination of military personnel; in systematic purposeful party political work in the troops.

Party leadership over military-organizational development has played an enormous role in creating and strengthening our army and in defeating our state's enemies during the years of the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars. "The Soviet

Armed Forces," pointed out the member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, "owe their outstanding victories and invincible might to the Leninist party, the tested strategist, genial organizer and wise indoctrinator. All their heroic history serves as convincing and vivid proof of the great vitality of the highest principle in Soviet military-organizational development, that is, the principle of the unchallenged leadership of the Communist Party over national defense affairs. In party leadership lies the main and decisive source for the combat might and invincibility of the USSR Armed Forces."

All of this is well known to our enemies. For this reason they so zealously and constantly endeavor to cast aspersions on the Leninist party, discredit its military policy, distort its leading role in the Soviet Armed Forces and thereby in some manner weaken its military might. For this, they employ both direct lies as well as various sorts of pseudoscientific falsifications.

In intentionally distorting the sense and content of party leadership over military organizational leadership, bourgeois ideologists have usually reduced this leadership to a primitive concept of "control over the enemy." For example, the West German military writer E. Pruck in an article "The Leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces" which claims "scientific objectivity," categorically asserts that the CPSU supposedly maintains power due to relying on the army and exercising control over it.

For such "researchers" who are accustomed to thinking in the categories of bourgeois reality, where everything is based upon relationships of class dominance and subordination, there is no way they can understand the essence of the Soviet system or the dialectics of socialism. Yes, the CPSU is a ruling party. But it is vain to attempt to imagine it as a certain self-contained force. The party has no other interests but the interests of the people. It leads society not because it "relies on the army," but rather under a mandate from the people and due to the objective needs of social development. Precisely the party armed with progressive Marxist-Leninist teachings determines the general prospects for society's development and the line of Soviet domestic and foreign policy, it directs the great creative activities of the Soviet people and gives a planned, scientifically based nature to their struggle for the victory of communism. In uniting in its ranks the most advanced and creative portion of the working class, the peasantry and the intelligentsia, the CPSU acts as the truly revolutionary vanguard of the entire people.

Equally unfounded are the attempts by bourgeois ideologists to put the CPSU in opposition to the Soviet state or to underplay the role of the latter in the questions of leadership over the Armed Forces. In disseminating a false view about the "passivity" and "powerlessness" of the state bodies and social organizations in our nation, the same E. Pruck goes so far as to say that the new USSR Constitution supposedly reinforces the notion of the "identicalness of the state and party leadership over the armed forces in the Soviet single-party state." An analogous position is held by the professor at the National Social Sciences Institute of France, E. Carrere d'Ancose, asserting that according to the new Constitution the Soviet state "is constructed around the party."

In actuality, our new Constitution contains a clause about the CPSU as the nucleus of the Soviet political system and the state and social organizations. But this provides no justification for setting the party in opposition to the state or confusing their functions. Thus, in exercising leadership over the Armed Forces, the CPSU in no way replaces state control of them. The most important defense questions for us are discussed and settled by the higher state bodies. For example, in accord with the national Constitution, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet establishes military ranks; it forms the USSR De+ fense Council and approves its membership, it appoints and relieves the higher command of the Armed Forces; in the interests of defending the USSR it declares martial law in individual localities or throughout the nation, a general or partial mobilization; during the period between sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, it declares a state of war in the event of a military attack on the USSR or in the event of the need to carry out international treaty obligations for mutual defense against aggression. In turn, the USSR Council of Ministers takes measures to ensure state security, it provides overall leadership over the organizational development of the Armed Forces, it determines the annual contingents of citizens to be called up for active military service. stitution also states that the local state bodies and administrations should aid in strengthening national defense capability.

In zealously endeavoring to seek out in our Basic Law "new claims by the CPSU to even more absolute power," the bourgeois ideologists are in favor of limiting party influence in the Soviet Army and urge the curtailment of political work in the Armed Forces which might "impede" their development.

It is not hard to be persuaded of the evil intent of these fabrications and recommendations. For this, one has merely to recall those basic factors which determine the leading role of the party in the area of national defense and the growth of this role at the present stage of military-organizational development.

The greater aggressiveness of imperialism and the forces militarization of the leading capitalist states have increased the threat of a world nuclear missile war. This has obliged the CPSU to show unflagging vigilance vis-a-vis the intrigues of the enemies of peace and socialism. The scientific methodology and enormous political experience have made it possible for the party to profoundly analyze the existing military-political and strategic situation, to elaborate the correct views on the nature of the war which imperialism might start and to combine a consistent struggle for peace with the strengthening of our nation's defense capability.

At present, the link noted by V. I. Lenin between the nation's military organization and its entire economic, political and cultural system have become even closer. The wagering of imperialism on the use of weapons of mass destruction has necessitated the early preparation of not just the army but also the entire population and the nation as a whole to repel aggression. Correspondingly the role of the party and its Central Committee has increased in elaborating the state's military policy, in the organizational development of the Armed Forces, in organizing Civil Defense and so forth.

Under the conditions of the present-day scientific and technical revolution, military-organizational development is becoming evermore complicated and diverse. The presence of modern weapons in the aggressive states requires particular attention by the party to the technical equipping of the Army and Navy, constant concern for a higher level of professional skills among the military personnel and the introduction into the combat training practices of the subunits, units and ships of those training methods which meet the requirements of modern warfare.

There has been an exceptional rise in the importance of the moral-political and psychological training of the troops, their steadfastness, endurance and readiness to make any sacrifices for the sake of defending the socialist fatherland. Because of this the role of ideological and political indoctrination has risen as this ensures the moral superiority of the Soviet Armed Forces over the armies of the imperialist states. The party and its Central Committee are constantly concerned with improving this work in the Army and Navy.

Finally, the growth of the leading role of the party in the military area is determined by the broadening and deepening of the international tasks of the USSR Armed Forces. They must securely defend not only the Soviet motherland, but along with the other allied armies guarantee the security of the entire socialist commonwealth. The further strengthening of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact is a matter of particular concern for the CPSU and the other fraternal parties.

This is the actual reality which repudiates the fabrications of the "sovietologists." Nor is there a grain of truth in the fabrications of the anticommunists who endeavor to depict CPSU military policy as a "intentional subordination of the army to narrow party tasks." This is done in the aim of spreading the bourgeois idea that any army, including a socialist one, is supposedly a certain "superclass" force and an implement of control over the political relations both within the society and between states in the interests of the entire nation. Thus, the American military writer H. Baldwin in his book "The Price of Strength," after asserting that "a next war, somewhere, sometime, of some sort is completely possible," advances the thesis of the need for an army as an "attribute of society" in this war. S. Lipset and H. Eccles, in discussing the supposed political neutrality of servicemen also endeavored to show that the army in a capitalist society supposedly operates as an implement of the civilian world.

Thus, we are concerned with attempts not only to cast doubt on the validity and historical determination of the leading role of the CPSU vis-a-vis the Armed Forces, but also an effort to conceal under the flag of the "neutrality" or apoliticalness of the army, the fact that the bourgeois governments have actually turned their armed forces into an implement of the imperialist policy of aggression, the seizing of foreign lands and the enslavement and plundering of other peoples and into a weapon for suppressing the working masses who are struggling against the exploiters within their nations.

Such fabrications are antiscientific by their very nature. Historical experience has long since shown that there are no armed forces which stand outside of

politics and that an army has always had a class nature, being the weapon of the ruling class. From this stems also the objective causality of leadership over the army by the ruling class and its party. This general thesis is completely applicable to the Armed Forces of our nation which were created and began operating under the direct leadership of the Leninist party, the vanguard of the Russian proletariat which had won state power.

In order to give their "theories" greater persuasiveness, the bourgeois ideologists have chosen as an object of falsification one of the areas of party activities during the first years of the founding of the Red Army, namely the control over the bourgeois military specialists.

As is known, the institution of military commissars during the period of the Civil War had two inherent functions. The first, but not the main one, was to supervise the military specialists who were used by Soviet power in establishing the Red Army. The second, basic one was an organizational and indoctrinational function. The commissars by their influence helped the military specialists understand the need for building a new army to defend the socialist fatherland. They organized the Red Army, they directed party political work in it, they protected the troop units against penetration by spies, they were concerned with the needs of the Red Armymen, they developed commanders from the ranks of the workers and peasants and helped them master military affairs.

The organizational-indoctrinational function, as the sole one, was inherent to the institution of military commissars which was introduced into the Red Army in 1937-1940 as well as at the outset of the Great Patriotic War. During these periods the institution of military commissars was of a temporary nature and was designed to provide effective aid to the commanders in strengthening the Soviet Armed Forces on the threshold of the approaching military threat by German Naziism as well as for mobilizing the men to defeat the enemy in the initial period of the war.

The assertions by bourgeois ideologists that the introduction of the institution of military commissars in the Red Army in 1941-1942 supposedly showed a "political crisis" or "lack of confidence" in the command personnel are needed by the falsifiers to represent in our times the political bodies and party political apparatus of the Soviet Armed Forces as a means of party control over the army and to distort the principle of one-man leadership and its party basis.

Contrary to historical facts and the logic of Soviet military organizational developments, the anticommunists have endeavored to show that the CPSU has supposedly always been hostile to one-man leadership, since it feared the possibility of the separation and changing of the army into an independent political factor. For just this reason, they assert, for maintaining its influence on the army during the most difficult years, the CPSU employed a system of dual command. In tendentiously interpreting the transition to one-man leadership, E. Pruck has written: "Lenin's intention, after the consolidation of the domestic and international situation, to abolish the 'institution of commissars,' the existence of which was caused by the revolutionary relations of those times and also to turn over command authority (one-man leadership) to the troop commanders was defeated initially due to Stalin's mistrust and subsequently due to the unshakable desire of the party leaders to keep control over all processes occurring

in the military area as well as over the commanders in order to prevent the formation of an independent political factor of power here."

But this is malicious slander. The decision to shift to one-man command in the Army and Navy was taken by the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee in July 1924. It proposed to the USSR RVS [Revolutionary Military Council] to study and prepare proposals on the forms, methods and dates for carrying out this measure. The plenum of the USSR RVS held at the end of November 1924 approved practical measures to introduce one-man command and in March 1925 the corresponding order followed. In converting to one-man command, the party was guided by Lenin's instructions that one-man command "best ensures the best use of human abilities and a real and not verbal verification of work" (PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 40, p 76).

Also unfounded are the attempts by bourgeois ideologists to distort the essence of one-man command in the Soviet Armed Forces at the present stage. In declaring its formal nature, the English historian M. Macintosh, the American sociologist W. Odum and the previously mentioned E. Pruck have asserted that in the Soviet Army all decisions are taken by party functionaries and it is the duty of the commanders to carry out these decisions.

In actuality, the CPSU has considered and does consider one-man command as one of the most important principles in Soviet military organizational development. It has carefully indoctrinated the command personnel and has strengthened their authority in every possible way.

The high effectiveness of one-man command in the Soviet Armed Forces is achieved precisely due to the fact that the solely responsible commanders carry out their service duties in accord with the interests of the socialist state. The Soviet commanders are distinguished by their ideological maturity, their profound and thorough knowledge of military affairs and their high professional and moral-combat qualities. This allows them not only to skillfully lead subordinates, but also to participate actively in their political indoctrination. Our one-man leadership has a firm legal basis under it and this is comprised of the Soviet laws, military regulations, orders and directives. At the same time socialist one-man command does not deny collective forms of leadership in certain elements of the military organism and is rationally combined with them. In the Soviet Armed Forces there are such bodies of collective leadership as the military council. They review and resolve all the major questions of troop life and activities and bear responsibility to the party and government for the state of their combat readiness.

It is important to emphasize that one-man leadership in the USSR Armed Forces is based on a firm party foundation. The commander acts in strict accord with CPSU ideology and policy. He works in close collaboration with the political bodies and relies on the party organization. As was pointed out at the recent 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, the membership of more than 80 percent of the party committees and bureaus in the regiments and on the first and second class ships include their commanders as elected members and they skillfully combine the qualities of solely-responsible commanders with the duties of members of elective party bodies.

Such facts fly in the face of those bourgeois ideologists who proclaim the supposedly existing contradictions between the Soviet political and military leadership, between the commanders and political workers. There have been and are no such contradictions. The socialist type of socioclass relations in our society and army excludes any friction and conflicts between the various categories of servicemen, including between the command and political personnel. The commanders and political workers are united by a unity of interests and goals and by a common concern for the dependable defense of the socialist fatherland. Together they carry out party policy and work hand in hand. Contrary to the assertions of R. Kolkowicz and other similar "experts," the present-day scientific and technical revolution does not distance but rather brings the commanders and political workers closer together. It is a question of the constant growth of the technical and operational-tactical training of the political personnel of our Army and Navy and equally of the further ideological and political tempering of the command personnel.

Above, we pointed out the great attention which the CPSU and the other Marxist-Leninist parties of the Warsaw Pact nations give to strengthening the combat alliance of the fraternal peoples and armies as the basic gurantor of peace and security. Such a state of affairs is not in the nature of the NATO rulers and their ideological supporters. For this reason by fabrications about the "imperial interests" and "hegemonism" of the USSR, they endeavor to cause mistrust for the activities of the CPSU aimed at strengthening the Warsaw Pact. Thus, the French international affairs writer P. Weisman in his book "The Illusion of Detente" writes about the "perfidious plans of the USSR" and endeavors to "establish" a supposedly existing dependence of the Warsaw Pact nations on the USSR.

But all of this is a clear fabrication. In order to realize this, one has merely to become acquainted with the preamble and articles of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid signed by the socialist nations on 14 May 1955 in Warsaw. The Warsaw Pact is based upon the full sovereign equality of all its members. None of the states receives any one-sided advantages or preferences at the expense of another. Such an alliance completely conforms to the fundamental national and international interests of each of the Pact's member nations and ensures the defense of their sovereignty and security.

Thus, a critical analysis of certain anti-Marxist concepts which distort the principle of party leadership of the armed forces shows their complete baselessness. Leadership of the Communist Party is a most important source in the might of the Soviet Army and Navy. The unwavering ideological conviction of the military personnel, their unity and solidarity with the Communist Party, the high political awareness of all the personnel and the support of all the peoplethis is the force which has always provided and does provide the invincibility of our army, an army of friendship and fraternity of the Soviet peoples.

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COMMENTARY ON U.S. RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCES

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 21, Nov 82 (signed to press 19 Oct 82) pp 83-87

[Article by Maj V. Roshchupkin: "Staging Areas and Policemen"]

[Text] In the postwar times, historians have gained access to the ultrasecret documents of the supreme military command of the overthrown Nazi Germany. Not without interest are some of these concerning events which happened 40 years ago.

...In August 1942, the Nazi leaders, intoxicated by the approach of the Nazi troops to Stalingrad and the Volga, were outlining their further plans for military operations in the East: "As the next step we will strike to the south of the Caucasus and provide aid to the rebels in Iran and Iraq. Another strike will be made along the Caspian Sea to Afghanistan and India. Then the English will be deprived of their oil. In 2 years, we will be on the Indian frontier. Some 20-30 crack German divisions will be enough for this."

In those same days, the Nazi rulers in whose feverish imagination the coming pictures of world domination were taking shape prophecized: "If in the future year we will cover the same distance we did in this one, then by the end of 1943 we will be based in Tehran, Baghdad and along the Persian Gulf." In a secret document drawn up by one of the higher officials of the "Third Reich," as if something preordained it was stated: "When the German troops reach Basra, then they will be able on the way to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf to link up with the Japanese troops which have taken Singapore."

Why was the Nazi Wehrmacht in such a rush to the Persian Gulf? The answer is simple: those who stood at the helm of Nazi Germany's military machine needed advantageous staging areas for seizing and plundering new nations and peoples; raw materials were needed, in the given instance oil. With good reason it is said that the policy of imperialism in the Near East has always smelled of oil. In the documents which have now become public, it was a question of specific plans of the German troops to seize the oilfields and various regions of Arabia and Iran. It is important to point out that for this purpose special units were to be formed, the so-called "oil brigades." By the autumn of 1942, they had even been dispatched to the foothills of the Caucasus.

But the "geopolitical" processes of the Nazi strategists were not to be realized. As the plans for a war in the East were crushed as a result of the heroic resistance by the Red Army, Hitler was forced to recognize that the Wehrmacht hordes would be able to reach the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean only across the "corpse of Russia." The collapse of the "Barbarossa Operation" worked out in the aim of defeating the USSR forced the Nazi clique to abandon the far-reaching, expansionistic, aggressive plans for the region adjacent to the northwest of the Indian Ocean.

At present, 40 years later after the described events, it is worth reflecting what fate was being prepared by the Nazi thugs for the peoples of this region. The evil shadow of the Nazi swastika which hung over this region disappeared as a result of the victories of the Soviet Armed Forces on the decisive front of World War II, the Eastern Front. The Wehrmacht's "oil brigades" also attained an unglorious end....

Seemingly at present all of this is a matter of history. But in many lessons of history one can also trace the outlines of modern times. Imperialism has not lost its aggressive essence which resides in its very nature. All the more so if it is a question of strategic types of raw materials and militarily important staging areas. At present, other, more dangerous forces are threatening the area which German imperialism longed for. At present, another, even more evil shadow hangs over the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. And again the notorious Nazi "oil brigades" come to mind! Even in our days the newly appeared pretenders of world domination, it would seem, have dusted off the 40-year-old ideas. Overseas a special troop contingent has been formed, the tasks of which are largely reminiscent of the mission of the Wehrmacht "oil brigades."

...On that March day of 1980, at MacDill Air Force Base near the city of Tampa, Florida, activities were in full swing as never before. Pentagon generals and highly placed officials of the American administration were present at the birth of their next militaristic offspring. Precisely on that day, in accord with the Directive No 18 of the U.S. President, at McDill, the staff was formed for the "Joint Operational Rapid Deployment Forces" (RDF). These were to include 250 American servicemen from the officer and NCO personnel.

Thus, a start was made to realizing the evil concept of "mobile interventionist forces." This became established in the United States during the previous American administration. The then president J. Carter gave instructions to the National Security Council to analyze the military potential of the United States. The report prepared on the basis of this analysis showed that Washington and its armed forces were supposedly insufficiently prepared to overcome "crises" in the Third World. Here, particular attention was paid to the oilrich Persian Gulf area.

Subsequent to this, there appeared the notorious Directive No 18 which envisaged the establishing of a "special troop contingent for local wars in the Third World." In the words of the former National Security Adviser, Z. Brzezinski, such forces would make it possible to undertake "rapid, effective and, if possible, pre-emptive measures" in those regions of the world where the "vitally important interestst of the United States" could be involved. Again

particular attention was given and is given here to Southeast Asia together with the Near East and the regions adjacent to the Persian Gulf. In Washington, the theory has even been concocted of an "arc of crisis" in the northern and western parts of the Indian Ocean.

In carrying out all these directives and "theories," the United States has begun to rapidly increase its military presence in the region. The American ruling circles assume that this presence should play the role of a means of intimidation capable of halting progressive changes in the nations of this region of the world which presently represents a nexus of acute struggle between the imperialist forces and the young independent states of Southeast Asia, the Indian Subcontinent and East Africa.

Indicative is the admission by the well-known American "hawk," the retired Adm. E. Zumwalt. He has stated that the situation in the region will determine "the global equilibrium of forces over the next 10 years." The attempt to employ weapons against Iran and the increased aid to the counterrevolutionary bands in Democratic Afghanistan are only a portion of the measures undertaken by Washington in endeavoring to fan the flames of conflicts in the region and to turn it into a staging area for countering the forces of progress and peace in the vanguard of which is the Soviet Union.

The expansionistic plans of the overseas "hawks" are inseparably tied to the interests of the major American monopolies, the capital investments of which in the coastal countries of the Indian Ocean exceed 10 billion dollars. Some 50 percent of the oil consumed by the Western European nations and Australia and 90 percent of the Japanese consumption are transported over the lines of communications in the Indian Ocean. And control over this makes it possible for the United States to hold its allies in check.

The main value of the region for the U.S. imperialist circles is military-strategic. The "bronze helmets" from the Pentagon feel that from here scores of nations in Europe, Asia and Africa can be kept under sights; here also it is possible to deploy large armed groupings, including strategic strike forces designed to attack the USSR and the other nations of the socialist commonwealth.

The ensuring of the "strategic interests" of the United States as well as the imposition of American military-political domination throughout the region are to be aided by the concentration of major naval and air formations and nuclear weapons in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean as well as the deployment of the interventionist rapid deployment forces here.

All of this cannot help but cause valid concern among the peoples of the Indian Ocean nations for their security, emphasized L. I. Brezhnev in a message to the participants of the international conference on "The Indian Ocean--A Zone of Peace" held in April 1982. The message drew particular attention to the fact that a threat is created to the security of the USSR and the other socialist nations from the south.

The aim of the dangerous game which Washington is playing with a gambler's zeal in the region is obvious: to provide staging areas for its police force.

The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff have worked out a five-year plan for the construction and modernization of military bases in the Near East and Indian Ocean for use by the U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces.

According to the Pentagon plans, here an important role has been assigned to Islamabad. Precisely Pakistan, as the foreign press has emphasized, has been chosen by the U.S. Defense Department as one of the basic staging areas for the RDF. Judging from certain press releases, the Pakistani President, Gen Zia-ul-Haq, in exchange for massed American military deliveries, has agreed to the use of two Pakistani ports by the American Navy and to the deployment of spy aircraft at the Bada-Bera base in Peshawar. The Western mass information media have repeatedly drawn attention to the fact that in accord with a secret agreement between Washington and Islamabad, the United States is building a naval base in Gwadar on the coast of the Arabian Sea.

In replying to a question, the Indian Minister of External Affairs P. V. Narasimha Rao, in July of the current year, stated in Parliament that the government of his nation has been informed of the U.S. intention to create military bases on Pakistani territory. The Indian Central News Service has recently announced that according to the Pakistani-American Agreement, the airfields and ports of Pakistan are to be used by the U.S. RDF. These invasion forces, judging from the press announcements, are to be shifted into the Persian Gulf area from American military bases in the Philippines, Okinawa and Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean. The Pentagon intends to turn Pakistani territory into one of the main areas for stockpiling military equipment destined for the RDF.

Abroad information has appeared that Pakistani troops are to be used directly as part of the American RDF. A group of Pakistani officers is stationed at the U.S. military base located on Diego Garcia Island. They, as the Indian press has announced, are taking a special training course which includes the working out of Pakistani troop operations as part of the RDF. The officers of the Pakistani Armed Forces are being trained on the island to use modern American military equipment. Thus, it is a question of the ever-greater involvement of Islamabad in the orbit of the aggressive plans of American imperialism.

Diego Garcia is the main base for the RDF. Since August 1980, seven special transports have been located there with spare heavy military equipment, ammunition and food. The supplies are designed to support the combat operations of a Marine landing brigade consisting of 12,000 men for a month. These vessels can be sent to the shores of any nation where the development of events is not to the liking of Washington. Thus recall that American aircraft, having taken off from the concrete runways of Diego Garcia, can reach any of the Persian Gulf nations in several hours.

The U.S. defense budget for 1982 has allocated a large amount, some 106.4 million dollars, for reconstructing the port and military base of Ras Banas in Egypt. Here they plan to build fuel dumps and other facilities for supplying the American naval vessels, to lengthen the landing strips and equip the territory for the deployment of ground contingents from the RDF.

In the current fiscal year, significant amounts have been allocated by the Washington administration for modernizing the former English military base on Masirah Island off the coast of Oman and the Somali port of Berbera. Work has already started on deeping the port of Mombasa in Kenya. This will make it possible for American aircraft carriers and other large ships to freely enter it. The cost of the work has been set at 48 million dollars. In referring to knowledgeable sources, the AP Agency has announced that the United States will also spend 10 million dollars for the reconstruction of the Mombasa Airport and 2.4 million dollars for building storage facilities at a local naval base.

As we see, for carrying out its expansionistic plans, the U.S. administration is sparing no expense. The total expenditures for the construction and modernization for Pentagon military bases over the 5 years can be 2 billion dollars. In 1981, an additional 1 billion dollars was allocated directly for the RDF. In the current year, they will receive 4.5 billion dollars.

"The monopolies need foreign oil, uranium and nonferrous metals and the United States have declared the Near East, Africa and the Indian Ocean to be a sphere of 'vital interests'," the 26th CPSU Congress pointed out. "The U.S. military machine is actively intervening there and intends to remain a long time. Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean, Oman, Kenya, Somali, Egypt, what next?"

The American administration is also wagering on the RDF as an instrument of its military-bloc policy. The journal EIGHT DAYS published in London has announced that the United States has undertaken constant efforts to create a new military bloc in the region of the Near and Middle East. According to the plans of Washington, its members should be Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey. There are also plans to involve in this alliance Sudan, Somali and Oman. The American RDF should become the military basis of the bloc. One of the methods for basing them, EIGHT DAYS has pointed out, is to be on ships which should be stationed in the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, the eastern Mediterranean and in the Indian Ocean.

What men and equipment have been allocated to the policemen of the Pentagon? The fighting strength of the RDF will be determined in each specific instance depending upon the situation and the tasks confronting them. Units of the well-known 82d Airborne and 101st Air Assault Divisions comprise the basis of the interventionist forces, as foreign publications have stated. We might recall that the daredevils from these formations "gained renown" even during the "dirty war" which the United States fought in Vietnam.

In addition, the RDF will include one other Pentagon assault formation, a Marine expeditionary division. It can be formed on the basis of the 3d Marine Division stationed on Okinawa. From the ground forces, the Pentagon strategists plan to include in the RDF the 9th Marine and 24th Mechanized Divisions as well as units and subunits of the special "green berets" troops.

From the Navy, there are plans to assign to the police forces one or two carrier groups as well as amphibious landing equipment including more than 60 landing and transport vessels. Around three-score B-52 strategic bombers, units of

the tactical and military air transport commands, strategic reconnaissance aircraft and AWACS aircraft are to be made available by the Air Force.

The conflict over the Falkland Islands, writes the American newspaper WALL STREET JOURNAL, disclosed those serious problems which the U.S. Armed Forces will encounter if they were to face a similar situation in the Persian Gulf. Many potential regions of conflicts among which the Pentagon strategists would put first the Persian Gulf are located far from American shores and the United States, the newspaper stresses, would have to ferry its forces over extended lines of communications.

How do they plan to shift the interventionist armada into the areas of its possible combat employment? First of all, with the available air force and naval resources. According to the estimates of foreign military specialists, the ferrying of one paratrooper battalion of 800 men from U.S. territory to the Persian Gulf region would take 2 days. The 82d Airborne Division could reach there in 3 weeks, and the 101st Air Assault Division in 2 weeks after the arrival of the paratroopers. As for the 24th Mechanized Division which is equipped with heavy weapons and combat equipment, the ferrying of this formation would take a month, as it could be done only with the aid of sea transports.

However, such times are clearly not to the liking of the Pentagon strategists. For more efficiently transporting the units of the police corps, the task has been set of broadening the capabilities of sea transport. Over the next few years, around 3 billion dollars will go to build new, large-tonnage transport vessels and modernize those in service, with a total of 14 ships. These are to be used as floating dumps for heavy military equipment and weapons for the interventionist forces. The carrying out of this program will start in 1983.

Nor has aviation been overlooked. Rapid development has been started on a new CX heavy military transport for the RDF. Allocations totaling over 260 million dollars are planned for its designing and testing. As the American press has pointed out, at least 7 billion dollars will be spent for the production and purchasing of such aircraft.

A Pentagon spokesman at a press conference informed journalists that the size of the RDF should be 230,000 men. Considering the units for combat, logistical and medical support, the total size of the RDF, according to data in the foreign press, will be 600,000 men. And this represents almost 30 percent of all the personnel of the American armed forces.

At present, the RDF is under the command of Maj Gen Robert Kingston, the former commander of the 2d Infantry Division stationed in South Korea. The Pentagon, judging from everything, knows well enough who to put at the head of the punitive troops. During service at Camp Casey, where the headquarters of the 2d Infantry Division are, this general boasted: "I am the only division commander who everyday sent our soldiers into the demilitarized zone...with the sole mission of shooting at people."

Soon after Kingston was appointed commander of the RDF, he stated in an interview: "The RDF are ready to start combat operations." In actuality, the personnel of the police corps is training intensely for pillage under the

conditions of Southwest Asia. Approximately 40,000 soldiers have undergone training in desert actions and in capturing oil fields. Exercises involving landings, the ferrying of combat equipment and cooperation among the various branches of troops were initially conducted in the California Mohave Desert where the landscape and climatic conditions are reminiscent of the Near Eastern ones. Since November 1980, the RDF maneuvers have been held directly in the region, in Egypt, Oman and Somali.

One cannot help but note that the rehearsals for intervention have a clearly provocative and anti-Soviet nature. This can be seen from the very fact that the personnel of the RDF subunits which portrays the hypothetical enemy is frequently clothed...in Soviet uniforms. In particular, this was the case of soldiers from the 24th Mechanized Division in exercises conducted in Georgia.

... The army testing range on Cape Cod, Massachusetts. A strong explosion rang out and a blinding fireball appeared above the range. Then a mushroom-shaped cloud rose into the sky. Hundreds of soldiers, in taking shelter close by in the forest, quickly began to put on gasmasks and protective gear.

Thus, the American press has described exercises which involved subunits from the RDF. The commentators assume that the nature of the exercises on Cape Cod shows that the Pentagon has begun to actively prepare the RDF for conducting "tactical nuclear warfare." This, in particular, is confirmed by the newspaper JOURNAL OF COMMERCE AND COMMERCIAL. In referring to informed sources in the U.S. Defense Department, it has announced that the RDF should be equipped with the most modern weapons, including nuclear.

The training of the RDF for combat operations employing nuclear weapons is carried out not only in the United States. American Marines from the 3d Marine Division stationed on Okinawa are also preparing intensely for such actions. Maj Gen S. Olmstedt, the commander of this formation which is part of the RDF, having apparently forgotten all the official Pentagon instructions on the "defensive functions" of the U.S. Armed Forces, chatted to journalists that his subordinates "were training intensely" for conducting combat operations under the conditions of the employment of nuclear weapons. Olmstedt admitted that the artillery howitzers in use in the division were designed to fire nuclear shells. He also stated that the RDF units were ready to put to use other types of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and bacteriological. The "bronze helmets" from the Pentagon in one way or another have dropped their false clothing of "friends" of the Asian and African peoples and themselves have disclosed their hypocritical talk.

The clear-thinking political figures in the region's states have sharply branded such hypocricy. "I do not like to hear these people (Americans.--V.R.) assert that they are going to defend and save our oil," the Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Sabah al Ahmad as Sabah, told journalists. And gesturing angrily at a pile of western publications on the table, he continued: "Protect us from whom? Who is occupying us? We have never asked to be protected, but naval ships are cruising around us and bases are demanded from us."

From April of the current year, under the screen of notorious "multinational forces," American troops have begun to occupy the approaches to the Persian

Gulf now on a permanent basis. Paratroopers from the mentioned 82d Airborne Division are part of the "multinational forces" which supposedly are to keep the peace in the Sinai. But precisely this formation, many foreign commentators have pointed out, represents the "strike fist" of the interventionist forces. Consequently, the U.S. RDF even now are ready to carry out punitive actions in the Near East.

The mass information media in the West have pointed out that the forming of the RDF is nothing more than one of the reappearances of the American "big stick" policy and a manifestation of the general adventuristic, militaristic policy of the most aggressive imperialist circles. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, in speaking about the militaristic trends in U.S. policy, pointed out that recently they have also been reflected in the formation of new long-term weapons programs and in the creation of new military bases outside the United States, including in the Near East and in the region of the Indian Ocean, as well as in the formation of the so-called "Rapid Deployment Corps," a tool in the policy of military intervention.

The Pentagon's police corps is a militaristic club in the hands of those who, under the pretext of hypocritical warnings about the "communist threat" and the necessity of defending U.S. "vital interests," endeavor to impose their will on the nations which have set out on an independent path of development. The policy of putting together the RDF has been a component part in the policy of U.S. imperialism aimed at achieving military superiority over the USSR and the world of socialism and at suppressing the national liberation movement of peoples. This conclusion was reaffirmed during the recent official friendly visit of the Indian Prime Minister I. Gandhi to the USSR. The joint Soviet-Indian Declaration signed by L. I. Brezhnev and I. Gandhi contains an appeal to eliminate all foreign military and naval bases existing in this region and to prevent the creation of new bases. It decisively condemns the attempts to increase the foreign military presence in the Indian Ocean.

The evil preparations of the U.S. militaristic circles are a serious threat to the peoples inhabiting the shores of the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf and are a threat to peace in the world as a whole.

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ARTICLE BY SOVIET DEFENSE MINISTER PUBLISHED IN VPA JOURNAL

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese Nov 82, pp 4-22

[Article by Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union, written for TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the occasion of the 65th anniversary of the Russian October Revolution and the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR: "Strengthening the National Defense Capability of the Soviet Union: An Undertaking of the Party and the Entire Population"]

[Text] The people of the Soviet Union, the people of the fraternal socialist countries, and all of progressive mankind, are preparing solemn ceremonies to commemorate the 65th anniversary of the great Russian October Revolution and the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR.

The people of the Soviet Union are awaiting that solemn holiday in the framework of making maximum efforts with regard to politics and labor. The working people in the cities and villages and the members of the Soviet Army and Navy, immersed in a high tide of patriotism, are victoriously implementing the historic resolutions of the 26th Congress of the CPSU and the plans of the 11th Five-year Plan and are achieving many accomplishments in the enterprise of building communism and in strengthening the economic and national defense power, as well as the international position, of the socialist homeland.

Under the leadership of the glorious Communist Party our country is over-flowing with confidence that it can advance to communism along the path of Lenin. The accomplishments of a worldwide historical significance which the homeland of the great October Revolution has accomplished — including its principal accomplishment of, for the first time in the history of mankind, building in the Soviet Union a developed socialist society — have been brilliant proof of the wisdom, clear-sightedness, and organizational genius of the CPSU.

If today the Soviet Union occupies advanced positions in the world with regard to social progress, that has only been possible because the CPSU, which follows the immortal theory of Marxism-Leninism, is based on the laws of social development, is always concerned with the economic strength of the nation and the great undertaking of stoutly defending the revolutionary accomplishments of the Soviet people and is resolutely and continually leading

that important, vital undertaking. That concern has been manifested very clearly in the famous words of comrade L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and an outstanding activist of our party and state: "There are two things that have always been closest to my heart and are now the main objects of my concern: bread for the people and security for the nation."*

The Party's national defense measures, which are unanimously supported by the people of the Soviet Union, are based on their limitless initiative and creativity. With regard to all Soviet people, there is nothing more precious than the freedom and well-being of their beloved country. They regard the defense of the nation and increasing its national defense strength as their vital undertaking.

Ι

The matter of defending the revolutionary accomplishments of the working people was posed during the first days of the existence of the Soviet state. The exploiting classes overthrown by the October Revolution, with the support of foreign countries, started a civil war in our country.

Under such conditions V.I. Lenin, the great leader of the proletarian class and the founder of the Soviet Communist Party and state, said that "Without arms with which to defend the Socialist Republic we could not exist."** Therefore, an extremely complicated and important mission was posed for the Party: organizing and carrying out the defense of the Socialist Republic.

V.I. Lenin confirmed that victory in defending the revolutionary accomplishments of the working class depends directly on the building of a powerful army. He wrote, "With a strong Red Army, we are certain to win victory."*** Such an army was founded. It was a new-style, socialist army, a true people's army of the workers and peasants.

At first, our army did not have trained command cadres, had little combat experience, and was always short of weapons, ammunition, food, and clothing. Nevertheless, it was victorious.

We were victorious because we relied on the selfless support of millions of working people in our country and our class brothers abroad. Our soldiers were inspired by the ideals of the October Revolution. That army also had the leadership of a very experienced revolutionary leader: the Communist Party led by the great Lenin.

^{*} L.I. Brezhnev, "Follow Lenin's Path," Vol. 7, p 565 (Russian language version).

^{**} Lenin, "Collected Works," Vol. 28, p 138 (Russian language version).

^{***} Op. cit., p 153.

While weaker than the imperialists militarily, the Soviet Republic was far superior to the enemy politically and with regard to morale and thought. The experiences of the civil war and the bankruptcy of the war of intervention by foreign countries demonstrated clearly that an attack on a socialist state is full of real danger not only for the aggressor army but also for the social foundation of capitalism in general and the political rule of the ruling bourgeoisie.

When evaluating the factors of our victory during those far-away years, V.I. Lenin wrote, "The miracle was that our devastated country was able to endure that war. That miracle did not descend from heaven but resulted from the economic interests of the working class and peasants, the people who created that miracle by their simultaneous uprising. It was that miracle that created the retaliation against the landlords and the bourgeoisie."*

In the struggle against the counterrevolutionaries, the people of our country were united on the basis of complete voluntariness and class solidarity. That solidarity was created by democratic means. V.I. Lenin regarded that as a principal condition for winning victory in the war against the exploiters. He emphasized that the liquidation of the opposition of the bourgeois class and its war apparatus could not be brought about without broad revolutionary changes, without the use of all democratic organs, and without the desire of the working people to escape from the ruling yoke of the bourgeoisie and the landlords.

In addition to leading the war activities, the Communist Party carried out extremely great educational tasks in all spheres of life and social activity. When carrying out those tasks, the Party based itself on Lenin's instruction that the revolutionary determination and spirit of having resolve and never retreading on the part of the proletarian class, and its consciousness, discipline, and readiness to sacrifice, were guarantees of victory. In the do-ordie test of strength with the enemies of the young Socialist Republic our working class proved that "We would rather sacrifice everything, down to the last person, than to lose our territory or to abandon our principle of discipline or our policy of resoluteness. For that reason, we must sacrifice....The determination of the working class and their resolution in implementing the slogan 'We would rather sacrifice everything than surrender' are not only historical factors but are decisive factors, the factors of victory."**

On the basis of the revolutionary consciousness and the limitless support of the working class, the Party knew how to win over the broad popular masses in our country and to win victory. The ability of the Communist Party transformed the ideals of the revolutionary working class into the property of the broad working masses, united them around the Party, and persuaded them to follow the Party in the liberation war. That was the source of the historical invincibleness of the socialist state.

^{*} Lenin, "Collected Works," Vol 43, pp 63-64 (Russian language edition).

^{**} Op. cit., Vol. 40, p 249.

After the end of the civil war our Party, armed by the immortal Leninist principles regarding military development, came forth with comprehensive viewpoints regarding the consolidation of the homeland's national defense capabilities and increasing its military strength.

The Party realized that the Soviet Union's path for increasing its economic and national defense strength would be to industrialize the country and collectivize agriculture in order to transform at the roots the spritual life of society and victoriously resolve the nationalities problem. The concentration of the people's efforts in that direction allowed us to, within the shortest historical period, transform our homeland into a powerful socialist country, ensured that the problem of resolving at the root the problem of increasing the state's economic-military potential, and created conditions for reequipping our army and navy technically, in order to teach communism to all Soviet citizens and members of the armed forces.

The entire glorious history of our state has amply demonstrated the correctness of the Party's military policy and of its principles regarding the development of the army. That was clearly manifested in the Great Patriotic War.

The economic, political-morale, and especially military, capabilities created in our country in accordance with the doctrines of Lenin and under the leader-ship of the Communist Party, were multiplied by the heroism of the Soviet people and became the most decisive factors in ensuring the victory of a world-wide historical significance over the assault force of world imperialism, the German fascists.

The path leading to that victory was not easy and rapid. During the initial phase of the war we had to endure the bitterness of retreat. But all Soviet people, and the members of our army and navy, did not for a minute lose confidence in their just cause or in victory. In the resolute defensive battles the Soviet armed forces inflicted heavy losses on the enemy and stopped the attacks of the German fascist troops, after which we changed over to a fierce offensive, inflicted decisive defeats on the enemy, swept the fascist animals from our territory and that of many other European countries, and ended their life in the final lair. Fascist Germany had to surrender. Only a few months later our armed forces, loyal to their obligations to their allies, attacked the Japanese militarists and annihilated their principal assault force, the Kuantung Army, within a period of half a month.

The glorious Communist Party organized and inspired the struggle of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War. It transformed all of our immense country into a unified combat front and led the Soviet people to achieving exploits in a bloody, arduous struggle. The Party cleverly guided the activities of the armed forces and knew how to organize and coordinate the efforts of the front with those of the rear area, organize a vast guerrilla movement, and lead the patriotic Soviet people in the enemy's rear area. History had never seen a war in which the interests of the people, the state, and the leading party were merged into one and were combined closely into an organic system in the Great Patriotic War.

The Communist Party became the true creator of victory. The most outstanding forces of the party were sent to the most dangerous, most important areas. The noble appellation of party members, in the eyes of the people during the war years, was tied in with the sacred obligation of all communists: always taking the lead in combat and labor.

The Soviet people were very accurate when they identified the outstanding features of communists at the front with the war activities of L.I. Brezhnev. From the first day of the war to its last day, comrade L.I. Brezhnev stood in the fore of the struggle against our mortal enemy where the war was most difficult and participated in the preparation of and the carrying out of many victorious campaigns. A loyal son of the Party, a brave political officer, and a talented organizer and educator of troops, comrade L.I. Brezhnev always lived with the troops, bolstered their fighting spirit, and encouraged them to achieve feats of arms in order to win victory. The homeland highly evaluated the merit of comrade L.I. Brezhnev in combat and labor and four times awarded him the honor "Hero of the Soviet Union," the honor "Socialist Labor Hero", the Victory Medal, and many other medals and orders.

In the Great Patriotic War against the German fascists and Japanese militarists, the Soviet people not only defended their socialist accomplishments but were loyal to their international obligations and contributed decisively to the salvation of European and world civilization from barbarous annihilation by the fascists.

The victory annihilated the bloc of reactionary fascist nations and created conditions favorable for the victory of the socialist revolution in many European and Asian countries and led to the formation of a world socialist system and created conditions favorable for the national liberation struggle movements in many countries and the further growth of the communists' and workers' movement.

Comrade L.I. Brezhnev called the victory of the Soviet Union over the German fascists in the Great Patriotic War a peak in the history of mankind. That victory pointed out the greatness of our socialist homeland, the peerless strength of the communist ideal, and its glorious victory over the mankind-hating ideal of imperialism. That victory was a victory for a better future, for mankind, for peace, and for social progress.

The incomparable feats in combat and labor of the Soviet people and armed forces members once again demonstrated to the world that no force on this planet can defeat a people who have been liberated from the fuling yoke of capitalism, and no force can annihilate the social system — a socialist social system — set up by those people. At the same time, our victory became a frightful obstacle for the aggressors and for everyone who likes military adventure.

ΙI

If will soon be the 40th year in which the Soviet people have been able to live in peace. That has been possible because of the fundamental change in the balance of forces on the international scene in favor of socialism, thanks to the implementation of the Leninist foreign policy of the CPSU and to the

positive struggle of the fraternal socialist countries and all progressive forces on this planet to prevent war and defend the security of nations.

Socialism has affected world development principally by means of its accomplishments in the economic sphere. The economic sphere is the front which determines the competetion between socialism and capitalism. It is in that sphere that there will be created the premises for bringing about the victory of Soviet society on the path of advance to communism.

The Soviet economy has attained many new accomplishments in its process of advance. The wealth of our country has steadily increased. Never have the production forces of society been as strong as they are today. Science and technology have developed effectively and at a high rate.

The following will allow us to see clearly what level Soviet industry has attained today. On a per capita basis our industry's output is three times higher than the average world level. The total industrial output of the Soviet Union is equal to one-fifth of the world output. That output is equal to the total output of the Western European countries, which have a population three times greater than that of the Soviet Union. Our country occupies a leading position in the world with regard to the production of oil, iron and steel, cement, chemical fertilizer, fuel pipelines, electric-powered locomotives, and many other principal industrial products.

Today, by means of the Party's plans we have achieved things that 10 or 20 years ago we could only see in our dreams. Occupying a special role in those accomplishments has been the Soviet Union's grain program, which is intended to ensure that all sectors are developed in a balanced manner and are closely combined with one another, and form a complete industrial-agricultural structure. The implementation of that program will ensure more comprehensive development and greater dynamism, increase the efficiency of agricultural production, and more fully satisfy the people's need for high-quality feed and ensure raw materials for industry. The resolutions of the 26th Party Congress and the May 1982 plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee provided guidance toward those objectives.

Because they attained good results in fulfilling the five-year plans of the national economy, the material and cultural living standards of the Soviet people have been continually improved. Political-morale unity, the alliance of workers, peasants, and intellectuals, and the friendship of the ethnic groups in the Soviet Union have been strengthened. The leadership and guidance role of the CPSU in Soviet society has been continually strengthened.

The victorious fulfillment of our development missions has been closely related to all aspects of the international situation. The Soviet Union is a peace-loving state. In order to build socialism we need peace. Thus the objectives of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union are to, along with the fraternal socialist countries, ensure international conditions favorable for peaceful labor and the construction of socialism and communism, and retaliate, decisively against all saboteurs of peace.

Peace has been, is, and will always be the highest benefit of mankind. But as comrade L.I. Brezhnev emphasized in that regard, "There are no rights that exist as a matter of course. That is regrettably true. Peace is being threatened, seriously threatened. It is necessary to struggle for peace."

At present, as in the past, the origin of the threat to peace and security of nations is imperialism. The lessons that the Soviet people have often taught to aggressors who foolhardily invade our country clearly have not enlightened them. Today, the policy of imperialism is becoming increasingly adventuristic, as noted by the 26th Congress of the CPSU. For its selfish interests imperialism is prepared to gamble the vital interests of mankind. Entirely disregarding the rights and desires of everyone on our planet, the imperialists have set for themselves a goal they cannot attain: blocking the path of change and progress all over the world and regaining their lost position of controlling the destinies of nations. That could be seen very clearly during the recent period: the U.S.-supported Israeli aggression in the Middle East, the actions of the English in the South Atlantic; and imperialist intervention in the internal affairs of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In the world of today there are a considerable number of hot spots in which wars are being fought and blood is flowing. All those things are the results of the aggressive policy of imperialism.

One of the most outstanding manifestations of the intensification of the aggressive nature of imperialism, as manifested in the excessive stepping up of war preparations, especially by the U.S., which are aimed against the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community.

The principal focus of their political plan is on shattering the unity of the socialist countries, uniting the efforts of the NATO bloc in opposing the Soviet Union and surrounding the Soviet Union by means of a ring of hostile states, consolidating the existing aggressor bloc, and forming new aggressor blocs.

In the sphere of material preparations, the basic efforts of the U.S. and the other countries in the NATO bloc are intended to attain military superiority and build truly strong scientific and production bases in order to research and produce the newest types of weapons. The industrial-war cartels are stepping up their efforts to militarize the economy and science of the capitalist countries and force them to serve the war.

Their military preparations are aimed primarily toward further improving the quality of their armies, reorganizing the armies, and providing them with the most modern technical means and weapons. The U.S. is especially stressing the urgent perfection of strategic nuclear weapons. In order to do so, the U.S. has set aside a large part of its military budget to prepare for war in space. The development of strategic weapons is accompanied by war doctrines which threaten peace, such as the doctrine of a "limited" nuclear war or "prolonged" nuclear war. They are still under the illusion that the capitalist world could win victory in a nuclear exchange.

The U.S. is manufacturing new weapons of mass murder, including bacteriological and chemical weapons. The production of neutron weapons and the inclusion of such weapons in its arsenal is leading to the use of a barbarous new mode of waging nuclear war.

Especially dangerous for the cause of peace is the plan to provide nuclear missiles for NATO, including the deployment of about 600 intermediate-range U.S. missiles in Western Europe. By that means the U.S. rulers hope to upset the existing balance in Europe and change the balance of strategic forces between the Soviet Union and the U.S. The Soviet Union cannot permit a change in the existing balance of forces in favor of the U.S. and NATO. The stand of the Soviet Union in that regard is very clear and cannot be understood in two ways. That stand is based on absolute adherence to the principle of balance and similarity with regard to the security of the two sides.

In addition to increasing their strategic facilities, most of the countries in the NATO bloc are increasing their ordinary equipment and weapons, improving their ground, air, and naval forces, and increasing the combat strength of those armed forces branches.

Along with strengthening the combat capabilities of the armed forces of the NATO bloc and perfecting their strategic deployment system, year in and year out they are increasing the intensity of their campaign and combat training.

In addition to its war preparations, imperialism is giving rise to campaigns against the Soviet Union and the socialist system to convince people of the "war threat" posed by the Soviet Union. According to their calculations, by means of such dirty campaigns they will be able to deceive international opinion, paralyze the vigilance of the world's people, and extinguish the fiery denunciations of war and the military plans of the U.S. and NATO.

A direct manifestation of the aggressive nature of imperialism, especially the U.S., is its plot to, by means of an unlimited arms race, sabotage the economies of the socialist countries and retard our economic development. They are exercising direct economic punishment of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. Some people in Washington calculate that the more bankrupt the economic programs of the Soviet Union and its friends become the more our people's standard of living will decline.

But all of those calculations have been bankrupted. The socialist countries are fully capable of smashing all reactionary plans of the imperialists to win military superiority. The Soviet Union and its allies are fully capable economically of defeating all adventures of the U.S. rulers in the political sphere as well as in the economic sphere.

The enemies of peace have been especially insane in the sphere of ideological struggle. To attain the above-mentioned objectives, the bourgeois propaganda apparatus is plotting to weaken the attraction of the revolutionary ideology and present to the laboring masses a distorted picture of socialism today and its accomplishments, smear our peace-loving policy when we are forced to take

defensive measures, and distort the objectives and noble missions of the armies of the socialist countries. But all of those sabotage activities have been bankrupted. Our ideological position is unshakable because its backbone is the great international doctrine -- Marxism-Leninism -- which is our most powerful weapon in the struggle against those who absolve war and imperialism.

At the same time, the policies of the aggressors have created a tense international situation, started an arms race, and attempted ideological sabotage, so they must be opposed with the utmost determination. In that regard, it is necessary to learn from the lessons of the past and to clearly realize the irreversible consequences of nuclear war, toward which the imperialist aggressors are increasingly pushing mankind.

The Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries are opposing imperialist aggression and opposing their monstrous strategic war concepts and plans by means of a resolute and continuous struggle for peace and security of nations, for the sake of social progress and in order to decrease tension. That policy encompasses the concept that in the nuclear age the only intelligent path is that of peaceful coexistence among nations with different social systems. It is the path of resolving disputes at the conference table. That path is objectively in the interest of the Soviet people, the people of the other socialist countries, and all of mankind. Playing an important role in that regard have been the effective negotiations between the Soviet Union and the U.S. in the spheres of intermediate nuclear weapons, the signing of agreements regarding the mutual reduction of armed forces and weapons in Europe, and the carrying out of other negotiations intended to eliminate the peril of nuclear war, and the arms race, and further the process of reducing international tension. Regrettably, because of the attitude of the U.S. those negotiations are making no progress, mainly because the U.S. government does not want to respond to the constructive proposals of the Soviet Union.

Our desire is to resolve disputes at the negotiating table, not on the field of battle. That is a true desire and not false love of peace. It certainly is not a sign of weakness. As we have many times declared very clearly, the Soviet Union has powerful means with which to defend its right to live and the rights of its friends and allies from any transgression by the aggressors. But peace based on mutual annihilation cannot attract us. Comrade L.I. Brezhnev declared on the podium of the 26th Congress of the CPSU that "Not engaging in war preparations and forcing nations to waste their material and spiritual wealth, but strengthening peace, is the path of the future."*

The peace program for the 1980's approved at the 26th Party Congress pointed out the way to escape from the rut in which many serious international problems are sinking more and more deeply. The above-mentioned constuctive proposals of the Soviet Union, expressed by comrade L.I. Brezhnev in a number of his speeches and in the appeal of the Supreme Soviet "To the national assemblies and people of the world" were creative developments of that program.

^{*}L.I. Brezhnev, "Follow Lenin's Path", Vol. 8, p 667 (Russian language version).

The letter from comrade L.I. Brezhnev to the Second Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly on disarmament had a major impact around the world. In that historic document the Soviet Union pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. That was an especially important step forward and mankind can justifiably expect responses from the other nuclear powers, especially the U.S. An explicit and clear-cut pledge on their part, as we have done, would have a real significance with regard to the complete prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

In making that proposal we are under no illusions and do not think that we will win the support and sympathy of the powers right away. We based our action on knowledge that the social strata would support and sympathize with our decision not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, thus forcing all nuclear powers to follow the example of the Soviet state. But at any rate those who would launch a preemptive nuclear strike or attain military superiority will have no ground on which to stand. Not strength but reason, and not a show of military force or the ferocity of militarism, but an equal and constructive dialogue, is the only way to successfully resolve international problems.

We are very much aware that the struggle to reduce tension and improve the world political atmosphere is extremely complicated and difficult and requires patience, determination, and clear goals. V.I. Lenin pointed out that "Anyone who thinks that bringing about peace is not difficult, that it is only necessary to be only superficially concerned with peace, or that the bourgeois class will present us with peace, is extremely naive."* By means of their friendship and solidarity the socialist countries will do all they can to lesson tension and improve the present situation. Our nerves are very steady, our courage will never be shaken, and we have sufficiently strong forces to stand firm for the cause of the peace and security of nations.

Of course, the Soviet Union, like all other fraternal socialist countries, will always base its policies on an examination of the actual situation of the current international scene. We cannot but take into consideration the threat posed by the imperialists and their lackeys to socialism and to peace in general, and we cannot carry out unilateral disarmament and weaken our self-defense capabilities, something the imperialists desire. While doing everything we can do to ensure international peace and security, we will always maintain the necessary level of national defense capability and maintain and strengthen the national defense potential of the Warsaw Pact and the militant solidarity of the socialist countries.

III

When carrying out the consolidation of the national defense capabilities of the Soviet state, the CPSU always observes Lenin's doctrine regarding the defense of the socialist homeland. The basic thoughts of that doctrine have been profoundly reflected and creatively developed in the Program of the CPSU, in the

^{*} V.I. Lenin, "Collected Works," Vol. 35, p 116 (Russian language version).

resolutions of the Party congresses, in the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee plenums, and in the works and speeches of comrade L.I. Brezhnev.

V.I. Lenin considered national defense and the military strength of a state in terms of the unity of political-social, economic, ideological, and purely military factors. He stressed that in war the victor will be the side with the most modern technology, good organization and discipline, much good machinery, larger food reserves, a larger manpower pool, and a stronger sense of responsibility toward the broad masses.

On the basis of the doctrine of V.I. Lenin, our Party has always believed that the social system and state of a country form the political-social basis of military development. The nature and functions of the armed forces, the system of manpower supplementation, training, and education of those forces, eve everyone's fighting will, and the over-all social nature of the military organization of a state depend above all on that social system.

In the capitalist countries the armed forces are among the principal tools used by the imperialist capitalists to maintain their ruling yoke and suppress the people in their contries so that they can take territory belonging to other countries, take over markets, and exploit other peoples. At the same time, they use the army to defend their economic-political system when attacked by stronger capitalist countries. The imperialist capitalists, controlling the state regime and using different forms as well as methods for affecting the consciousness of their soldiers, have transformed their armed forces into tools for defending class and national oppression and for serving militarism and reactionaryism, so they have become major threats to the peace and security of nations. In contrast to the armed forces of the capitalist countries, the socialist military organizations share the nature of the new system, the socialist system. Using wars of aggression as a means to resolve international disputes are foreign to them.

The developed socialism that has been created in the Soviet Union is a society of mature socialist social relationships, in which the convergence of all social classes and strata and the de jure and de facto equality of all ethnic peoples and class, and their fraternal cooperation, has created a new historical community of mankind: the Soviet people. Our society has reached a high level of organization and enlightenment of workers -- patriots and internationalists -- a true democracy that ensures the positive participation of all the people in the activities of the state. The leadership and guidance strength of Soviet society, and the nucleus of its political system and its state and social organizations lies in the Communist Party, a party which exists for the people and is loyal to the people.

The distinctive features of a developed socialist society -- its revolutionary and humanitarian nature -- like the reflection in a mirror are reflected in the military development of the Soviet state and in the nature, obligations, and status of its armed forces. The Constitution of the Soviet Union states clearly that the defense of the socialist homeland is the most important function of the state and an undertaking of all the people, that the Soviet armed forces were formed to defend the accomplishments of socialism, the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of

the Soviet Union. The obligations of the armed forces toward the people are to stoutly defend the socialist state and always be prepared to fight and immediately retaliate against all enemies.

The social nature and functions of the Soviet armed forces have determined the system of building forces and training and educating troops. Service in the armed forces is a glorious mission, and defense of the socialist homeland a sacred obligation, of all Soviet citizens. The task of training and troops is intended to train people who know how to effectively and consciously defend their homeland, and developing in them a strong fighting will, is a characterristic of each progressive social component and raises the the communist moral standards which are representative of the most humanistic morality in history.

The economic base of military development is the national production mode, i.e. the developmental level of the productive forces and the nature of the production relations. The higher the level of development of the productive forces and scientific-technical progress, the greater are the capabilities of the state to equip the army with modern weapons. By means of weapons and technical combat facilities the economy will affect the war-waging mode and tactics, campaign art, and strategy, and strategy, and by that means affect the organizational structure of the armed forces. In brief, the economy is the basis of the military strength of a nation, the foundation of military development, and the foremost factor determining the quantity and quality of the armed forces. But that is not all there is to it. The economic foundation of a society determines the production relations and the infrastructure, i.e. the policies and ideology, which have a decisive effect on the quality of man and many other aspects of military development, and are also dependent on the production relations.

The military development of the Soviet Union has been based on an economic system the foundation of which, as stated by the Constitution of the Soviet Union, is the system of the socialist ownership of the means of production in the form of state (social) ownership.

The economy of a developed socialist society is a unified national economy which encompasses all aspects of social production, including distribution and circulation, throughout the Soviet Union. The planned nature of the socialist economic system and its rich economic potential allow the victorious fulfillment, on a broad scale, of the missions of increasing the nation's national defense capabilities and providing everything needed by the army. The accomplishments of Soviet scientists in the spheres of physics, electronics, chemicals, and the other scientific fields, and the large-scale training of skilled young scientific cadres and specialists, have been directly reflected in the consolidation of the economic potential of the Soviet state and in the continual improvement of the armed forces.

The elimination of conflicting contradiction, along with the socialist ownership of the means of production, have allowed the state to mobilize its economic resources and reserve for national defense the means necessary to ensure national defense and joint action with the fraternal socialist to defend socialism and prevent the aggressors, no matter what their potential, from being able to carry out their intention of resolving the historical conflict between the two opposing systems by strength.

The theoretical-ideological basis of military development is the ideology of the ruling class and its system of viewpoints regarding war and the army. The bourgeois ideology reflects the private ownership right of the exploiting class, which tries to explain the permanency and unskakability of the capitalist system. Under the banner of opposition to the Soviet Union, it plots to rally the forces of reaction and aggression to prepare for a new world war, deceive the masses and lead them to the point of opposing the socialist countries, confuse class consciousness in the armies, and transforming them into tools for blindly carrying out the schemes of the imperialists. The imperialist ideologists all-out to explain that the capitalist armies were not created to commit aggression but to protect the interests of the working masses and preserve peace and justice.

The theoretical-ideological basis of the Soviet Union's national defense is the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, the Marxist-Leninist doctrine regarding war and the army, and the Communist Party's thought on the defense of the socialist homeland. The Marxist-Leninist ideology is a great source of inspiration. It inspires the Soviet people to devote themselves selflessly in labor and combat. Lenin taught that "In a war, ultimately depends on the state of morale of the masses who are shedding blood on the battlefield. Confidence in the just cause of the war and consciousness of the necessity of sacrificing their lives for the sake of their brothers are the factors which bolster the morale of the troops and enables them to endure the greatest difficulties ever."*

The great motive force of the Soviet social system and state, and the solid economic-social and political-morale foundations o the Soviet state ensure that the Soviet Union has a strong national defense capability and ensure the reliability of the continual development of the combat strength and combat readiness of the Soviet armed forces.

IV

In order to fulfill the requirements of the Program of the CPSU, the Constitution of the Soviet Union, and the resolutions of the congresses and plenums of the CPSU, and on the basis of the accomplishments of the national economy, science and technology, and culture during recent years, the Party has applied a whole series of measures to further strengthen the nation's defense and increase the fighting strength of the Army and Navy. In his report to the 26th Congress of the CPSU comrade L. I. Brezhnev stressed that "During the recent period there has not been a day during which the Party has not been concerned with strengthening the nation's defense and its armed forces."*

The Party bases its policy on the fact that the socialist system must cope with the increasing belligerence of imperialism by means of its unparalleled military strength. The true nature of our military policy is that everything should contribute to an effective defense, and that nothing could have a higher priority. The Soviet Union will never participate in the arms race. Everything that the Party and state are doing in the military sphere is intended to

^{*} L.I. Brezhnev, "Follow Lenin's Path," Vol. 8, p 710 (Russian language edition).

defend our country, and its friends and allies, from attacks by the reactionary imperialist forces and all aggression, no matter what its origin.

The just goals of the peace-loving foreign policy and military policy of the CPSU are reflected in the military doctrine of the Soviet state. That doctrine is a complete system of scienticically based principles and viewpoints regarding the nature of modern war, the war-waging modes, and the preparation of the nation and the armed forces to retaliate against the aggressors. The contents of Soviet military theory include all missions regarding the protection of the peaceful labor of Soviet citizens, and the protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Soviet Union and the security of the nations of the socialist community. With extremely clear viewpoints regarding that matter, in an interview in the magazine DER SPIGEL comrade L.I. Brezhnev emphasized that the Soviet Union "never threatens anyone and never intends to attack anyone. Our military doctrine is defensive in nature. It does not include preemptive wars or the "first strike" concept. Soviet military doctrine could not be otherwise. It is based on the socialist nature of the socialist system in our country."*

All of the defensive measures of the Soviet Union are merely actions in response to the war threat posed by the imperialist countries and measures to protect ourselves if we are attacked. Our state expends for defense the necessary amount to ensure the defense of socialism, no more and no less.

The plots to distort the defensive goals of Soviet military doctrine of the leaders of the NATO bloc and the other reactionary groups are intended to attack the high degree of combat readiness of the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the positive, resolute nature of the measures and actions we are now utilizing.

The Soviet Union has never denied that it has powerful armed forces which are always in a state of readiness to fight to defend their country. The political report of the 26th Congress of the CPSU stressed that "The flexible combination of modern technical equipment with skilful war art and an unshakable fighting will is the military potential of the Soviet armed forces."**

While strictly honoring all international commitments, the Party and state of the Soviet Union always maintain the necessary level of combat readiness on the part of the army and navy. The Soviet armed forces of today possess the most terrible weapons and technical equipment.

Along with perfecting their modern technical equipment, the armed forces are continually raising their political-morale level and imposing their fighting ability and its organization and discipline. The members of the Soviet army and navy are people who are well-tempered ideologically, are absolutely loyal to the homeland and the people, and are strong-willed. They have completely mastered their modern weapons, are devoted to their work, and are ready to achieve exploits.

^{*} PRAVDA (Soviet Union), 3 November 1981.

^{**} Documents of the 26th Congress of the CPSU, p 66.

Taught love for the socialist state and socialist internationalism by the Party, the members of our armed forces respect and greatly enhance the heroic traditions of past generations.

Commenting on our servicemen of today, on the podium of the 26th Party Congress comrade L.I. Brezhnev stated that "Serving in the ranks of the defenders of the homeland of today are the children and grandchildren of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War. They have not undergone the severe challenges of their fathers and grandfathers. But they are very loyal to the heroic traditions of our army and people. When so required by the nation's security situation and the defense of peace, and when it is necessary to help the victims of aggression, in the eyes of the world the Soviet soldiers become selfless patriots and international warriors who are prepared to overcome all difficulties."*

As for the positiveness and resolution in action of the Soviet armed forces, our military doctrine is based on the laws of war and the principles of military art. It has a self-defense nature but can never have a passive nature. Soviet military doctrine regards positive, resolute action, including offensive action which uses all necessary forces and facilities, as one of the most effective means to retaliate against an attack by an enemy. Such actions are always taken for defensive purposes. They are fierce retaliatory strikes intended to smash the plots of the enemy and their attacks against our country. And it is certain that the Soviet armed forces will always maintain that active character.

Clearly realizing the ugly nature of the imperialist aggressor forces, our armed forces are positive, persistent, and steadfast in defending the accomplishments of socialism, and never hesitate to use all economic and national defense strengths to retaliate as resolutely as possible against enemy aggression.

As stated above, the self-defense nature of our military doctrine is reflected most clearly in the Soviet Union's unilateral pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. We do not have, and will never have, the intention of winning nuclear superiority, but are always prepared to limit nuclear arms and eventually completely prohibit them. Only when imperiled, especially when there is direct nuclear aggression against the Soviet state or its allies, will we be forced to carry out nuclear retaliation, which is only a last resort for self-defense.

However, aggressors must know that they cannot win victory by launching a nuclear surprise attack. It is necessary to remind those who approve of nuclear war of a severe warning: "Anyone who wants to start a nuclear war with hopes of winning vitory will only commit suicide. No matter how strong an aggressor, and no matter what means it uses to wage a nuclear war, it cannot attain its goal. Immediate punishment cannot be avoided."**

Furthermore, our pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons poses for us the objective requirement of continually improving the vigilance and combat readiness of the Soviet armed forces, systems for detecting nuclear weapons,

^{*} Documents of the 26th Congress of the CPSU, p 66.

^{**} PRAVDA (Soviet Union), 2 October 1981.

and command and communications facilities and organs, and of strengthening Soviet soldiers with regard to politics and morale. It is necessary to nullify the advantage of the element of surprise, so that the aggressors will have to abandon their plot of being the first to use nuclear weapons.

Along with the armies of the other socialist countries, the Soviet armed forces are fulfilling their historical mission of defending the accomplishments of socialism and protecting the peace and security of nations.

In stopping the imperialist aggressors and smashing their criminal plots against mankind, a very great role is played by the united armed forces of the Warsaw Pact, the military-political alliance of the European socialist countries. The Warsaw Pact and its united armed forces manifest in a comprehensive manner the Leninist principles regarding proletarian internationalism and socialism, including the harmonious combineation of the individual interests of the peoples and nations making up the Warsaw Pact, the socialist community in general, and the entire international communists' and workers' movement.

The Soviet Union and the other countries of the Warsaw Pact do not stint in helping the other socialist countries resist aggression in order to protect their independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. We continually support and assist the newly independent nations which are on the path of development and progress, including the strengthening of national defense in accordance with their requirements. The profound righteousness of that assistance has been distorted by the enemy propaganda organs. But despite the insidious plots of the enemy, everyone of good will all over the world are aware that the socialist countries are progressive in nature, serve the objectives of the freedom and security of nations, and meet the ardent aspirations of mankind.

The Communist Party and people of the Soviet Union and the members of the Soviet armed forces highly evaluate the friendship and cooperation that have united the Soviet Union and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Soviet-Vietnamese relations, which were consolidated and strengthened by the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, did not form spontaneously. Over the course of many years it has been built and developed by the communists, people, and soldiers of the two countries. The principal directions of cooperation between the two countries were delineated in the course of regular meetings comrade L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and comrade Le Duan, General Secretary of the Vietnam Communist Party. We are profoundly pleased when we see that there is a unity of principle in viewpoints regarding all major problems of the era. We are pleased that relations between the parties and people of the two countries have long enjoyed an atmosphere of sincerity and mutual respect and confidence in a spirit of comradeship. That is the firm, unskakable foundation of Soviet-Vietnamese friendship.

The armies of our two countries are advancing together in the unified fighting formation of the armed forces of the socialist community. The two armies continually assist each other in all spheres of life and work, exchange experiences regarding combat training and political-ideological education, and exchange

the results of military science and technology. The Soviet soldiers will always maintain and develop our close friendship and military cooperation.

The Soviet people fully understand the desire of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam that Southeast Asia -- which has been in turmoil because of decades of war -- become a region with solid peace and constructive cooperation among all countries in that region. Everyone is also aware that Soviet-Chinese relations will have a very great effect on the development of the situation in that region. When speaking of those relations in a speech at a reception for the delegation of the party and government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam led by comrade Truong Chinh, a member of the Political Bureau of the Vietnam Communist Party and chairman of the Council of State of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, comrade L.I. Brezhnev stressed that we and our Vietnamese comrades share a common view: "We want to build normal, neighborly relations with China and friendship with the Chinese people, and we will always fully adhere to that line. That is not an easy task, especially in view of the burdens of the past. but we believe that it can be fulfilled if it is begun calmly, without preconditions and on the basis of true, sincere mutual understanding. In all instances that will be on goal."*

The Soviet armed forces have traversed a long heroic route, have achieved many brilliant feats of arms, and are indestructible. The Soviet armed forces are extremely grateful to the CPSU. Uniting closely around the CPSU and its Central Committee, headed by comrace L.I. Bhreznev, the Soviet armed forces are absolutely loyal to the great ideals of the Party and fully meet their obligations set forth by the Constitution.

They have everything necessary to achieve those goals: the experienced leader-ship of the Party, our socialist social system, the material-technical bases of a developed socialist country, people who are loyal to communism and are well-trained, modern weapons, and advanced Soviet military art. The Soviet armed forces will commemorate the 65th anniversary of the great October Revolution and the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR by achieving new accomplishments in labor. They will always be loyal defenders of the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and a bastion of world peace.

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^{*} PRAVDA (Soviet Union), 6 October 1982